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This thesis examines the information content of earnings components conditional on the 
existence of misclassification of core earnings as transitory earnings in the income statement 
(often referred to as classification shifting), and how this misclassification is likely to induce a 
“hidden” core earnings element in reported transitory earnings. The thesis focuses on a major 
type of the misclassification of earnings line items, namely the transfer of negative core earnings 
(operating expenses and losses) to negative special items in order to increase net core earnings, 
while bottom-line earnings remain unaffected. The thesis comprises three empirical essays.  
In the first essay, we develop a vector autoregression (VAR) of a set of accounting information 
that includes, in addition to other accounting variables, two components of transitory earnings; a 
shifted core earnings component and a purified transitory earnings component. The model 
analysis derives two properties of shifted core earnings. First, shifted core earnings forecast 
future abnormal earnings similar to core earnings. Second, shifted core earnings provide a “bad 
news” signal of management incompetence. Using special items as an objective measure of 
transitory earnings, we develop an innovative approach to decompose special items into core and 
transitory components. Our empirical results support the former property of shifted core 
earnings, and show little evidence for the latter one. The model demonstrates how the properties 
of the transitory earnings components map into stock prices. However, we find empirically that 
stock prices do not fully reflect the heterogeneity between the two components of transitory 
earnings, but rather overstate the shifters‟ entire special items, which are mostly income 
decreasing items, as if they are all shifted core earnings.  
In the second essay, we investigate the manager‟s incentive to misclassify negative core earnings 
as negative special items, and the change in the composition of negative special items as a result 
of the misclassification. We find that large negative special items are increasing with the 
difference between reported core earnings in the prior period and expected core earnings in the 
current period. Extremely large negative special items are more likely associated with GAAP-
violation rather than allowable discretion within GAAP. We distinguish between two types of 
misclassification signals, an “informative” signal associated with steady improvements in 
negative special items predictability and a “noisy” signal associated with a pattern in earnings 
response coefficients (ERC) that is inconsistent with improvements in negative special items 
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predictability. We propose and find that the measures of negative special items predictability of 
future earnings go hand-in-hand with the extent of an informative signal based on the difference 
between reported core earnings in the prior period and expected core earnings in the current 
period. However, stock prices do not fully impound information in this identified informative 
signal, and react to a “noisy” reporting signal that is based on the level of earnings before special 
items in the income statement. 
In the third essay, we investigate whether analysts fully understand the nature and quality of 
negative special items when they adjust actual earnings and whether their future earnings 
forecast incorporates the actual persistence of negative special items components. We identify an 
alternative direct approach to measure the core and transitory elements of negative special items. 
We validate our measures by showing that the identified core component is more persistent and 
has very low asymmetric timeliness relative to the identified transitory component. We expand 
our decomposition of negative special items further in order to examine the nature of negative 
special items included in and excluded from street earnings. We find that the analysts‟ inclusion 
decision reflects analysts‟ expertise in processing information in special items. The analysts‟ 
treatment of negative special items does not lead to predictable forecast errors, consistent with 
analysts fully understanding the persistence of negative special items components. This result is 
robust to partitioning the sample between different disclosure and information environments and 
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Standard textbooks on financial statement analysis suggest the exclusion of special items 
when forecasting future earnings. This is because special items have significantly lower 
information content than core earnings. Recent research documents a substantial increase in the 
magnitude and persistence of negative special items, which is unjustified by corresponding 
changes in the business environment that could have resulted in recognizing shocks outside core 
earnings. This line of research proposes that the misclassification of negative core earnings 
(operating expenses and losses) as negative special items is the main factor behind the change in 
the special items reporting strategy over time. This implies that pooling economically different 
earnings components as being “special items”, when forecasting earnings, may result in loss of 
information. 
This thesis examines the information content of earnings components conditional on the 
existence of misclassification of core (recurring) earnings as transitory (nonrecurring) earnings in 
the income statement, and the extent to which this misclassification induces a “hidden” core 
earnings element in nonrecurring earnings. The thesis consists of a literature review chapter and 
three empirical chapters. Each empirical chapter investigates the phenomenon of 
misclassification of earnings from certain dimensions including forecasting, market valuation, 
managers‟ motives, and analysts‟ perceptions. Nevertheless, all empirical chapters are self-
contained, have different sample data, and can be read independently. 
Chapter two, Accounting Earnings Information Content and Market Valuation, reviews the 
literature on the information content of accounting earnings and the relation between accounting 
earnings and security prices. The chapter dedicates specific attention to the concept of transitory 
earnings and the use of special items as an objective measure of transitory earnings. 
Chapter three, Classification Shifting, Abnormal Earnings Dynamics, and Stock Valuation,  
develops a theoretical foundation for classification shifting and provides empirical evidence on 
the forecast and value relevance of (negative) core earnings that are shifted to negative special 
items. The study develops a vector autoregression (VAR) of a set of accounting variables that 
accommodates, besides other variables, two components of transitory earnings; a core 
component reflecting shifted core earnings and a transitory component reflecting purified 
transitory earnings. The model analysis derives two properties of shifted core earnings. Shifted 
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core earnings forecast future abnormal earnings similar to reported core earnings, and shifted 
core earnings provide a “bad news “signal of management incompetence. Using special items as 
a measure of a transitory line item that is potentially contaminated by shifted earnings, we 
provide empirical evidence in support of the former. We propose and find empirically that 
purified special items are transitory. Nevertheless, our evidence suggests that stock prices do not 
fully reflect the heterogeneity between the core and transitory components of special items, but 
rather overstate the entire amount of special items when shifting is suspected. 
Chapter four, On Negative Core Earnings Misclassification, investigates the motive behind 
the misclassification, the extent to which this misclassification represents a GAAP-violation or 
allowable management discretion, the structural change in negative special items in 
correspondence with the misclassification. We propose and find that the misclassification of 
negative core earnings as negative special items is a primary factor for large special items 
reporting. Extremely large negative special items are associated with a drop of expected core 
earnings in the current period in relation to reported core earnings in the prior period, after 
controlling for economic conditions, which is consistent with the manager striving to enhance 
core earnings by taking a misclassification decision. Our results reveal that the manager‟s 
misclassification strategy represents GAAP-violation rather than allowable management 
discretion. Decomposing negative special items into misclassified core earnings and real special 
items shows that the misclassified component is associated with subsequent financial 
restatements, and forecasts earnings as reported core earnings, but receives an ERC (earnings 
response coefficient) that is inconsistent with its forecasting ability. Further results reveal that 
stock prices react to information in a “noisy” reporting signal of misclassification. An 
“informative” signal of misclassification that is associated with an increase in the negative 
special items persistence, a convergence between negative special items persistence and core 
earnings persistence, and an improvement in the negative special items Shorrocks-Shapley value 
does not impact the ERC of negative special items accordingly. 
Chapter five, Do Analysts Fully Understand the Quality of Negative Special Items When 
Negative Core Earnings are Misclassified in the Income Statement?, investigates the analysts‟ 
adjustment of negative special items in arriving at street earnings. Analysts tracking services, 
such as IBES, report forms of “street earnings” that reflect the majority of analysts‟ decision on 
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the inclusions and exclusions of less persistent earnings items. Negative special items pose a 
complicated identification problem, because some negative special items represent unusual or 
infrequent events, and others are strategically reported by managers, which might lead to 
different implications for future earnings or cash flows. Research documents that the analysts‟ 
adjustment of negative special items is made on a firm-by-firm basis rather than on an item-by 
item basis, such that restructuring charges, for example, can be included in one firm and 
excluded from another firm in a given period, and this adjustment decision might change in the 
next period for the same firms. While this suggests that the analysts‟ decision might be based on 
some fundamental characteristics of the firm‟s special items that result in their inclusions in or 
exclusions from street earnings, very little is known about how analysts process information in 
negative special items. In this study, we identify new measures that capture core and transitory 
elements of negative special items. The measures pass validation tests. The identified core 
component is more persistent and has very low asymmetric timeliness, while the identified 
transitory component is less persistent and is highly asymmetrically timelier. The measures 
resemble the adjustment process by analysts, because they identify the components at the firm-
year level. Extending this to negative special items included in and excluded from street earnings 
yield further extended decompositions. We document that analysts are aware of the underlying 
compositions of negative special items and the motivations and circumstances behind negative 
special items reporting by the firm. Additionally, the analysts‟ adjusted negative special items 
components are not associated with future analysts forecast errors. This latter result is robust to 
partitions of sample between different disclosure and information environments, or adding 















Chapter 2: Accounting Earnings 





As a prelude to the research main theme, this chapter reviews related literature in market 
based accounting research (MBAR). It discusses the information content of accounting variables, 
with a focus on accounting earnings, and the relation between accounting numbers and security 
prices. The chapter devotes particular attention to the concept of transitory earnings and the use 
of special items as an objective measure of transitory earnings. 
In their seminal papers, Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) provide empirical 
evidence of the information content of accounting earnings numbers. Their research spawned     
a considerable body of accounting research that examines the relation between accounting 
numbers and security prices. Ohlson (1979) classifies this line of research into three broad 
categories: the valuation of equity, the association of unexpected earnings and unexpected 
returns, and the forecasting of future returns. Although the findings in Ball and Brown and 
Beaver create a broad area of accounting research that investigates different dimensions of the 
return-earnings relation, after two decades of research, Lev (1989) notes that the contribution of 
earnings towards security prices or returns forecast is still limited. This is because the return-
earnings relation does not operate in a vacuum, and is being affected by other factors such as 
noisiness in earnings and market inefficiency.     
The informational perspective of accounting numbers implies that accounting earnings are 
primitives that signal information to the market. In order for accounting numbers to be value 
relevant variables, they should map explicitly into equilibrium market prices. This valuation 
perspective views accounting numbers as economic variables, rather than merely signals, which 
infer the firm‟s equity value.  Determining the extent of information contained in accounting 
earnings or their different components, and their implications for future earnings forecast, is an 
integral part of the valuation process. This is because valuation centers on the earnings 
forecasting process. Therefore, understanding the evolution of different components of earnings 
assists in understanding how these components are valued by the market. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the informational 
perspective of accounting numbers and the earnings response coefficient. Section 2.3 reviews the 
main research on the times series of accounting earnings, and section 2.4 reviews abnormal 
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earnings dynamics and valuation models. Section 2.5 presents the concept of transitory earnings. 
Section 2.6 reviews research on special items. It defines special items, discusses the increasing 
magnitude of special items reporting, assesses the use of special items to measure transitory 
earnings, and discusses the manager‟s misuse of negative special items to hide core recurring 
losses. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.  
2. Information Content and Value Relevance of Accounting Numbers 
2.1 Information Content Defined 
Information is generally defined as the portion of available data that is useful for a certain 
purpose (Taylor 1979), or a change in expectations about possible outcomes of a particular event 
(Theil 1967). Announcement of accounting data such as the release of an earnings report and 
dividends declaration are said to have information content, should they change expectations 
about a particular event to a revised probability distribution of possible states (Taylor 1979, 
Beaver 1968). If the market is efficient, in the sense that it reflects quickly newly arrived 
information, a change in security prices around the accounting event date suggests that the 
accounting numbers release conveys information that alters the market prior expectations about 
future cash flows. Hence, accounting information about a particular firm manifests itself by a 
change in its security return (Ball and Brown 1968, Foster 1981 and Kothari 2001).  This 
information perspective suggests that accounting numbers (e.g. annual earnings) act as signals 
and primitives that convey information. The market uses the information contained in the 
accounting signals to infer the inputs of valuations models (e.g. discounted cash flows) (Watts 
and Zimmerman 1990, Penman 1983).  
Taylor (1979) describes a framework in which the release of an accounting number has 
information content. Assuming a particular accounting event as the only signal at the current 
period, the information content of an accounting event is implied from an inequality between the 
probability distribution of possible states of a particular object of interest (e.g. expected future 
earnings or cash flows) conditional upon available information prior to an accounting event and 
the corresponding distribution conditional upon an expanded set of information that includes the 
accounting event. This can be written as: 
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If the market is efficient in its semi-strong form, where security prices reflect all publicly 
available information, the inequality in equation (1) can also be expressed in terms of security 
prices (Fama 1976), as follows: 
  |t t tP E P   (3) 
where tP  is an efficient price that incorporates all available information  ,St t   
Equation (1) and equation (3) indicate that an accounting event has information content, if it 
results in revised expectations of profitability, for example, which is reflected in price change. 
An operational framework that illustrates how an accounting event contains information and 
signals that alter expectations and assessments of a particular event is presented in Figure (1). 
The informational perspective of accounting events views accounting numbers as signals or 
primitives that change the market expectations. A step further suggests that accounting numbers 
are economic variables explicitly relate to value (i.e. value relevant) rather than merely signals of 
information, if they properly map into a valuation model (Beaver et al. 1980, Ohlson 1995, 
Ohlson 1999, Feltham and Ohlson 1995). In this sense, one can view the accounting signal as an 
accounting variable tX  that is value relevant if it satisfies the following valuation function: 




tX  is an accounting variable at time t,   is the valuation coefficient of the accounting 
variable, and 
t  is Other information at time t. 
Equation (4) implies that, in order for an accounting variable to be value relevant, one needs 
to specify a function that relates equity value from the concept of the underlying accounting 
variable.  
2.2 The Information Content of Accounting Earnings 
 
Positive economics theory, efficient market hypothesis and Fama et al.‟s (1969) event study 
are the impetus to Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) seminal papers that spawned a 
stream of market based accounting research (MBAR). Doubts on the information content of 
accounting numbers motivate Ball and Brown and Beaver to empirically investigate whether 
published accounting numbers convey information to the market (Kothari 2001).  
Building on concurrent capital market theory that suggests capital market efficiency and 
price adjustment to newly arrived information, hence stock price changes infer the flow of 
information to the market; Ball and Brown (1968) provide empirical evidence of a significantly 
positive correlation between the sign of abnormal return in the month of an earnings 
announcement and the sign of income number change from the preceding year. Their evidence 
reveals the usefulness of information contained in accounting income numbers, because the 
market reacts in the same direction as unexpected income. To this end, earnings are separated 
into two components; expected and unexpected earnings using two earnings expectation models: 
a regression model and a naïve forecasting model (a simple random walk model). Stock returns 
are also divided into normal and abnormal components. If a negative (positive) earnings forecast 
error, defined as bad news (good news), results in a firm‟s stock return being lower (higher) than 
expected, earnings numbers are alleged to convey information to the market.   
Beaver (1968) obviates the need to specify an earnings expectation model via using two 
information content measures; price and volume test. A price test targets the overall change in 
the market expectations, while a volume test concerns with the expectations of individual 
investors.  Beaver‟s (1968) notion is that an earnings announcement period is likely to have 
greater price volatility (price test) and higher trading volume (volume test) than other periods, 
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because earnings convey information to the market. His empirical findings support the 
informational contention of accounting earnings numbers.  
Though Ball and Brown (1968) evidence suggests that earnings contain much of the firm‟s 
information; most of this information is expected by the market before issuing the annual report 
by other information sources such as interim reports and dividends announcements. Therefore, 
more information in annual reports is supplied by alternative sources that make annual reports 
release not a timely source of information. Foster (1981) provides evidence of other competing 
sources of information, and documents that the release of annual reports of other firms is a part 
of the information set that affects the stock prices of firms in the same industry.  
The evidence that other competing information sources preempt annual earnings release is 
consistent with the notion that longer reporting lag to the date of earnings release is associated 
with less stock return variability because investors seek for substitute sources of information 
perhaps by other firms‟ earnings releases in the same industry as suggested by Foster (1981). 
Nevertheless, Chambers and Penman‟s (1984) empirical evidence on the relation between the 
reporting lag and stock price reaction doesn‟t support this prediction. Defining timeliness as the 
period between the end of the fiscal year and the issuance of report, they provide evidence of 
insignificant relation between the variability of stock returns associated with interim and annual 
reports and the timeliness of the report. Their analysis is conducted on interim and annual 
earnings announcements of 100 firms from New York Stock Exchange and covers the period 
1970-76. In this sense, accounting earnings do convey information to the market that is not 
supplied by other sources, despite the reporting time lag.  
Landsman and Maydew (2001) replicate the Beaver‟s (1968) study to examine the 
informativeness of quarterly earnings over the period 1972-98.  Using a sample of 90,000 firm-
quarters, their evidence reveals an increase over time in the information content of quarterly 
earnings. 
2.3 The Return Earnings Relation and the Earnings Response Coefficient 
 
Given that accounting income numbers have information content, Kormendi and Lipe (1987) 
examine another dimension to this information and its linkage with equity valuation. They focus 
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on whether the magnitude of the relation between unexpected earnings and security returns 
relates to the time series properties of earnings (persistence), considering its valuation 
implication. In this context, an earnings response is defined by Collins and Kothari (1989) as the 
degree of the co-movement between stock returns and shocks to an earnings series without 
implying that the latter causes the former. It is a statistical measure of the strength of the market 
reaction to a dollar of unexpected earnings (Feltham and Pae 2000). The earnings response 
coefficient is therefore expressed mathematically as follows: 
 0 1t t tRET UE      (5) 
where tRET  is risk adjusted return, 1  is the earnings response coefficient (ERC), and tUE  is 
unexpected earnings.  
Equation (5) indicates that one can infer the information content of earnings based on the 
significance of the ERC and the explanatory power 
2R  of the model. The return earnings model 
is estimated using cross section and time series analyses in event or association studies.  
Kothari (2001) distinguishes between both types of studies. An “event” study examines 
whether an accounting event, such as earnings announcement, has information content revealed 
by changes in stock return and trading volume over a short period of time around the accounting 
event. The focus of this type of studies is on testing whether earnings convey information to the 
market that revises its expectations of future cash flows and therefore leads to a change in stock 
returns. Early examples of event studies include Ball and Brown (1968), Ball and Kothari (1991) 
and Vincent (1999). An “association” study tests for the positive correlation between accounting 
numbers and stock returns over a long period of time. In essence, it investigates whether 
accounting earnings measures capture changes in information set reflected in stock prices, 
without inferring causality between accounting information and stock price change. Ball and 
Brown (1986) conduct both event and association studies, other examples of association studies 
include Collins and Kothari (1989), Easton et al. (1992) and Dechow (1994).  
Relaxing the assumption that ERC is cross-sectionally and temporally constant, Collins and 
Kothari (1989) investigate four temporal and cross-sectional effects on estimated ERC, namely; 
risk free rate of return, earnings persistence, systematic risk and growth opportunities not 
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captured by persistence. Consistent with their modeling, their empirical evidence reveals that 
ERC varies positively with persistence and growth and inversely with interest rates and 
systematic risk. This indicates that ERC depends not only on persistence as in Kormendi and 
Lipe (1987), but also on other information such as risk, return and growth opportunities.  
Using a book value model and an earnings model, and assuming clean surplus and Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) dividends irrelevance proposition, Easton and Harris (1991) show an 
association between stock returns and both the level and change of earnings each scaled by 
lagged price, such that: 
       1 1 1/  / 1 /t t t t t t t tP DV P E P E P             (6) 
where tDV  is dividends,   is the earnings valuation coefficient in a simple regression of price 
on earnings, and   is the weight coefficient.  
Using a sample of firms during the period 1969 to 1986, Easton and Harris (1991) provide 
empirical evidence that both earnings level and earnings change deflated by lagged price are 
relevant for explaining returns. Moreover, the two independent variables are complements rather 
than substitutes, because when both variables are considered together, more security return 
variations are explained. 
Ali and Zarowin (1992) support the evidence in Easton and Harris (1991) and argue that the 
earning level variable enters the return earnings association because of the presence of transitory 
components in annual earnings. In this sense, the earnings level variable is an additional proxy 
for unexpected earnings when prior period earnings include a transitory component. Their 
empirical evidence reveals that the explanatory power of the return earnings regression increases 
with the inclusion of earnings level as an explanatory variable and the presence of transitory 
components in prior period earning.  
2.4 The Information Contained in Earnings Components: Does Earnings Decomposition 
Provide Additional Information? 
 
Kothari (2001) reports that one reason for research on the properties of earnings components 
is to examine whether earnings components possess additional information than aggregate 
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earnings. Results in Ball and Brown (1968), Beaver and Dukes (1972), Gheyara and Boatsman 
(1980), Ro (1980), Rayburn (1986), Lipe (1986), Wilson (1986), Clubb (1995) and Cheng and 
Yang (2003) among others are mixed. The conclusion is that some components of earnings have 
more information content while others do not. 
Lipe (1986) investigates the incremental informativeness of a set of earnings components -
gross profit, general and administrative expense, depreciation expense, interest expense, income 
taxes and other items- beyond aggregate earnings in association with security returns. The 
analysis in Lipe (1986) extends Kormendi and Lipe (1987) to test for return reaction to the 
earnings components shocks. In a sample of 81 firms for the period 1947 to 1980, the evidence 
reveals that the earnings components innovations are positively related to the earnings 
components persistence, which implies that the market reacts differently to earnings components 
based on their time series properties.  
Wilson (1986) tests for the information content of two components of earnings: accruals and 
cash from operations and two accrual variables: current accruals and long term accruals. 
Defining current accruals as cash flow from operations less working capital and long term 
accruals as working capital from operations less earnings, he finds evidence consistent with total 
accrual and cash components having additional information content beyond aggregate earnings. 
In addition, total accruals are more informative than cash, and current accruals possess 
information while long term accruals do not. Rayburn (1986) tends to support the evidence in 
Wilson (1986).  
Using a UK sample of 48 companies for the period 1955 to 1984, Clubb (1995) investigates 
the relative information content of cash flow and earnings. The evidence suggests that earnings 
numbers are superior to cash flow numbers in association with stock returns. In addition, 
unexpected working capital from operations and unexpected long term accruals have incremental 
information content beyond operating, investment and financing cash flows. Clubb (1995) 
ascribes his findings to the behaviour of the UK market that reacts to current and noncurrent 
accruals as if they provide additional information not obtained by cash flow data.   
In contrast, using a sample of 324 firms for the period 1971-81, Bowen et al. (1986) 
investigate whether accrual earnings vis-a-vis a range of cash flow measures have information 
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content with respect to future cash flows. Their evidence reveals that earnings numbers do not 
outperform cash flow numbers in forecasting future cash flows.  
3. The Time Series of Accounting Earnings Numbers 
3.1 The Time Series Properties of Annual and Quarterly Earnings 
 
The Ball–Brown analysis (1968) motivates interest in forecasting accounting income 
numbers. Their rationale to relate unexpected returns to unexpected earnings, in order to test for 
the information content of earnings, requires expectations of accounting earnings, which can be 
derived via time series models. Hopwood and Newbold (1980) argue that another concern of 
accounting research in time series-forecasting models for accounting earnings is assessing the 
possibility that managers use discretion to smooth earnings. The intuition is that if a change in 
accounting practice brings reported earnings closer to a target earnings number that was 
previously determined using a time series-forecasting model, managers are deemed to smooth 
earnings. Additionally, accounting numbers-forecasts using time series analysis is to some extent 
problematic in the sense that accounting filters out qualitative or non-accounting events and 
aggregates economic events to record the “bottom line” earnings (Bao et al. 1983).  
Early attempts in applying time series analysis to forecast accounting earnings arbitrarily 
select a time series model that visualizes the income-generating process of firms. Dopuch and 
Watts (1972) are the first to employ the Box-Jenkins (1970) technique in accounting research
1
. 
The Box-Jenkins (1970) approach to modeling ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving 
average) tends to select a time-series model that best fits a firm-generating process, in order to 
improve forecasts. ARIMA models can be used for both quarterly and annual data (Hopwood 
and Newbold 1980).    
Bao et al. (1983) argue that the Box-Jenkins approach using ARIMA models provides a more 
powerful methodological approach than other models. Other evidence suggests that a fitted Box-
Jenkins model performs no better than the best random walk model on the annual earnings series 
                                                 
1
 The Box-Jenkins approach to modeling ARIMA ( Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average) processes in order to 
make forecasts includes identifying an appropriate ARIMA process, estimating parameters and testing the model 
assumptions. [ see Box and Jenkins 1970 ] 
24 
 
(See Albrecht et al. 1980 and watts and Leftwich 1977). Moreover, a parsimonious Box-Jenkins 
model for quarterly earnings performs as well as a more-detailed Box-Jenkins model (Foster 
1977). 
Time series studies in accounting analyze either quarterly earnings (Foster 1977, Giffins 
1977, Brown and Rozeff 1979) or annual earnings (Ball and Watts 1972, Beaver 1970, Dopuch 
and Watts 1972, Watts and Leftwich 1977 and Albrecht et al. 1977). Foster (1977) performs a 
study that is similar to Ball and Brown (1986), however he uses quarterly earnings and daily 
returns. He finds that the sign of unexpected quarterly earnings change is significantly associated 
with the sign of a firm risk adjusted return in the 60 trading days up to the announcement date of 
each quarter. Kothari (2001) lists four reasons for interest in quarterly earnings forecast. First, 
the seasonality of quarterly earnings which is due to the seasonal nature of most business 
activities. Second, quarterly earnings are timelier than annual earnings. Third, quarterly earnings 
are more powerful in testing market efficiency. Forth, the abundance of quarterly earnings 
observations compared to annual earnings. Hopwood et al. (1982) compare the additional 
information contained in quarterly as opposed to annual earnings. Using univariate time-series 
models and both quarterly and annual earnings streams to predict one year ahead earnings, they 
provide evidence of information loss in annual earnings which are inferred from the previous 
annual earnings figure. More specifically, the prediction error variance from annual earnings is 
15-21 % higher than that from quarterly earnings. This implies that the ARIMA quarterly 
earnings time series models can be used to improve the forecasting accuracy of annual earnings. 
In a comparison with analysts‟ forecast, Brown and Rozeff (1978) are the first to find 
evidence of analysts‟ forecasts superiority relative to time series models on quarterly earnings 
figures. Brown et al. (1987) support the evidence in Brown and Rozeff (1978), and relate it to 
contemporaneous and timing advantages. Conroy and Harris (1987) show that a combination of 
both time series and analysts‟ forecasts produces more predictive ability. 
3.2 The Joint Time Series of Accounting Variables:  Markovian Linear Information 
Dynamics systems 
 
Ohlson (1979) is an early attempt to construct a linear information dynamics framework for 
decision variables. Ohlson‟s (1979) original Markovian dynamics system is a linear 
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autoregressive model that includes all relevant decision variables, including accounting earnings 
and dividends at time t, that affect investors‟ expectations about future realizations of these 
variables and stock prices. Though its originality in Ohlson (1979), the dynamics system in 
Garman and Ohlson (1980) is a more general description of information that maps into stock 
prices. The information set includes variables that are intuitively fundamental in valuation as 
accounting earnings and dividends.  
The linear information dynamics in Ohlson (1979), Garman and Ohlson (1980) and Ohlson 
(1989a) generally take the following form 
 1 1 t t tz z     (7) 
The vector tz  
contains variables that determine the value of the firm and   contains 
parameters of the linear information dynamics. In this setting, the value of equity can be 
determined as a function of the information contained in the state variable tz  such that: 
 ( )t tV V z  (8) 
Ohlson (1989a) utilizes the Markovian specification analyzed by Garman and Ohlson (1980), 
however state variables are identified and restrictions are imposed on the evolution of accounting 
variables in order to yield more parsimonious dynamics. More specifically, the information 
environment considers three variables: earnings tE , book value of equity tBV , and net 
dividends tDV ,  I.e.  , ,t t t tz E BV DV . Given this definition of tz , the linear information 
dynamics system can be written out in full as: 
 1 11 12 13 1t t t t tE E BV DV         (9) 
 1 21 22 23 1t t t t tBV E BV DV         (10) 
 1 31 32 33 1t t t t tDV E BV DV         (11) 
The parameters in   represent either the degree of persistence of each accounting variable 
or the contribution of variables towards predicting a specific accounting variable. More 
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specifically, the parameters 
11 , 22 , 33  represent the degree of persistence of earnings, book 
value and dividends, respectively. Other parameters, e.g. 
12  represents the effect of current 
book value on one year-ahead earnings. Ohlson (1989a) demonstrates that tz  can be also 
extended to include other non-accounting information, 
t , hence  , , ,t t t t tz E BV DV   becomes 
a four dimensional state. The implication of this extension of the state variable is that a closed 
form- valuation model that solves for the dynamics system will include other information as one 
determinant of the market value of equity. 
Ohlson (1989a) indicates a powerful property of the dynamics system presented in equations 
(9) to (11) in deriving an abnormal earnings dynamics equation. He develops the following 
abnormal earnings dynamic: 
  1 1 2 1 3 1at f t t t tE R BV BV DV           (12) 
where  
a
tE  denotes abnormal earnings and is equal to  1 1 1at t fE E R    , 1 3fR   , 
2 3fR    and 3 11 13    . This can also be simplified to an AR(1) process of abnormal 
earnings: 
 1 3 1
a a
t t tE E     (13) 
The dynamic given by (12) indicates the predictive ability of accounting variables for one 
period ahead abnormal earnings. Equation (12) is an autoregressive process of the first order, 
AR (1), for abnormal earnings. The analysis in Ohlson (1989a) leads to a more advanced 
valuation theory in Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995).  
4. The Abnormal Earnings Dynamics and Closed Form-Valuation Models 
4.1 Theoretical Perspective 
The use of abnormal earnings dynamics is common in theoretical work that focuses on 
developing accounting based valuation models and highlighting related accounting attributes 
(e.g. persistence, conservatism and attributes of earnings components). The assumption of the 
abnormal earnings evolution feeds through into the derived valuation equation. Parsimonious 
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abnormal earnings dynamics that exclude a structure for book value results in unbiased 
accounting valuation models (Ohlson 1995). This implies that book value of assets is properly 
measured in the accounting system and has no effect on forecasting future abnormal earnings 
(Lundholm 1995).  
If the abnormal earnings dynamics formula includes a book value structure, this implies that       
a conservative accounting system understates book value and a positive coefficient attached to 
the book value in the dynamic adjusts for the undervaluation. The positive book value coefficient 
ensures an upward correction in forecasting future profitability. A resulting valuation model in 
this sense permits unconditional conservatism to manifest itself by a valuation parameter 
attached to book value in the valuation function which also articulates with the book value 
forecasting parameter in the abnormal earnings dynamics (Feltham & Ohlson 1995).  More 
intervention in the linear abnormal earnings dynamic, via including both book value and 
dividends, is also found to proxy for additional conservatism (Clubb 2013). 
The time series behaviour of abnormal earnings in Ohlson (1995) is given via two equations: 
 1 1 1
a a
t t t tE E       (14) 
 1 2 1         t t t       (15) 
where t  is current other  information that is not captured by accounting,   is the persistence 
parameter of abnormal earnings  0 1  , and   is the persistence parameter of the other 
information  0 1  .  
The recursive system of abnormal earnings in Ohlson (1995) is an autoregressive process for 
both abnormal earnings and non-accounting information. The existence of t  in the abnormal 
earnings dynamic implies that other information is an additive shock to next period abnormal 
earnings. The absence of 
a
tE  in the dynamic of other information ensures that next period non-
accounting information depends on current non-accounting information not abnormal earnings. 
The process shows that t  summarizes events that have not yet affected current book value and 
accounting earnings (or abnormal earnings), but it must flow through future abnormal earnings. 
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This captures the lack of timeliness in accounting numbers (Pope 2010). To elaborate on this 
point, assume a firm signs a contract in the period t (other information, 
t ). The abnormal 
earnings dynamic in equation (14) implies that this bears upon next period abnormal earnings
1
a
tE  . This is because relevant non-accounting information turns to earnings in the future 
(Lundholm 1995). 
In order to derive a closed form-valuation model, Ohlson (1995) overlays the assumed 
abnormal earnings dynamic on an abnormal earnings valuation model that measures the value of 
equity as the sum of book value and discounted future abnormal earnings.  
The Ohlson (1995) model is given by: 
 1 2
a
t t t tV BV E      (16) 
where  1 / 0fR     , and    2 / 0f f fR R R       
The valuation model can be equivalently expressed in terms of normal rather than abnormal 
earnings such that: 
     21t t t t tV E DV BV          (17) 
where    1 /f fR R     , and 0 1  ,  / 1f fR R    is an earnings multiplier 
The Ohlson model in equation (17) indicates that the value of the firm is the sum of a 
weighted average of an earnings model and a book value model plus other information not yet 
reflected in earnings or book value.   determines the weight placed on each accounting based 
model. Therefore the lower bound of   places all weight on the book value of the firm and the 
higher bound places all weight on a multiple of current earnings less current dividends.  
The assumption that abnormal earnings may converge to zero over time suggests that the 
dynamic does not accommodate positive net present value (NPV) project opportunities. In other 
words, the dynamics implicitly imply that firms cannot on average earn in excess of the cost of 
capital and all expected NPV projects must equal to zero (Lo and Lys 2000). Nevertheless, 
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Ohlson (2003) argues that the Ohlson (1995) model “allows for positive abnormal earnings, on 
average, given appropriate parameterization”. A solution to this drawback, if any, is also 
obtained by the inclusion of a book value structure in the abnormal earnings dynamic to allow 
for accounting conservatism, because conservatism results in unrecorded goodwill that may 
reflect expected future positive NPV projects (Feltham and Ohlson 1995). 
4.2 Empirical Evidence 
While the autoregressive time series of abnormal earnings is intuitively appealing, there is no 
economic theory to suggest that the evolution of abnormal earnings over time approximates an 
AR (1) process for all firms over all time periods. Empirically,“ any one-size-fits-all description 
of the evolution of future cash flows or earnings for a sample of firms is likely to be rejected” 
(Kothari 2001). Nonetheless, some empirical results still generally support some aspects in the 
linear information dynamics system (Dechow et al. 1999 and Barth et al. 1999).  
In their direct test of the Ohlson‟s (1995) linear information dynamics, Dechow et al. (1999) 
employ a pooled time series and cross sectional regression analysis for a sample of 50,133 
annual observations over the period 1976−1999, in order to investigate whether the persistence 
parameter of abnormal earnings   differs from its extreme bounds as suggested by Ohlson 
(1995), the optimal lag length of the autoregressive process, and the constraints placed on the 
abnormal earnings dynamic. The results reveal that   = 0.62 with a t-statistic of 138.31. The 
effect of including more abnormal earnings lags in the abnormal earnings dynamic is minor; 
though a second order term is statistically significant. Therefore a first order autoregressive 
process is empirically appealing and approximates the abnormal earnings pattern. When book 
value is added to the abnormal earnings dynamic, the coefficient on abnormal earnings declines, 
and the coefficient on book value is significantly negative. Though the negative coefficient on 
book value is suggested as a manifestation of aggressive accounting by Feltham and Ohlson 
(1995), Dechow et al. (1999) argue the Feltham and Ohlson‟s (1995) specification is 
unsatisfactory.  
Dechow et al. (1999) examine also the autoregressive process of other information t . Using 
other information derived from analysts‟ forecasts as a proxy of  t , their evidence shows that 
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the autoregressive coefficient of other information is significantly different from 0 and 1 (    
0.32 with a  -statistic of 57.94). Nevertheless, results show that the information dynamics 
contribution to valuation is modest and outperformed by utilizing a simple valuation model that 
capitalizes analysts‟ earnings forecasts in perpetuity. Further tests attribute this result to an 
investor behavior effect that overweights (underweights) information in analysts‟ earnings 
forecasts (current earnings and book value).   
Thought the evidence in Dechow et al. (1999) broadly supports the system of dynamics, the 
results are relatively disappointing with respect to explaining contemporaneous stock prices 
(assuming that stock price is a proxy for equity value). Results indicate that the valuation model 
tends to undervalue equity relative to the market price.  
Using UK data, O‟Hanlon (1995) provides evidence in support of a zero mean autoregressive 
process rather than the best fit ARIMA model as an approximation of how the market weights 
earnings variables. One interpretation underlying his results is that” the market may behave as 
though residual income is generated by a zero mean autoregressive process even though it is 
not”. Callen and Morel (2001) extend the one-period lagged-abnormal earnings dynamic in 
Ohlson (1995) to a two period-autoregressive process
2
. Their intuition is that an AR (2) process 
is assumed to incorporate more time series paradigms than if it is single lagged. Therefore, an 
AR (2) closed form-valuation model is expected to yield higher predictions of market prices. 
Using a sample of 19,789 firm-years from the period 1962 to 1996, Callen and Morel find that 
both AR (1) and (2) models provide poor estimates of stock prices. In addition, although book 
values underestimate market values, they approximate market values better than the estimated 
equity values of the Ohlson model, regardless of the lag structure imposed on the abnormal 
earnings dynamic. One explanation of their result is that the Ohlson model is mis-specified. 
Callen and Segal (2005) argue that the limited empirical validity of the Ohlson (1995) model 
is probably due to the fact that accounting is biased. Hence, adjusting for biases in accounting is 
expected to improve the empirical results. Nevertheless, Myers (1999) tests the Feltham and 
Ohlson (1995) conservative valuation model, and the evidence indicates that the conservatism 
                                                 
2
 Note that the AR (1) abnormal earnings dynamic is theoretically similar to and derived from AR (1) dynamics of 
accounting variables (See Ohlson 1989a) 
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parameter in the Feltham and Ohlson‟s (1995) abnormal earnings dynamic is negative for 60% of 
firms in the sample, which contrasts with the model assumption. Moreover, Myers (1999) 
modifies the linear information dynamic system in a manner that allows for conservatism to 
manifest itself in two parameters; an income parameter and a book value parameter. His intuition 
is that, while Feltham and Ohlson (1995) suggest that a book value parameter approximates the 
effect of conservatism on future abnormal earnings (due to understatement of assets), the clean 
surplus identity ensures that understatement of assets is linked to either overstatement of 
expenses or understatement of revenues. Therefore, including an additional structure to control 
for the conservatism income effect is also essential. The evidence shows that neither the Myers‟ 
modifications nor the Ohlson‟s (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson‟s (1995) dynamics capture 
aspects of the market valuation process.  
Barth et al. (2005) utilize the Feltham and Ohlson framework to test whether earnings 
disaggregation, dynamics system imposition and by-industry estimation aid in predicting out-of-
sample current equity values. They construct three valuation models along with a specific system 
of linear information dynamics for each model. The first model includes aggregate earnings. The 
second model decomposes earnings into cash flows and accruals. The third model further 
decomposes accruals into change in receivables, change in inventory, change in payables and 
depreciation. Barth et al. (2005) perform prediction error tests across all models, impose the 
dynamics structure to constraint the valuation parameters, and compare prediction errors from 
pooled and industry samples for each dynamics system. Using a sample of 14, 128 firm-years 
over the period 1988 to 2001, their evidence reveals that both earnings disaggregation and 
prediction of valuation parameters on an industry-basis reduce prediction errors. In addition, 
imposing the dynamics structure yields significantly smaller prediction errors only in the pooled 
sample and not across industries.  
5. Transitory Earnings 
 
Transitory earnings have been defined as noise or garbling in reported earnings, which is 
likely to contribute to reducing the value relevance of earnings (See Graham and Dodd 1940, 
Collin et al. 1997, Easton et al. 2000). This is because reported (observable) earnings are equal to 
permanent earnings plus transitory earnings, which are both unobservable, and the intrinsic value 
of the firm is based on its long term permanent earnings. Therefore, a tendency to record more 
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transitory earnings is expected to decrease the value relevance of reported earnings. Evidence in 
Easton et al. (2000) reveals a reduction in the ERC when reported earnings include one-time 
earnings items that are generally transitory. Ohlson (1989b) demonstrates that when earnings are 
permanent, unexpected earnings are captured by earnings change, and when earnings are 
transitory, unexpected earnings are captured by earnings level. Since earnings contain both 
permanent and transitory components, unexpected earnings are a weighted average of both 
earnings change and level. Easton and Harris (1991) use both earnings change and earnings level 
as explanatory variables of returns, and attribute the loading of earnings level to the existence of 
transitory earnings in reported earnings. Evidence of presence of transitory earnings is also 
provided by Brooks and Buckmaster (1976), Ou and penman (1989) and Ali and Zarowin (1992) 
among others. In contrast to the view that accounting practices garble information about 
earnings, Ou and Penman (1989) provide evidence that accounting can provide information that 
filters out transience in earnings. In Ou and Penman (1989), transitory earnings are indeed value 
relevant aspects of the firm‟s operations rather than measurement error.  
Ohlson (1999) formally defines three attributes of transitory earnings. First, transitory 
earnings are unpredictable. Second, transitory earnings are irrelevant for forecasting future 
earnings. Third, transitory earnings are irrelevant for equity valuation. The analysis in Ohlson 
(1999) extends the Ohlson‟s (1995) information dynamics, by modeling transitory earnings in 
order to show the linkage among their three properties. Ohlson‟s (1999) generalized linear 
information dynamics system is given by: 
 1 11 12 2 1 1 1 
a a
t t t t tE E E          (18) 
 2 1 22 2 2 2 1           t t t tE E        (19) 
 1 3 1                       +t t t      (20)  
where 2tE  is an individual earnings component that is labeled as “transitory earnings” under 
specific circumstances, 12  is the incremental effect of 2tE  on forecasting one period ahead 
abnormal earnings, and 22  is the persistence parameter of 2tE .  
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 Using the triangular information structure in equations (18-20), Ohlson (1999) develops the 
following closed form-valuation model: 
 1 2 2
a
t t t t tV BV E E       (21) 
where  1 11 11/ fR    ,   2 12 11 22/f f fR R R      , and   depends on all parameters 
in the dynamics. 
The Ohlson‟s (1999) valuation model provides significant insights into the link between the 
two sides of informational relevance: forecasting and valuation relevance for a separate 
component of earnings. In this setting, Characterizing 2tE  as “transitory earnings” implies three 
restrictions on the dynamics and the valuation model: Non-predictive ability  22 0  , 
forecasting irrelevance  11 12 0   , and valuation irrelevance  1 2 0   . Ohlson (1999) 
further demonstrates that, any two restrictions imply the third, yet one restriction will not imply 
the other two. However, an earnings component 2tE  
that is unpredictable  22 0   can still be 
forecasting relevant  11 12 0    under very specific accounting conditions such as hedge 
accounting.  
Barth et al. (1999) utilize the linear information dynamics assumed by Ohlson (1999) to 
examine some properties of the accrual and cash flow components of earnings. Their evidence 
reveals that findings are generally consistent with their expectations about different attributes of 
both components. A favourable interpretation is that the Ohlson‟s (1999) specification of the 
time series behaviour of the individual earnings components is empirically descriptive.  
Landsman et al. (2011) employ Ohlson (1999) and Barth et al. (1999) to test forecasting and 
valuation properties of two components of dirty surplus earnings; dirty surplus and really dirty 
surplus. The former is a component of comprehensive earnings that is excluded from reported 
earnings, and the latter is a component of earnings that might arise when the firm issues or 
reacquires its own shares (e.g. conversion of bonds into common stocks). In general, dirty 
surplus earnings are viewed as transitory earnings with less persistent implications for future 
earnings. The evidence in Landsman et al. (2011) reveals that the dirty surplus component is 
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forecasting irrelevant and valuation irrelevant; and acts as a transitory earnings component as 
described by Ohlson (1999). However, really dirty surplus are forecasting irrelevant but 
valuation relevant. In addition, insignificant (significant) hedge returns are obtained when based 
on the dirty surplus component (really dirty surplus component). This match between the hedge 
return results and the Ohlson‟s (1999) forecasting and valuation link results validates the 
characterization of transitory earnings in this setting.   
In a recent paper, Ohlson (2014) differs from Ohlson (1999) in that transitory noise that is 
observable can contain some relevant information, but Ohlson (2014) stresses on the idea that the 
noise is not part of reported earnings. Ohlson (2014) argues that though permanent earnings are 
never observable regardless how reported earnings are modified, reported earnings can at best 
approximate permanent earnings. The focus on what accounting information can be used to 
forecast future earnings and update this forecast leads to whether special items, earnings 
decompositions, and earnings quality can play a role in equity valuation. 
6. Special Items and Transitory Earnings 
6.1 Special Items Gains and Losses 
Special items are unusual or infrequent earnings that are often reported as a separate 
component of income from continuing operations in the income statement. Special items are by 
definition less persistent than other operating income components. The presentation of special 
items on the income statement allow for managerial discretion in reporting special items as 
individual line items on the income statement with possibly discussions in the footnotes, or as an 
aggregate amount on the income statement with only discussions in the footnotes (Riedl and 
Srinivasan 2010).  
Though special items contain positive and negative components of earnings, negative special 
items are much more common than positive special items (Johnson et al. 2011). The 
preponderance of negative special items is attributed to the conservative nature of accounting 
that requires timely recognition of negative shocks to value (bad news). Therefore negative 
special items act as an account through which accounting conservatism is facilitated, which in 
turn contributes to the transience of negative special items (Callen et al. 2010). In contrast, 
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positive special items are less common, more difficult to interpret, and often part of broad 
restructuring transactions that have average negative effects (Elliot and Hanna 1996).  
Accounting for special items has been significantly changed over years. These changes affect 
the timing, measurement, and disclosure requirements for special items (Elliott and Hanna 1996 
and Johnson et al. 2011). Alciatore et al. (1998) provide a review of the standards that affect 
accounting for write downs, which are a major component of special items. As a brief summary, 
SFAS.5 requires an immediate write down of asset when it is probable that the asset is impaired 
and the impairment loss can be reasonably estimated. However, SFAS.5 does not provide 
specific guidelines and results in a wide range of practices employed by firms in accounting for 
write downs (Elliott and Hanna 1996). SFAS.121, SFAS.144 and SFAS.146 deal more 
specifically with special items, in order to minimize the inconsistency in practice, which resulted 
from previous standards. Afterwards, the change in regulations in the 2000s due to the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002 and Regulation G of 2003 appear to have some influence on the reporting of 
special items (Kolev et al. 2008 and Chen 2010).  
Literature documents a significant increase in the frequency of special items reporting. 
Johnson et al. (2011) report that the frequency of special items reporting increases from 22 
percent of all firms in year 1980 to 59 percent of all firms in year 2009. The significant increase 
in special items reporting is due to negative rather than positive special items. While the 
frequency of negative special items increases from 8 percent of all firms in year 1980 to 44 
percent in year 2009, positive special items reporting is 13 percent of all firms in year 1980 and 
increases only to 15 percent in year 2009. Riedl and Srinivasan (2010) show consistent results to 
Johnson et al. (2011) using a sample over the period 1978 to 2003. 
Frankel (2009) raises concerns in the substantial increase in negative special items reporting 
by firms. His perspective is that since there are no substantial changes to the business 
environment that justify the increasing magnitude and reporting frequency of negative special 
items over years, this casts doubts on the possibility of using negative special items as a tool to 
hide real recurring expenses that are part of the core operations of the firms.     
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6.2 Are Compustat Special Items a Reasonable Place to Identify Transitory Earnings? 
Compustat codes unusual or nonrecurring items as special items. The Compustat special 
items variable (annual data item SPI and quarterly data item SPIQ) includes a range of earnings 
items that result from one-time gains and losses, write offs, restructuring charges, among other 
earnings with less persistent nature. The Appendix includes the standard format of income 
statement in Compustat that shows the location of special items within other earnings line items. 
 According to Compustat, the following are examples of special items: 
1. Adjustments applicable to prior years (except recurring prior year income tax adjustments) 
2. After-tax adjustments to net income for the purchase portion of net income of partly pooled companies 
(when the adjustment is carried over to retained earnings) 
3. Any significant nonrecurring items 
4. Bad debt expense/Provisions for doubtful accounts/Allowance for losses if non-recurring 
5. Current year‟s results of discontinued operations and operations to be discontinued 
6. Flood, fire, and other natural disaster losses 
7. Gain/loss on extinguishment of debt 
8. Impairment of goodwill/unamortized intangibles 
9. Interest on tax settlements (when reported separately from other interest expense) 
10. Items specifically called “Restructuring/Reorganization”, “Special,” “Nonrecurring” or Core Earnings 
Specials regardless of the number of years they are reported 
11. Inventory write downs when separate line item or called non-recurring 
12. Nonrecurring profit or loss on the sale of assets, investments and securities, if the company has not 
adopted SFAS #115 
13. Profit or loss on the repurchase of debentures 
14. Purchased research and development 
15. Recovery of allowances for losses if original allowance was a special item 
16. Relocation and moving expense 
17. Reserve for litigation 
18. SFAS 133 related adjustments that the company calls „one-time‟ or „non-recurring 
19. Severance pay when a separate line item 
20. Special allowance for facilities under construction 
21. Transfers from reserves provided for in prior years 
22. Write-downs or write-offs of receivables and intangibles 
23. Year 2000 expenses regardless of the number of years they are reported 
 
Using a sample from Compustat between 2001−2009, Johnson et al. (2011) report that 39 
percent of negative special items are restructuring charges and write-offs, 25 percent are 
Goodwill impairments, and any other sub-type of negative special items does not represent more 
than 20% in their sample. With respect to positive special items, gains on disposal of assets are 
approximately 42 percent and litigation gains are 29 percent of all positive special items.  
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Though the Compustat‟s special items variable contains different subtypes of special items, 
they all have a common feature of being unusual items with less persistent implications for 
future earnings. The definition of special items in Compustat has been widely accepted as an 
objective measure of transitory earnings for the following reasons. First, Compustat‟s definition 
of special items is a reasonable definition of items with transitory implications for future 
earnings (Frankel 2009). Second, Compustat seems to filter earnings components searching for 
items that are on the income statement and its accompanying notes to identify properly the 
nonrecurring items (Burgstahler et al. 2002). Third, Compustat has no incentive to intentionally 
bias the measure of special items (Christensen et al. 2011). Fourth, Compustat identification of 
special items is consistent with that of other market participants (e.g. exclusions from street 
earnings are highly correlated with Compustat special items) (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002).  
Nevertheless, a drawback in the Compustat‟ identification approach of special items (or even 
in assuming that special items on the income statement are an appropriate measure of transitory 
earnings) is that Compustat appears to depend partially on the information provided by 
management in the annual report. If the earnings item is labeled as nonrecurring in the annual 
report, Compustat will directly include it in special items (Frankel 2009).   
6.3 Are Special Items a “Perfect” Measure of Transitory Earnings? 
Misuse of special items aside, the association of special items reporting with complex and 
unusual economic events such as restructuring charges and write down of assets is alleged to 
affect adversely the information contained in reported earnings and make the measurement of the 
recurring component of earnings more complicated. Special items are by definition “unusual” or 
“infrequent”, induce uncertainty for example in the case of success or failure of restructuring, 
and involve complicated measurement issues which in turn obscure information in operating 
income (Elliott and Hanna 1996, Riedl and Srinivasan 2010). 
In this sense, the effect of special items on reported earnings is similar to that of transitory 
earnings. One can think of special items as noise or garbling in reported earnings. Indeed, 
evidence reveals that earnings before special items are more value relevant than operating 
earnings and that the relevance of earnings before special items decreases when the financial 
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statements contain more special items (Elliott and Hanna 1996). Taken at face value, this is what 
one would expect from a transitory earnings component.  
Notwithstanding this evidence of special items transience, special items are far from a perfect 
measure of transitory earnings. Some results show that negative special items can still play          
a role, though being limited and less than that of recurring earnings, in forecasting future profit 
margin (Fairfield et al. 2009, Hsu and Kross 2011). In addition, the prior reporting of negative 
special items is related to subsequent reporting (Johnson et al. 2010). 
With regard to the market pricing of special items; there are some mixed results. Special 
items appear to explain future returns in Dechow and Ge (2006), overpriced by the market when 
only included in rather than excluded from street earnings in Hsu and Kross (2011); and though 
being viewed as finite horizon events rather than recurring, they induce noise in the information 
environment in Elliott and Hanna (1996). Burgstahler et al. (2002) also show that the market 
appears not to fully understand the implications of special items for future earnings.  
Ohlson (2006) reports that special items are one of the flaws inherent in GAAP reliance on a 
balance sheet approach; a write down of assets in the balance sheet will lead to a negative special 
item charge in the income statement that is viewed as a transitory earnings item, however in 
some cases the realization of this item may influence subsequent recurring earnings. 
6.4 Misclassification of Recurring-Nonrecurring Earnings Inducing a Core Composition in 
Transitory Special Items 
Adding to the complications and economic uncertainty surrounding negative special items 
reporting that contribute to their permanence/transience nature, the literature documents a 
tendency to misuse negative special items to accommodate shifted recurring expenses. McVay 
(2006) provides evidence of firms moving recurring expenses into negative special items in order 
to boost their core earnings. Evidence in McVay (2006) reveals a positive contemporaneous 
association between unexpected core earnings and negative special items, consistent with the 
classification shifting of core expenses. Moreover, the improvement in core earnings reverses in 
the subsequent period when the firm does not repeatedly reports special items.  
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Classification shifting or misclassification of expenses is an earnings management tool that 
intentionally misclassifies categories of recurring and nonrecurring expenses in the income 
statement. By moving recurring expenses into negative special items, core profitability 
temporarily increases and those moved expenses are more likely to be excluded from pro forma 
earnings measures. Since investors are influenced by the placement of gains and losses in income 
statement (Bartov and Mohanram 2014), and the market is increasingly focusing on pro forma 
earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002, Gu and Chen 2004), management is seeking to temporarily 
maximize stock price via this misclassification strategy (McVay 2006).  
Since its introduction by McVay (2006), the concept of classification shifting has provided 
some insights into research on earnings management and special items. Fan et al. (2010) 
replicate the analysis in McVay (2006) using quarterly rather than annual data as in McVay 
(2006) and a revised core earnings expectation model. Their evidence supports the classification 
shifting evidence in McVay (2006). Athanasakou et al. (2009) provide consistent evidence of 
misclassification of expenses in the UK, and that this appears to be more attractive to UK firms 
than accrual management in order to avoid negative earnings surprises. Interestingly, Kolev et al. 
(2007) show that managers become recently more engaged in classification shifting after the 
SEC intervention into non-GAAP reporting (between years 2001 to 2004). Fairfield et al. (2009) 
find that special items are more permanent (more transitory) for high (low) profitability firms 
consistent with high profitability firms moving more recurring expenses to special items to 
maintain higher profitability. More recently, Abernathy et al. (2014) provide evidence of 
classification shifting being a substitute for both accrual earnings management and real earnings 
management under certain circumstances. 
Evidence also reveals that the misuse of negative special items to conceal recurring expenses 
is not limited to “within-the-period” shifting, but can be also exercised over periods (inter-period 
shifting) to improve future performance (Burgstahler et al. 2002 and Cready et al. 2010). 
Additionally, Kinney and Trezevant (1997) show that managers have also discretion in the 
timing and magnitude of negative special items reporting. Thereby, negative special items are 
reported when the firm expects higher than average income in order to smooth earnings, or lower 
than average income in order to take a big bath.  
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Frankel and Roychowdhury (2008) demonstrate that both conditional conservatism inherent 
in GAAP and strategic reporting of negative special items affect the fundamental composition of 
negative special items. This is because conservatism induces transience in negative special items, 
and strategic reporting enhances the permanence of negative special items. Callen et al. (2010) 
show empirically that conditional conservatism is facilitated via negative special items reporting. 
Heflin et al. (2014) provide evidence of special items capturing conditional conservatism, and 
that analysts‟ exclusion of special items from street earnings results in street earnings being less 
conditionally conservative than GAAP earnings.  
The uncertainty and different circumstances associated with negative special items reporting 
impact the predicted persistence of negative special items and pose a complicated identification 
problem for analysts when adjusting street earnings. This is because analysts seek to include only 
earnings items that have high implications for future earnings. While recent evidence by 
Christensen et al. (2011) documents that the analysts‟ adjustment process is influenced by 
management earnings guidance, it does not rule out the possibility that managers are the 
followers rather than the initiators, and that managers merely respond to the analysts‟ demands 
of exclusions and inclusions of earnings items. 
7. Conclusion 
The present chapter discusses and reviews research on the informational contention of 
accounting earnings numbers. It focuses on the relation between accounting earnings and stock 
returns, and the role of transitory earnings.  
Evidence is consistent with an information role of unexpected earnings in explaining stock 
returns (or unexpected returns). Moreover, different earnings components have different value 
relevant information corresponding to the time series properties of the earnings components.  
Neoclassical valuation theory assumes a system of accounting information dynamics, which 
characterizes the stochastic evolution of accounting data, and conjectures a unique valuation 
solution that maps accounting information into an equilibrium equity value.  
Transitory earnings are alleged to obscure information in reported earnings and reduce the 
value relevance of earnings. Since transitory earnings are unobservable, special items have been 
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used as a measure of transitory earnings. This is justified because special items are less persistent 
earnings components, and special items reporting is associated with unusual or infrequent 
economic events that are expected to have less implications for future earnings. Nevertheless, 
research documents a considerable increase in negative special items reporting that is 
inconsistent with changes in the business environment which could have led to recognizing 
shocks outside of the core operations of firms. Evidence documents an improper use of negative 
special items as a device to conceal core operating expenses. Special items pose a challenge for 
analysts when adjusting street earnings, because analysts need to assess the recurrability of 
special items which might be affected by whether special items are economically driven or 
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One major type of the misclassification of earnings line items in the income statement is the 
opportunistic transfer of operating expenses to negative special items in order to increase core 
profitability, while bottom-line earnings remain unaffected. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has been actively issuing a number of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases (AAERs) in connection with this classification shifting practice
3
.Empirical evidence 
presented by McVay (2006), Fan et al. (2010) and Alfonso et al. (2015) support the existence of 
classification shifting in the form of a positive relation between unexpected core earnings and 
negative special items. A recent study by Abernathy et al. (2014) find evidence of the use of 
classification shifting as a substitute tool for both accrual earnings management and real earnings 
management under certain conditions. 
In standard accounting-based valuation, market models map accounting variables, which 
follow a certain time series pattern, into equity values. This pattern is usually characterized by a 
vector autoregression framework of accounting information (often referred to as “accounting 
information dynamics”) that specifies the evolution of an information set of variables that are 
fundamental in valuation (Ohlson 1995). Nevertheless, an extensive body of literature shows that 
stock prices fail to fully reflect information contained in earnings components (Bernard and 
Thomas 1990, Sloan 1996, Elliot and Hanna 1996, Burgstahler et al. 2002). If stock prices act as 
if investors fixate on core earnings and are not able to adjust for the misclassification of earnings, 
classification shifting may result in temporarily higher stock prices.  
Research in the area of classification shifting is relatively new and has focused on whether 
the documented positive relation between unexpected core earnings and negative special items is 
evidence of classification shifting or is potentially attributable to a statistical fluke. The general 
belief is that firms move some core expenses and losses into special items to increase earnings 
before special items and thereby affect stock prices. For this to occur, one has to hypothesize that 
misclassification obscures the information contained in earnings components, and thus stock 
prices do not fully impound the true historical forecasting relevance of accounting variables with 
respect to future earnings. This possibility arises because stock prices reflect investors‟ 
                                                 
3
 McVay (2006) and Alfonso et al. (2015) provide some examples of real cases of classification shifting and the 
firms‟ AAERs numbers. For more examples; look at the SEC website (www.sec.gov) 
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expectations of future earnings rather than the true implications of earnings components for 
future earnings. 
In this study, we develop a vector autoregression (VAR) of a set of accounting variables that 
accommodates, besides other variables, two components of transitory earnings, namely a core 
component, reflecting shifted core earnings, and a transitory component reflecting purified 
transitory earnings. The VAR implies an abnormal earnings dynamic and its solution yields 
closed-form valuation models. One important feature of this framework is that it allows us to 
theoretically link the VAR transition matrix with coefficients in the abnormal earnings dynamic 
and valuation models. Hence, each variable‟s forecasting and valuation coefficient is a function 
of its persistence and feedback among variables in the VAR. This enables us to calculate the 
implied theoretical values of coefficients in the abnormal earnings dynamic and valuation 
models, and then compare these to the coefficients we observe from our estimations for the 
models using unrestricted regressions.  
Using “special items” as a measure of a transitory earnings line item that is potentially 
contaminated by shifted core earnings, we provide evidence of special items having limited 
forecasting ability in relation to future abnormal earnings, but the core component of special 
items that we suspect to be made up by classification shifting forecasts one year ahead abnormal 
earnings similar to reported core earnings. Our results show that all forecasting coefficients in 
the abnormal earnings dynamic are consistent with their implied theoretical counterparts derived 
from the VAR. This suggests that failure to adjust the dynamic (the forecasting model) to reflect 
explicitly the core component of special items may lead to loss of forecasting-relevant 
information.  
We draw relatively similar conclusions in market valuation with respect to the match 
between the valuation coefficients and their theoretical values, except for the two components of 
special items. The results show that the market appears not to be able to correctly price the 
special items components. Further results reveal that the market can only detect the incidence of 
shifting but rather applies a higher coefficient on the entire amount of reported special items. 
Taken together, the evidence in this study, suggests that the market is not able to fully process 
special items information and value the core and transitory components of special items 
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according to their implications for future profitability. However, the market appears to be able to 
identify when shifting takes place and applies an incremental valuation coefficient on the 
shifters‟ entire amount of special items rather than only the respective shifted component.  
 In order to execute our tests, we construct an innovative measure of shifted negative core 
earnings at the firm-year-level that builds on McVay (2006)
4
. We develop an empirical 
extraction approach that disentangles the core portion of negative special items, which is 
attributable to classification shifting, from negative special items. Our measure of shifting differs 
from a recent attempt in Cain et al. (2014) to identify high and low quality special items. Cain et 
al. (2015) identify low quality special items as comprising past, current, and future operating 
expenses. However, their identification approach implicitly assumes that all firms reporting 
negative special items must have been shifting some expenses over periods, and does not account 
for the possibility that negative special items are entirely reported as a result of poor 
performance. We focus on current year misclassification and use a different approach that is 
more specific to small industry groups of firms shifting operating expenses each year. Moreover, 
our approach requires only one expectation model, while their approach is based on four 
expectation models which might induce more measurement error. 
Our objective is also different from Alfonso et al. (2015) who assign firms as shifters and 
non-shifters and show evidence of mispricing of shifters‟ reported core earnings. They label all 
firms that have positive unexpected core earnings and negative special item or negative 
discontinued operations as shifters, and argue that their proxy is based on McVay (2006). A 
limitation of their assignment methodology is that it ignores firms shifting expenses and having 
less negative unexpected core earnings, which is inconsistent with the intuition in McVay 
(2006). In this paper, we develop a measure of the core component of negative special items 
rather than merely identifying shifters. We argue that our measure captures all dimensions of the 
McVay (2006) analysis for firms that shift expenses and have either positive unexpected core 
earnings or less negative unexpected core earnings. We also account for firms reporting negative 
special items as a consequence of deteriorating performance and are less likely to be misusing 
negative special items to hide their operating expenses.  
                                                 
4
 The terms “operating expenses”, “core expenses”, and “negative core earnings” are used interchangeably.  
57 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the VAR framework 
and the forecasting-valuation setup. Section 3 presents the approach used to measure shifted 
negative core earnings. A description of data and sample used in the study is provided in section 
4, and all empirical results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Vector Autoregression (VAR), Abnormal Earnings Dynamic and Market Valuation 
The VAR model is an extension of the information dynamics in Clubb (2013) which builds 
on previous research by Ohlson (1995), Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and Ohlson (1999). Our 
analytical models are designed to be as simple as possible and yet provide sufficient scope to 
represent the key aspects of the phenomenon of interest.  
Consider an accounting variables data generating process that follows a first-order VAR 
system where, as in Clubb (2013), the state vector tz  includes total abnormal earnings tae , book 
value tbv , and dividends, tdv  
: 
 1 1t t tz z u    (1) 
The VAR coefficient matrix   is assumed to be constant over firms and over time. 1tu   
is             
a vector of “surprise” movements in the variables after considering current values and feedback 
among variables. The VAR model can be modified to handle different specifications, while 
preserving the informational content of the state variable. Consider now the definition of 
abnormal earnings 1( 1)t t tae e R bv     , where te  
is aggregate earnings and R  is one plus risk 
free interest rate.  Since aggregate earnings, te ,  is not a sufficient earnings construct for 
forecasting and valuation, because earnings components have different information content  
(Lipe 1986); and classification shifting is assumed to occur within earnings components, we first 
decompose abnormal earnings into three components: core abnormal earnings, tcae , “purified” 
transitory earnings, tpute , and shifted core earnings, tsce . The earnings variable tsce  is a 
hypothesized and unobservable earnings component that the manager opportunistically uses to 
inflate core earnings. Hence, tsce  is, by construction, an earnings component shifted from core 
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to transitory earnings and 
tpute  is transitory earnings absent classificatory shifting
5
. Our 
decomposition of the abnormal earnings variable increases the dimensionality of the VAR 
framework and suggests some parametric restrictions on the   matrix. 
 We assume the following modified system in the paper: 
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where 1( 1)t t tcae ce R bv    , and tce  is reported core earnings. This characterization implies 
that purified transitory earnings and shifted core earnings sum to reported transitory earnings in 
the income statement, I.e. t t tpute sce te  , and abnormal earnings can be equally defined as 
1( 1)t t t t t tae e R bv cae pute sce      . Restricted zero coefficients on the   matrix are added 
for mathematical tractability and have appealing economic intuition. We set 21 31 0   and 
12 32 0    to allow the current realization of core abnormal earnings and purified transitory 
earnings to affect future total abnormal earnings that include future realizations of these 
variables via their persistence coefficients 11  and 22
 , respectively6. However, the differential 
persistence of these variables suggests that 11 22  . Since tsce  is independent of future 
purified transitory earnings, we set 23 0  . We do not restrict 13  to be zero, because tsce  is in 
essence a core earnings variable that is misclassified in the income statement and is expected to 
have predictive ability for future core abnormal earnings. This allows tsce  to forecast total 
abnormal earnings similar to tcae  when 13 33 11    , or results in an additional signaling role 
for tsce  when 13 33 11    . In the empirical analysis, we focus on shifting core expenses to 
negative special items. Therefore, given that tsce  is a negative earnings variable and 
13 33 11    , this implies that tsce  negatively predicts future total abnormal earnings similar to 
                                                 
5
 The terms “classification shifting” and “misclassification” are used interchangeably. 
6
 Note that total abnormal earnings values are determined by adding the first three rows in the VAR.  
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core abnormal earnings and acts also as a bad news information variable for firms engaging in 
classification shifting.  In other words, if 13 33 11    , tsce  provides relevant information 
because it is both an earnings variable and an “other information” variable similar to other non-
accounting information in Feltham and Ohlson (1995) but in our context of classification 
shifting. 
The clean surplus identity implies that 1 1 1 1 1t t t t t tbv cae pute sce Rbv dv         , which in 



















Adding the first three rows of the VAR and applying clean surplus yield the total abnormal 
earnings dynamic expressed in earnings components: 
 1 1 2 3 4 5 1t t t t t t tae ce pute sce bv dv             (4)   
where the implied forecasting parameters are; 
1 11
2 22 11 11
3 13 33 11 11
4 14 11 11
5 15 11 11
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We call the forecasting model in equation (4); the total abnormal earnings dynamic
( )AE DYNAMIC .  
When setting stock prices; if investors‟ expectations of future abnormal earnings reflect the 
forecasting relevance properties of accounting variables consistent with the VAR estimation and 
AE DYNAMIC , one can derive an accounting based valuation model by assuming a dividends 
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discount model and applying the valuation procedure in Clubb (2013) whereby the clean surplus 
coefficient constraints in equation (3) are applied to the valuation function: 
 
1
5[ | ] [ ]t t tE MV z e RI z 
   (5) 
where 5 [0,0,0,0,1]e   picks out the valuation coefficients for the tz  variables from the 
dividends forecast equation, and I  is the unit matrix. The solution of equation (5) given the 
constraints in equation (3) yields the following core abnormal earnings valuation model: 
 1 2 3 4 5 t t t t t tMV cae trte sce bv dv          (6) 
where the implied valuation multiples are:
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and; 11 15 44 14 41 45( )( ) ( )R R             
The valuation model in equation (6) ensures that if earnings components do not forecast 
growth in book value (I.e. 41 42 43 0     ) or future core abnormal earnings are not affected 
by current book value such that 14 0  , earnings valuation multiples 1  and 2  unambiguously 
increase by their own persistence coefficients 11  
and 22 , respectively, to the extent that 
1 0   when 11 0    and 2 0    when 22 0  . Under the same conditions, 3 , however, is 
affected not only by its persistence parameter 33  but more importantly by the impact of shifted 
core earnings on one period ahead core abnormal earnings via 13 . This result is interesting, 
because it shows that tsce  is expected to contain current value relevant information even if one 
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period shifting is weakly associated with shifting in the next period. In other words, even if 
shifting core earnings is done temporarily in certain periods to beat analyst forecasts, for 
example,  as found in empirical research and is not a repetitive act by the manager, the valuation 
multiple 3  is still expected to pick this up. If [ ]11, 22,33 and 130 h h  , all earnings valuation 
coefficients will be affected by other VAR coefficients. In particular, they will be positively 
related to the accounting conservatism parameters 
14  and 15  identified in previous research by 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995), Pope and Wang (2005), and Clubb (2013). 
Similarly, the valuation model in equation (6) can be rewritten in terms of normal earnings 
components consistent with the abnormal earnings representation in equation (4) using the clean 
surplus and core abnormal earnings definitions: 
 
* * * * *
1 2 3 4 5 t t t t t tMV ce trte sce bv dv          (7) 
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To differentiate between the valuation models in equations (6) and (7), we call the valuation 
model in equations (6); a core abnormal earnings valuation model  CAE MODEL  and the 
valuation model in equation (7); a core earnings valuation model  CE MODEL . 
When considering the theoretical values of the forecasting and valuation coefficients of both 
tce and tsce  in equations (4), (6) and (7) in terms of their   values, our analysis provides a link 
between a direct and indirect forecasting and valuation roles of tsce . To elaborate on this point, 
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consider the difference between the total abnormal earnings forecasting coefficients of tce  and 
tsce  in equation (4): 
 3 1 13 33 11         (8)   
Equation (8) shows that if 13 33 11    , the forecasting relevance of shifted core earnings 
tsce in relation to future total abnormal earnings will be identical to the forecasting relevance of 
reported core abnormal earnings tce  (because 3 1 0   ). Indeed, this is what one would 
expect if the presence of shifting behavior by the manager does not itself provide a signal of 
future performance. This is because the impact of tsce  on next period total abnormal earnings is 
equal to its impact on next period reported core abnormal earnings, 13 ,  plus any association 
between shifted earnings at date t  and shifted earnings at date 1t   via 33 . Therefore, if 
13 33 11    , this implies that the forecasting relevance of shifted earnings is greater than 
reported core earnings, consistent with the notion that shifting core losses into transitory items 




Turning now to the equivalence of this condition in the valuation models, the difference 
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     
 (9) 
The difference in equation (9) equals zero under the requirement that 13 33 11    , given an 
additional condition that 41 43   . In relation to the plausibility of the latter condition, one can 
substitute the CSR requirements 11 51 41     and 13 53 43 33       into 13 33 11      
which implies that 51 53   if 41 43   . In other words, the additional condition that 41 43   
                                                 
7
 As mentioned earlier, we consider shifting negative core earnings to transitory earnings, hence 
t




can be interpreted as simply requiring the expectations of future dividend payout not to be 
affected by the division of core (abnormal) earnings between reported and shifted earnings. 
Clearly, if the book value equation in the VAR has been restricted such that only 44  affects 
future book value as in Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and Barth et al. (1999b), one needs not to 
assume any further condition in order for 13 33 11     to results in 3 1 0  
8
.  Alternatively, 
if 14 0  , then 3 1 0    when 13 33 11     even if 41 43   . Therefore, the condition 
13 33 11     is fundamental to the equivalent valuation of reported and shifted core earnings.  
The total abnormal earnings dynamic in equation (4) shows that the direct effect of tsce  may 
also be augmented by an indirect (signalling) effect if shifting provides a bad news signal to the 
market about future total abnormal earnings, I.e. 13 33 11    . In an efficient market, equation 
(9) indicates that the bad news effect is expected to result in a higher valuation of shifted core 
earnings. 
To summarize, our model setup assumes an accounting system that accommodates a 
hypothesized earnings variable tsce  which represents misclassified core earnings in the income 
statement. Restrictions applied on the VAR transition matrix indicate how each component of 
earnings impacts on the total abnormal earnings dynamic and the valuation models. The analysis 
shows possible direct and indirect forecasting and valuation effects for tsce  that are consistent 
with the view that shifted core earnings contain useful information both as core earnings and 
possibly as a signal of firms that attempts to opportunistically maximize their reported 
performance.  
The total abnormal earnings dynamic in equation (4) and the valuation models in equations 
(6) and (7) form the basis of our empirical tests. We also consider estimating the VAR and 
calculating the theoretical counterparts of the coefficients in these equations as per our 
theoretical analyses. 
 
                                                 
8
 Empirically, we show that calculating 
3 1
   when the book value equation has all coefficients restricted to zero 
except 
44
  do not change inferences. 
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3. Constructing a Measure of Shifted Core Earnings 
Special items have been broadly considered an objective measure of transitory earnings 
(Burgstahler et al. 2002, Frankel 2009, and Christensen et al. 2011). Hence, the identification of 
core and transitory earnings is readily available to investors in the income statement. However, 
to test the model predictions we need a measure of the core portion of special items
9
. Prior 
empirical research (Ronen and Sadan, 1975 and Barnea, et al. 1976) posits that an association 
between deviations of core earnings and transitory items from their expected levels is evidence 
of classificatory smoothing. These studies assume that transitory earnings are expected to be 
constant, should no income smoothing occur. This assumption is deemed to be restrictive and 
unrealistic, because it explicitly assumes consistent recurrence of non-recurring items. McVay 
(2006) avoids estimating a transitory earnings expectation model, and assumes that a 
contemporaneous association between unexpected core earnings and negative special items level 
documents the presence of classification shifting. Nevertheless, none of these studies attempt to 
identify a misclassified core earnings component that is part of transitory earrings. 
In this current paper, we focus on shifting operating expenses to negative special items 
because there is more supporting empirical evidence for shifting expenses than revenues. 
Therefore, the earnings variable tsce  represents shifted (negative) core earnings and the earnings 
variable tpute  implies purified special items
10
. Since tsce  is a misclassified core earnings 
component in this current setting and core earnings are more tractable than transitory earnings, 
our approach to estimate tsce  is based on constructing a measure of shifted negative core 
earnings that is firm-industry specific and is updated annually. The basic idea is that a fraction of 
negative special items is in essence negative core earnings that have been moved from core 
                                                 
9
 Most empirical research estimating different components of earnings where some of them are unobservable follow 
certain assumptions to define the unobservable components of earnings. For example, dirty surplus earnings are 
measured using a clean surplus relation that has two earnings components: core earnings and dirty surplus in Ashton 
and Wang (2013), while they are directly observable in Landsman et al., (2011) who assume that really dirty surplus 
are those dirty surplus earnings not observed by investors. Landsman et al., measure the really dirty surplus 
component using a more comprehensive variant of the clean surplus relation. Another measurement approach of 
unobservable earnings components appears in the earnings management literature when estimating the discretionary 
and nondiscretionary elements of total accruals. To the extent that all estimation methods might measure the 
unobservable variables of interest with error, misspecification of the measurement model is always an alternative 
interpretation of the empirical results. 
10
 We will also consider purified negative special items in our empirical tests.   
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earnings to negative special items when misclassification takes place. Hence tsce  for firm i  at 
year t  is measured as: 
 ( )it itsce negsi   (10) 
where itnegsi  is negative special items for firm i  at year t .  
To estimate  , there has to be ex ante evidence of classification shifting, and a mechanism 
through which one can extract the ratio of shifted negative core earnings. In prior literature, this 
type of classification shifting is tested using the following OLS regressions in McVay (2006): 
 0 1 ,[ ( )]it it it i tce E ce negsi error      (11) 
 , 1 , 1 0 1 , 1[ ( )]i t i t it i tce E ce negsi error          (12) 
where ,( )i tE ce  is expected core earnings level and ,( )i tE ce  is expected core earnings change 
and are measured using the following empirical models: 
 0 1 1 2 3 1 4 5 6t t t t t t t tce ce ato acc acc sa neg sa error                  (13) 
 0 1 1 2 1 3 4 1 5 6 7t t t t t t t t tce ce ce ato acc acc sa neg sa error                        (14) 
where tce  is core earnings level (scaled by sales), tce is core earnings change (scaled by sales) 
tato is the asset turnover ratio, tacc is operating accruals (scaled by sales), tsa  is the percentage 
change in sales, and tneg sa  is sales decrease which is equal to tsa  if tsa  is negative, and 0 
otherwise. 
Estimates are made out of sample using coefficients from equations (13) and (14) estimated 
by fiscal year and industry and excluding firm I. In normal operations, negative special items are 
meant to be a sign of poor performance which is supposed to create a negative relation between 
unexpected core earnings and negative special items (a performance effect). However, when       
a firm shifts negative core earnings at time t  to negative special items, unexpected core earnings 
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will increase with negative special items at time t , I.e. 1 0  .
11
 At time 1t   , this 
improvement in core earnings reverses as negative core earnings shifted at time t  recur,  I.e 
1 0   . However, the reversal will be less pronounced in case of inter-period shifting and nearly 
zero if a firm has special items at time 1t  , because of the possibility of serial misclassification. 
In order to extract the ratio of shifted negative core earnings within special items; first, we 
estimate 1   per industry and year if there are more than 15 observations per the industry-year 
combination. As shown later, this will result in positive and negative values of 1  that differ 
among industries in the same year and for the same industry over years. The intuition is that in a 
given year, not all firms in the sample misallocate core expenses and if some firms do, they 
might not persistently classification-shift in all future years. Hence, an estimate of ˆ  that is 
updated annually is as follows: 
  1,  ˆind t ind t   (15)   
We set 1,  ( ) 0ind t  , because those are not classification shifters; and 1,  ( 1) 0ind t   , because 
these coefficients are outliers
12
. Second, we multiply the estimate of ˆ   for each firm industry-
year combination by the firm‟s actual negative special items. This results in a firm industry-
specific estimate of shifted negative core earnings each year that is within the bound of shifting 
such that , , ,ˆ[ ( )]i t ind t i tsce negsi , where  ˆ1 0ind t  . We also estimate purified special items as 
the difference between reported special items and our measure of tsce . This ensures that tpute  
becomes equal to reported special items when firms do not classification shift (I.e. when there is 
no shifting in the current year,  ˆ 0 0 and )t t tind t sce pute te     .  
The estimation of other variables is straightforward; core earnings variable tce  is measured                  
as (sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general and administrative expenses) similar to McVay 
                                                 
11
 Assuming negative special items are measured at their absolute values here consistent with McVay (2006). 
12
 It does not make sense for a firm to have more than 100% of its negative special items as shifted core expenses, 
because classification shifting is bounded by the amount of negative special items. We believe it is more 
conservative to disregard these coefficients (substituting by 0) rather than assuming 100% shifting. Even if we set 
these coefficients to 100%, inferences do not change. 
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(2006), Barua et al. (2010) and Fan et al (2010). We measure tbv  as book value of common 
equity at the end of the fiscal year and tdv  as common dividends declared. We set 1.12R 
(Dechow et al. 1999, Hand and Landsman 2005 and Barth et al. 1999b), therefore the core 
abnormal earnings variable is estimated as ( 10.12t t tcae ce bv    ). Total abnormal earnings 
1( 0.12 )t t tae e bv     are measured using two measures of income; 
ni
tae  where 
ni
t te e  is net 
income, and ibtae  where 
ibc
t te e  is income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations
13
. We measure tMV  as market value of equity three months after the end of the fiscal 
year. Since estimating tsce  is based on regressions in McVay (2006) where sales are used as the 
deflator for most variables, we deflate other variables in the VAR, forecasting and valuation 
models by sales for consistency. Detailed definitions of all variables and their locations in 
datasets are provided in appendix.  
4. Data and Sample Selection 
We collect accounting data from annual Compustat and stock prices from the monthly Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for years 1989 through 2012. We start our sample in 1989, 
because accruals are measured directly from the cash flow statement, and cash flow from 
operations are reported in Compustat after 1988
14
. All variables are measured as of fiscal year-
end, except equity market values which are measured three months after the end of the fiscal 
year from which financial statements data are gathered to ensure that financial statements are in 
the public domain. 
We follow McVay (2006) in our initial sample selection procedures. Each firm-year observation 
is required to have sufficient data to estimate the core earnings level and change models and 
shifted core earnings. We drop observations with sales less than $1 million as sales are used as a 
deflator for most variables in the regressions. We also drop firms that have changed their fiscal 
year end between 1t   and  t  . Two-digit SIC code is used to identify industry membership. We 
require a minimum of 15 observations per industry-year combination in all industry level 
                                                 
13
 We refer to the implication of these measures on our estimation when we report the abnormal earnings estimation 
results. 
14
 Hribar and Collins (2002) find that accruals are measured with error, when they are estimated as the change in 
subsequent balance sheet accounts. 
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regressions. We assign 0 to special items if the data item is missing (Elliott & Hanna 1996 and 
Dechow and Ge 2006), or the special items are positive (McVay 2006)
15
. Also, extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations used to calculate accruals in the core earnings models are set 
to 0 if the data item is missing. We do not limit estimation of tsce  to firms with full data for the 
forecasting-valuation models and all abnormal earnings specifications, because doing so would 
unnecessarily limit the generalizability of the shifted core earnings measure (Barth et al. 1999a).  
This results in a sample of 69,430 firm-years used to estimate tsce . In tests of the forecasting-
valuation systems, we further delete observations with missing book value and dividends and the 
net income measure of abnormal earnings.  Cost of capital is assumed to be constant at 0.12 
consistent with most similar studies.  All variables used in regressions are winsorized at their 
first and ninety-ninth percentiles. The final sample used to estimate the forecasting-valuation 
equations is 54,912 firm years.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Shifted Core Earnings Estimation Results 
We begin our empirical analysis by replicating the classification shifting tests in McVay (2006), 
in order to investigate if firms tend to shift negative core earnings to negative special items, on 
average, in our sample. Table 1 Panel A reports the results of pooled OLS and quintile 
regressions for the core earnings level model in equation (13) and Table 1 Panel B provides the 
regression results for the core earnings change model in equation (14). Table 1 Panel A and B 
also report summary statistics for mean and median coefficients from industry-year regressions. 
Results indicate that all coefficients are statistically significant and have the predicted sign as in 
McVay (2006). Both pooled and industry-year mean and median coefficients values in Table 1 
are consistent with their values in McVay
16
.  
                                                 
15
 Though Compustat reports special items on a net basis which implies that negative special items reported in 
Compustat are the outcome of netting both positive and negative special item sub-types, Johnson et al. (2011) find 
that when a firm reports a negative special item, the special item sub-types are almost always negative. Since 
Compustat starts only to report the breakdown of special items in 2001, we measure negative special items as net 
income decreasing special items as reported by Compustat  (Data item #17), if it is negative, and zero otherwise. 
 
16
 McVay(2006) reports the mean and median coefficients from regressions estimated by industry (using Fama and 
French (1997) industry classification) and fiscal year, and one tailed p-values in her tables 4 and 5. In Table 1 Panel 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
In order to test for the presence of classification shifting as per equations (11) and (12), we run 
OLS regressions and report the significance of regression coefficients using two-way clustered 
standard errors, with firm and year clusters (Petersen 2009, Gow et al, 2010). Negative special 
items are measured at their absolute values here, in order to be consistent with McVay when we 
report our results in this section. We do not require next year unexpected change in core earnings 
to be non-missing to avoid the selection bias.  
Table 2 Panel A provides the regression results for equation (11). Results reveal that unexpected 
core earnings are increasing with negative special items at time t  , which is consistent with 
classification shifting rather than a poor performance effect associated with negative special 
items reporting. The coefficient on tnegsi  is positive and significant at the 0.01 level (
1 0.042  , t = 2.81). This means that approximately 4.2 % of reported negative special items, 
on average, are operating expenses that were shifted from core earnings in the current year. A 
one standard deviation increase in negative special items as a percent of sales results in an 
average increase of 38 basis points ( 1 negsisd  ) in unexpected core earnings. 
Table 2 Panel B provides the regression results for equation (12). Results reveal that the 
coefficient on negative special items is negative and significant at the 0.01 level ( 1 −0.034, t 
= −2.80). This implies that the improvement in core earnings reverses in the next year, because 
previously misclassified operating expenses recur. The reversal is 31 basis points ( 1 negsisd  ) for 
a one unit increase in negative special items as a percent of sales. As indicated by McVay, inter-
period shifting may decrease the reversal. In untabulated results, we find that the reversal is not 
statistically different from zero when firms reports negative special items in year 1t 
17
.  This is 
not surprising because firms can continue to misallocate operating expenses when they have 
                                                                                                                                                             
A and Panel B, we show the pooled mean and median regressions results and summary statistics for mean and 
median coefficients from the industry year regressions used to estimate core earnings levels and changes. Both 
pooled and industry-year coefficients values are very close to those in McVay. Industry-year regressions have higher 
explanatory power. In our estimation of core earnings levels and changes, we follow the same approach                    
as in McVay, in order to calculate unexpected core earnings, i.e. expectations are made out of sample from industry-
year regressions excluding firm i . 
17
 When we add negative special items at year t+1 to the regressions and restrict that they are not equal to zero, the 
coefficient on current year negative special items is −0.0129 and not statistically different from zero. 
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consecutive special items. For these reasons, in constructing our measure of shifted core 
expenses, we focus on firms that classification shift each year, regardless of whether the shift 
reverses in the next period.   
In sum, the results suggest that an average percentage of 4.2 of negative special items reported 
by firms represent operating expenses (a core earnings component) that were opportunistically 
shifted to negative special items (a transitory earnings component). Since, our sample has some 
overlap with the 1988 2003  sample period used in McVay, these results confirm her principal 
findings for classification shifting using recent data.  
This approximate ratio does not imply that all negative special item firms are classification 
shifters to some degree. Therefore, in order to estimate a more accurate measure of the ratio of 
misallocation, we rerun equation (11) for each industry-year combination and estimate industry 
specific coefficients that are updated annually. This results in a range of positive and negative 
1   each year. As indicated before, we set all 1,  ( ) ind t  to equal 0 (representing 46 % of 
estimated 1,ind ) because those are not classification shifters and are more likely reporting 
negative special items as result of poor performance . In addition, 1,  1ind t   are set to equal 0 
(representing only 3.91 % of estimated 1,  ind t ), as we believe that those are outliers. The post-
restriction coefficients represent the annual measure of  . In order to estimate shifted negative 
core earnings at the firm-year level, we multiply the industry measure by actual negative special 
items reported by each firm in a given industry. The use of two-digit SIC codes provides a more 
spread pattern of estimated coefficients than the Fama-French 48 industry classification, which is 
more relevant to this study, because the aim is to estimate coefficients that are more specific to 
each industry smaller group.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In Figure 1 Panel A, we report on the time series of unexpected core earnings surrounding our 
shifting measure, an average measure of shifting based on the fitted value from a pooled OLS 
regression of unexpected core earnings on negative special items, and a control firms‟ industry 
measure that is based on only the excluded negative coefficients from our measure of shifting 
and estimated in a similar fashion as the treatment firms comprising the shifting measure (I.e. 
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control firms are those experiencing current poor performance rather than shifting). Year zero is 
the event year of a non-zero value of the measures, and the plots show the means of unexpected 
core earnings for three years prior to and subsequent to the event year. The figure shows that our 
shifting measure captures the spirit of McVay‟s classification shifting construct better than an 
average measure of shifting. According to our shifting measure, there is a substantial 
improvement in unexpected core earnings in the year of shifting, and this improvement is 
followed by a monotonic decline consistent with firms‟ inability to maintain the temporary 
improvement in unexpected core earnings. For example, unexpected core earnings are negative 
and zero in year 2t   and year 1t  , respectively, markedly increase above zero in the year of 
shifting, and then monotonically decrease for three years following the year of shifting 
(reversal). This is consistent with McVay (2006) and our regression results in Table 2. While 
such pattern is consistent with classification shifting, it is much less pronounced using an 
average measure of shifting that combines both shifters and poor performers. For the poor 
performance control measure, unexpected core earnings substantially decline when firms report 
negative special items as a result of low performance at year zero, and this decline is followed by 
an increase that lasts for two years. This is consistent with future performance-enhancing in the 
short term after recognition of negative special items as one would expect when negative special 
items are not used for shifting purposes. 
In Figure 1 Panel B, we show, based on our shifting measure, the differential temporal patterns 
of unexpected core earnings when shifting occurs at the event year, as in Panel A, and when 
firms serially shift in both year zero and year 1t  . Serial shifters experience higher level of 
unexpected core earnings in year zero and even improve it in year 1t  , when they shift again. 
This is later followed by a monotonic decline in performance that documents their failure to 
maintain the artificial improvement in performance in the years subsequent to the shift. Indeed, 
this is consistent with the non-reversal result in the unexpected core earnings change regression 
when the sample is restricted to firms that shift in years t  and 1t  as in McVay (2006). Overall, 
these observations add credibility to the extraction approach we use in isolating shifted core 
expenses from negative special items, and are consistent with the shifting mechanism 
documented in prior research.   
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We now move on to report annual changes in negative special items and shifted negative core 
earnings based on our measure. Figure 2 shows the annual trend of reported negative special 
items and the estimated core component (shifted negative core earnings) in the sample. Figure 2 
panel A indicates that the frequencies of firms reporting negative special items and 
misclassifying negative core earnings have dramatically increased over the sample years. In 
1991, 25% of all firms reported negative special items and 8% of all firms shifted negative core 
earnings to negative special items. By 2012, the frequency of negative special items firms 
increased to approximately 52%, while 30% of the sample firms engaged in classification 
shifting. Focusing on only negative special items firms, Figure 1 Panel B indicates that the 
incidence of shifting for negative special items firms increased from approximately 34% to 55%, 
while peaking at 80% in 2008 during the financial crisis period. Overall, this descriptive 
evidence is consistent with an increasing number of firms reporting negative special item and 
misallocating expenses over the sample period. 
Figure 3 shows how the magnitude of negative special items and shifted negative core earnings 
changed over time. In Panel A, we show the annual trend of the absolute value of negative 
special items, conditional on the firm reporting negative special items. The magnitude of 
negative special items has increased over years from 25 million to approximately 43 million, 
while peaking at approximately 79 million during the financial crisis period in 2008. In Panel B, 
we show the means of negative special items scaled by sales, as used in regressions, conditional 
on the firm reporting negative special items; and shifted negative core earnings, conditional on 
the firm misallocating the expense. The magnitude of negative special items as a percent of sales 
increased from 1991 to 2002 (ranging between 7% to 10%). After 2002, the ratio decreased 
dramatically over the sample period (from 10% in 2002 to 3% in 2012); however, in 2008 it 
increased to approximately 11%. With respect to our estimates of shifted negative core earnings, 
the mean remained relatively stable over the years in our sample.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
73 
 
5.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 3, Panel A presents distributional statistics for the main variables used in the forecasting 
and valuation models. The mean core earnings are higher than mean negative special items and 
shifted negative core earnings. Consistent with Barth et al. (1999b) mean abnormal earnings 
calculated using net income or income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations is 
negative. This could be attributable to the profitability of firms, on average, is less than the 
required cost of capital or that the assumed constant cost of capital of 12% used in calculating 
abnormal earnings is too high. However, using book value in the abnormal earnings dynamic 
mitigates the problem of a fixed cross sectional cost of capital.  
Table 3 Panel B reports Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for the main explanatory 
variables in the forecasting and valuation models. All correlation coefficients are statistically 
significant but their magnitudes do not raise collinearity concerns. In general, none of the 
correlation coefficients exceeds 0.5 except the correlation between tpute  and tsce  which is close 
to 0.6. However, in subsequent regressions, variance inflation factors for all explanatory 
variables are less than 10 (Kennedy 1992).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
5.3 The Vector Autoregression Results and Implied Theoretical Values of Forecasting and 
Valuation Coefficients 
We estimate all forecasting and valuation regressions using fixed effects panel data models 
except for regressions with truncated dependent variables where we use censored regressions 
with fixed effects. We start with estimating the   matrix of the VAR in order to calculate the 
theoretical counterparts of the total abnormal earnings dynamic and valuation models 
coefficients. Though we mainly draw our conclusions regarding the forecasting and valuation 
properties of z  variables based on the coefficients of the total abnormal earnings and valuation 
models in next sections, which are estimated using unrestricted regressions, the implied 
theoretical values serve as benchmarks for these coefficients. 
Table 4 Panels A and B show the estimates of the   matrix coefficients and the implied 
theoretical values for the forecasting and valuation models coefficients based on these estimates. 
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Table 4 Panel A reveals that all variables are statistically significant in all VAR equations except 
tdv  in the book value equation. The core abnormal earnings equation results show that future 
core abnormal earnings are positively associated with current core abnormal earnings                    
( 11 0.316  ), shifted negative core earnings ( 13 0.225  ) and dividends ( 15 0.312  ) and 
negatively associated with current book value ( 14 0.145   ). Since tsce  is a negative variable, 
by construction, we interpret this as firms that shift operating expenses to negative special items 
in the current period in order to temporarily increase current reported core earnings will have 
lower core abnormal earnings in the next period. This is also consistent with our results in Table 
2 and McVay (2006) where shifted operating expenses revert back to core earnings in the future.  
In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in operating expenses that are packed into 
special items results in approximately 21 basis points  13 SD 0.225 0.009sce     decrease in 
core abnormal earnings in the next period (all scaled by sales).  
The purified transitory earnings equation results show that purified special items exhibit negative 
persistence in a small magnitude 22( 0.044)   . This suggests that current purified special 
items‟ gains and losses partially reverse in the next period. Jones and Smith (2011) observe a 
similar negative autoregression for reported special items (albeit insignificant in their analysis 
using a different persistence test approach) that continues for two lags. The shifted core earnings 
equation indicates that our measure of operating expenses that are misrepresented as negative 
special items in the income statement exhibits a positive autoregression 13( 0.166)  . This 
indicates the persistent trend of shifting and implies that one dollar shifted to special items in the 
current period is associated with less than a dollar in the next period
18
.  
The book value equation results show that next period book value is high, when current period 
book value, core abnormal earnings and purified special items are high; while it is only 
marginally affected by shifted negative core earnings (at the 10% level), and not affected by 
dividends paid. Indeed, our theory demonstrates that a perfect theoretical linkage between 
differential forecasting and valuation properties of tce  
and tsce  occurs when 14 0   or 
                                                 
18
 Since we measure 
t
sce  each year from the contemporaneous relation between unexpected core earnings and 
negative special items, the positive autoregression here is more consistent with a persistent trend of shifting than an 
inter-period shifting practice. 
75 
 
41 43  , which we do not obtain empirically herein. Another theoretical constraint that leads to 
the same forecasting-valuation link is not to allow earnings variables to forecast future book 
value. Therefore, we also re-estimate the book value equation as a simple autoregression process 
and do not allow feedback from other variables (Feltham and Ohlson 1995). The book value 
autoregression coefficient 44  is approximately the same in this case. When we calculate the 
theoretical counterparts of the coefficients of the total abnormal earnings dynamic and valuation 
models in Table 4 Panel B, we consider different alternatives based on our estimation of the 
book value equation, in order to see how binding this variables-exclusion restriction is. The 
dividends equation results show that future dividends are positively associated with all VAR 
variables.  
Table 4 Panel B reports the calculated theoretical counterparts of the total abnormal earnings 
dynamic and the valuation models coefficients that are based on our estimation of the VAR 
transition matrix,  .  We add "   `" to the calculated theoretical coefficients to differentiate them 
from their observed values in the regressions that we estimate in the following sections. All 
calculated forecasting coefficients in the AE DYNAMIC  are as one would expect according to 
our theoretical analysis. Core earnings and shifted negative core are expected to forecast total 
abnormal earnings, while purified special items appear to have a very weak theoretical 
forecasting ability. This validates our theoretical VAR setup and measurement approach for    
tsce , and ensures that special items should have less forecasting power, if one appropriately 
extracts the permanent composition attributable to classification shifting. The difference between 
tce  and tsce theoretical forecasting abilities result, 3 1` ` 0.075   , is attributable to the result 
that 11 13 33    . This leads us to expect that tsce  may have dual forecasting roles, a core 
earnings variable and a bad news signal. The theoretical effects of book value and dividends on 
future total abnormal earnings 4 5( ` 0.183, ` 0.274)     are consistent with their feedback on 
core profitability in the first equation of the VAR.  
With regard to valuation, we calculate three variants of the theoretical counterparts of the 
CAE MODEL  and CE MODEL  valuation coefficients using all significant and insignificant   
coefficients,  only significant   coefficients at least at the 5% level (i.e. further setting 
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43 450, 0   ), and lastly when future book value is only affected by current book value and no 
feedback is assumed from other variables (I.e. 41 42 44 43 450.5270,  0,  ,  0,  0         ). In 
the last column, we report the means of the theoretical values based on these three variants. 
Overall, our results confirm that differences between calculated coefficients under these 
alternatives are minor, and they all lead to similar conclusions with respect to the valuation 
properties of the variables. The results for both valuation models show that core abnormal 
earnings, core earnings and shifted negative core earnings have theoretical valuation coefficients 
higher than purified special items. Consistent with the abnormal earnings dynamic results, 
shifted negative core earnings provide superior valuation information to core abnormal earnings 
as if they serve dual roles (
*` *
3 1 3 1` ` ` 0.344       ). The valuation results here ensure that 
allowing coefficients from the specific dynamic processes of book value and dividends in the 
fourth and fifth rows of the VAR to vary leads to similar earnings valuation coefficients. Purified 
special items continue to have smaller and negative theoretical valuation coefficient relative to 
other earnings variables in both valuation models. However, though the theoretical forecasting 
coefficient of purified special items is small and near to zero ( 2` 0.006   ), their theoretical 
valuation coefficient is somewhat higher (
*
2 ` [ 0.083 ,  0.02]    ). This suggests that purified 
special items provide some useful information in valuation despite having lower forecasting 
ability due to their partial reversal in the future as noted here. Indeed, this valuation role is 
consistent with Callen et al. (2010) who find empirical evidence that conditional conservatism is 
facilitated via special items, hence special items are priced by the market as  a tool through 
which conservatism is achieved though their transience. More importantly, the results show         
a very clear link between forecasting and valuation for core earnings and its shifted portion to 
special items, such that 11 13 33     in the estimated VAR leads numerically to 1 3` `   and 
1 3` `  .   





5.4 The Abnormal Earnings Dynamic Results 
5.4.1 Main Results 
Our formulation for the VAR provides the theoretical foundations for our predictions and tests 
regarding forecasting and valuation properties of the core and transitory components of reported 
special items. We restricted specific   coefficients to be equal to zero consistent with theory and 
the VAR empirical results appear to support the main theme of classification shifting. Moreover, 
the calculated theoretical counterparts of the abnormal earnings dynamic and valuation models 
coefficients show that the shifted negative core earnings coefficient is higher than the core 
earnings coefficient, and both coefficients are higher than the purified special items coefficient. 
Nevertheless, our results so far are still limited by the assumption of the VAR as the data- 
generating process for the underlying variables.  
The advantage of estimating the AE DYNAMIC  directly is that the corresponding empirical 
results will not be based on any assumptions in the VAR with regard to the evolution of the 
variables and will show the differential forecasting ability of each earnings component in 
presence of other earnings components in the regression.  Moreover, we can use different 
variants of the abnormal earnings regression to test our predictions, such as replacing purified 
special items with only purified negative special items, aggregating the two components of 
special items into reported special items, and decomposing core earnings into positive and 
negative components hence reported negative core earnings are directly compared with shifted 
negative core earnings. It worth noting that even if no restrictions are applied on the VAR 
transition matrix, we will end up with a similar regression for the AE DYNAMIC  except that the 
“theoretical” values of the coefficients will depend on the full interaction of variables. Therefore, 
estimating the abnormal earnings dynamic as an unrestricted regression is expected to provide 
evidence on the validity of our measure of tsce  
and our specific characterization of the founding 
VAR. 
 In our tests for the dynamic and valuation models, we admit that these functions are abstracts 
from many fundamental issues that might affect expectations and valuation. For example, the 
models suppress non-accounting information and other unobservables which, if correlated with 
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the regression variables, would cause omitted variable bias. Estimating the models more 
precisely might require separation of the ordinary error term and those unobservables. Therefore, 
we begin by reporting the estimated coefficients of the dynamic using an ordinary least square 
(OLS) as a benchmark, in addition to other estimators. Though results in relation to the main test 
of whether shifted negative core earnings can forecast one year ahead abnormal earnings are 
consistent, further tests favor a panel fixed effects model. 
We estimate the abnormal earnings dynamic in Table 5. In Panel A, we start by estimating the 
dynamic using a net income measure of abnormal earnings, 1
ni
tae  , consistent with theory that 
abnormal earnings are to be calculated using a clean surplus measure of earnings. In Panel B, we 
follow prior research that uses an income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
measure of abnormal earnings, 1
ib
tae   (Dechow et al. 1999, Tsay et al. 2008). Though this latter 
measure violates clean surplus, it builds on an empirical perspective that extraordinary earnings 
and discontinued operations are nonrecurring items that should be excluded from the abnormal 
earnings measure. In Panel C, we use a more cautious approach, that is driven by theory, to deal 
with the dynamic and the clean surplus relation by including another explanatory earnings 
variable calculated as the difference between the earnings measure used for estimating abnormal 
earnings on the LHS and all other earnings components used in the RHS of the regression. 
Specifically, we include an earnings “plug” variable, _ni plug , equal to (net income − core 
earnings − special items) in the abnormal earnings dynamic that uses net income as a measure of 
abnormal earnings. We also consider a similar variable, _ib plug , equal to (income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations − core earnings − special items) in the abnormal 
earnings dynamic that uses income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations in the 
abnormal earnings measure. We scale the “plug” variables by sales to be consistent with other 
variables in the analysis.  
In Panel A, the OLS results show that all earnings components have significant coefficients in 
the dynamic. The differences in forecasting weights among earnings variables is ”eye 
catching”19.  Overall, the coefficients on earnings components are significantly different from 
                                                 
19
 Only Wald test statistics relating to the differential forecasting and valuation relevance between core earnings and 
shifted negative core earnings are reported in the tables. All other Wald test results are reported in the text. 
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one another [ 54.80, 0.00]F p  .The forecasting coefficient on core earnings is significantly 
positive 1 0. 7)( 72  , and indistinguishable from the forecasting coefficient on shifted negative 
core earnings 3( 1.218)   [ 2.01, 0.1566F p  ]. The forecasting coefficient on purified special 
items is statistically significant  2 0.274  , but smaller than core earnings and the difference is 
significant [ 101.30, 0.00F p  ]. Results do not change when the dynamic is estimated using 
Fama−Macbeth cross-sectional regressions20. 
The results of both the random and fixed effects models lead also to rejection of equality of 
coefficients on earnings components in forecasting one year ahead abnormal earnings
2[Random: 697.76, 0.00,Fixed : 194.37, 0.00]p F p     . In both models, core earnings act 
as a strong predictor of future abnormal earnings and shifted negative core earnings are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level with slightly higher coefficients than core earnings. Wald 
test results show that this differential forecasting ability in favor of shifted core earnings is 
statistically insignificant across all estimations. Comparing random effects with fixed effects 
models, we obtain a Hausman test statistic of 324.195  0.000p  that is heteroscedastic and 
firm cluster-robust, suggesting that unobservables are correlated with regressors and a fixed 
effects model is a better choice for estimating the dynamic over a random effects model. Though, 
main conclusion regarding the forecasting relevance of shifted negative core earnings does not 
change, we base our main analysis on fixed effects
21
. 
Interestingly, the fixed effects model reveals that the coefficient on purified special items is not 
statistically different from zero  2 0.011   as predicted by theory
22
. This result ensures the 
existence of unobservables that are caught up by the error term in the pooled OLS and are swept 
out by the fixed effects technique. Shifted negative core earnings persist to have a forecasting 
                                                 
20
 t-statistics are computed using the Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. We 
use a lag of two in the Newey-West procedure; however untabulated results show that significance is not sensitive to 
a higher lag length. 
21
 Johnsons et al. (2011) find that there are significant differences across industries in the propensity to report special 
items and that industry effects must be controlled for in any analysis that include special items. We believe that 
using a panel fixed effects model controls for this heterogeneity at a higher level (firm fixed effects). 
22
 The predicted coefficient for purified special items is near to zero and negative. Table 5 Panel A shows a small 
positive coefficient that is indistinguishable from zero. When we change our abnormal earnings income measure to 
exclude extraordinary items and discontinued operations in Table 5 Panel B, we obtain the exact negative coefficient 
that is indifferent from zero. 
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coefficient that is statistically different from zero but indistinguishable from the coefficient on 
core earnings [ 0.43, 0.512F p  ].  
Panel B shows coefficients estimates from alternative specifications of the AE DYNAMIC  that 
are based on income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. We consider 
column (A) a direct estimate of our theoretical dynamic. We rewrite the mean calculated 
theoretical values of the dynamic coefficients ( `)n in Table 4 Panel B for expositional 
convenience and to further compare the dynamic estimated coefficients with their theoretical 
counterparts based on the VAR estimation. Core earnings and shifted negative core earnings 
indifferently forecast one year ahead abnormal earnings, while purified special items do not 
significantly load in the dynamic. In addition, the coefficients on book value and dividends are 
broadly consistent with their calculated values in the VAR. While this is not entirely surprising, 
given that AE DYNAMIC  is the outcome of the sum of the first three rows in the VAR, it 
validates our restricted coefficients in the   matrix which are mainly in the first three equations 
of the VAR and also ensures that the use of a different estimator for a truncated dependent 
variable is plausible. In column (B), we re-estimate the dynamic while replacing purified total 
special items (gains and losses) with purified negative special items calculated as the difference 
between reported negative special items and shifted negative core earnings (positive special 
items are set to equal zero here). Results are not sensitive to this specification. Finally, we 
estimate the dynamic using reported special items in column (C), in order to test the implications 
of ignoring to control for the core portion on special items. Results show that reported special 
items are statistically insignificant 2( 0.024, 1.56)t   . When negative special items are used 
instead of special items gains and losses in column (D), the coefficient of reported negative 
special items increases slightly to 0.031, and is only significant at the 10% level. 
Panel C results reveal that the earnings plug variables that allow the abnormal earnings dynamics 
to satisfy clean surplus are significant, but their coefficients are lower than reported and shifted 
core earnings. More importantly, the coefficient on tsce  is not affected by this alternative test, 
which rules out the possibility that the shifted negative core earnings result is an artifact of an 
omitted earnings variable from the dynamic.   
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Taken together, the results from Table 5 suggest that though reported special items have, on 
average, little forecasting ability for one year ahead abnormal earnings, they do include 
transitory and core partitions due to classification shifting. Our measure for tsce  appears to 
perform well in extracting the core component of special items and is equally statistically 
important as reported core earnings in forecasting one year ahead abnormal earnings. Failure to 
account for this core component of special items results in ignoring forecasting relevant 
information that is “hidden” within a reported transitory earnings category in the income 
statement.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
5.4.2 Additional Tests for the Bad News Signaling Role of Shifted Negative Core Earnings 
in the Dynamic 
Across all results in Table 5, the coefficient of shifted negative core earnings is slightly higher 
than the coefficient of core earnings. Building on our theoretical VAR, this is consistent with the 
possibility that tsce  provides a bad news signal for firms that mask their performance besides its 
fundamental forecasting role as an earnings variable. Nevertheless, the observed bad news effect 
is statistically insignificant in all tests in Table 5. One potential factor that might induce bias 
against finding a significant effect is constraining the coefficient on tce  to be the same for 
positive and negative core earnings values and comparing it with the coefficient on tsce  that 
comprises only shifted negative core earnings. This is because positive and negative earnings 
have different properties (Jan and Ou 1995 and Collins et al. 1997), and negative earnings are 
found to be less informative about future earnings (Hayn 1995). We re-estimate the dynamic 
permitting the coefficient for negative core earnings to differ from those with positive values, in 
order to see if results change after controlling for the positive/negative partitions of core 
earnings. By the same token, we also allow the coefficient on purified special items to differ for 
negative values. Permitting the coefficient on purified special items to differ for negative 
observations relaxes the zero value constraint that we applied on positive special item in column 
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  
 (16)   
where _tce ind  ( _tpute ind ) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if tce  ( tpute )  
is negative 
and 0 otherwise. Hence, the bad news signaling test now depends on the statistical significance 
of  /  3 1 1[ (  )]  
    . The results in Table 6 show that although the coefficient of shifted 
negative core earnings ( 3 0.519  ) is higher than reported negative core earnings 
 /  
1 1[(  ) 0.407] 
    , the difference between the coefficients, which is the bad news signal, is 
still statistically insignificant [ 0.49, 0.482]F value P value     similar to previous results. 
All purified special items coefficients are also insignificant (positive or negative) in the revised 
dynamic.  
We conclude that the evidence of tsce  representing core expenses that the manager chooses to 
report as noncore expenses is convincing. The fundamental forecasting property of these 
expenses leads to their association with future profitability similar to core earnings. However, the 
possibility for tsce  to provide other relevant information beyond its earnings role, though 
theoretically appealing and consistent with the VAR estimation, seems to be over-optimistic. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
                                                 
23
 Compustat reports special items on a net basis. Since we focus on shifting expenses from core earnings to special 
items,
t
sce  will be zero for all positive special items observation in the dataset because it is estimated from negative 
special items. In column B of Table 5 Panel B, we run the analysis with only purified negative special items, 
restricting reported positive special items to be zero. Now, we consider permitting the coefficient on purified special 
items to differ for negative values which allows us to disentangle the adjusted negative special items (that are 
purified) from reported positive special items without throwing away positive special items or restricting them be 
equal to zero. Main results are not sensitive to these alternatives. 
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5.5 The Valuation Models Results 
5.5.1 Main Results 
Thus far, forecasting results support our measure of shifted negative core earnings, which is 
extracted from reported negative special items, and its ability to forecast future abnormal 
profitability. Since stock valuation is more complicated and reflects investors‟ expectations of 
future abnormal earnings rather than the actual abnormal earnings process, we now turn to 
testing whether stock prices act as if they fully reflect the information in the permanent 
component of negative special items about future abnormal earnings. Following Sougiannis 
(1994), we estimate the valuation models in the semi log form using the natural log of market 
values as the dependent variable to reduce the variance and skeweness of the residual
24
. 
Table 7 reports results on different tests of CAE MODEL  and CE MODEL  in Panels A and B, 
respectively. Similar to our forecasting tests, we re-write the implied theoretical coefficients 
from the VAR for sake of comparison. Untabulated Hausman test that is heteroscedastic and firm 
cluster-robust suggests that a fixed effects model is a better choice for analyzing the data over a 
random effects model. Though we report all coefficients in Table 7 using panel fixed effects 
models, untabulated random effects estimators show very consistent results. 
In Panel A column (A), we estimate the valuation coefficients of the CAE MODEL . Results 
reveal that the valuation coefficients of core abnormal earnings, book value and dividends are 
positive and statistically significant, and broadly consistent with their implied values from the 
VAR and the AE DYNAMIC . The coefficient on core abnormal earnings is equal to 0.866. This 
is relatively close to its mean theoretical value of 0.529. The difference between the magnitudes 
is consistent with the evidence in Alfonso et al. (2015) that the market overvalues core earnings, 
when firms classification-shift. Book value has a coefficient equal to 0.317 which has the same 
sign but a smaller magnitude in relation to its theoretical value of 1.044. Dividends have a 
                                                 
24
 In untabulated results, we convert variables into their decile rankings and use the decile rankings in the valuation 
model rather than actual values. Results are not sensitive to this approach.  
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Both purified special items and shifted negative core earnings coefficients are substantially 
different from their implied theoretical values. The market attaches a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of 0.653 to purified special items, in contrast to the predicted negative and 
small coefficient of −0.083. The coefficient on shifted negative core earnings of 0.568 is 
relatively similar in magnitude to purified special items, but is statistically insignificant, which is 
also inconsistent with its calculated theoretical value of 0.872 and its positive statistical 
significance in relation to prediction of future abnormal earnings previously reported. When we 
replace purified special items (gains and losses) with only purified negative special items in 
column (B), we obtain a smaller coefficient on shifted negative core earnings that is 
insignificant, and a higher statistically significant positive coefficient on purified negative special 
items. In column (C), we test the valuation model when the two components of special items    
are aggregated. Results show that the market attaches a statistically significant                   
positive coefficient of 0.648 to reported special items, but that the difference between this 
coefficient and the coefficient of 0.866 on core abnormal earnings is statistically significant 
[ 16.17, 0.00]F value P value    .  
In Panel B column (A), we estimate the valuation coefficients of the CE MODEL . Similar to 
the CAE MODEL , results indicate that the coefficients on core earnings, book value and  
dividends are qualitatively consistent with their theoretical values from the VAR estimation. The 
coefficient on core earnings is 0.922 and has a corresponding theoretical value of 0.592.  The 
differential magnitudes between book value and dividends coefficients and their theoretical 
counterparts are similar to those in the CAE MODEL . In contrast, the coefficient on purified 
special items has an opposite sign in relation to the calculated theoretical coefficient and the 
difference between the magnitude of the coefficient and its theoretical counterpart is obvious. 
Moreover, the coefficient on shifted negative core earnings of 0.595 is insignificantly different 
                                                 
25
 Hand and Landsman (2005) investigate different explanations for the pricing of dividends. In our models, we 
actually allow dividends to have forecasting and valuation effects, yet observe a higher valuation coefficient on 
dividends than its calculated theoretical value.  Thought this is not the focus of our paper, we find it intuitively 
appealing from a theoretical perspective to link this excess in coefficient magnitude to corrections of the differences 
between the market estimation of the core abnormal earnings and book value coefficients that we observe here and 
their theoretical values.  
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from zero in comparison to the theoretical coefficient of 0.936 based on the VAR. We repeat the 
same tests in Panel B columns (B and C) as per Panel A columns (B and C) and the inferences 
we drew earlier do not change. Moreover, in untabulated results, we estimate the valuation 
models after adding _ tni plug or _ib plug  and all results are consistent.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
5.5.2 Does the Market Anticipate the Incidence of Shifting? 
So far, our valuation results suggest that the market acts as if it does not see through 
classification shifting. In addition, the market appears to overestimate the implications of special 
items on future abnormal earnings. One possible interpretation for the overvaluation of special 
items is that the market applies a higher coefficient on the entire amount of special items in order 
to mitigate its limited ability to identify the core element of special items. In this case, the market 
chooses to penalize suspected firms by placing an incremental valuation coefficient on their 
special items
26
. In order to test this, we estimate the following model: 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 _t t t t t tMV ce te shift ind te bv dv             (17) 
where _shift ind  is an indicator variable that is equal to one if 0tsce   and zero otherwise. If 
the market is able to identify the “incidence” of shifting, but cannot “quantify” the shifted 
component, we expect that the market attaches an incremental valuation coefficient to the special 
items interaction term and also values the shifters‟ special items similar to core earnings, that is 
3 0   and 1 2 3    . We estimate the valuation model using a fixed effect panel model and 
report the results in Table 8. 
Table 8 reveals some interesting results. The coefficient on special items, 2 0.491  , is 
significantly lower than core earnings, 1 0.922  ,[ 44.08, 0.00]F value P value    . The 
coefficient on the interaction term is significantly higher than zero, 3 0.319( 4.23)t   , and 
                                                 
26
 Note that the majority of special items are expenses (negative data values), hence a positive coefficient on special 
items indicates their negative association with the market value. As in previous sections, results do not change when 
we use only negative special items.  
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both core earnings and shifters‟ special items coefficients are insignificantly different  
[ 3.91, 0.048]F value P value    . 
Taken together, the valuation results suggest that stock prices do not fully impound the differing 
implications of special items components, because of the market limited ability to quantify the 
core and transitory elements of special items. Nevertheless, the market appears to be able to 
detect the incidence of shifting, rather than the magnitude of shifted earnings, and chooses to 
place a higher valuation coefficient on the entire amount of special items. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines core earnings misclassification from conceptual and empirical perspectives. 
It develops a robust forecasting and valuation framework that ties the evolution of a 
parsimonious set of accounting variables, which includes misclassified core earnings, to their 
valuation weights in the price models. The mapping of accounting variables into equity prices 
requires, besides a specific VAR characterization, only the clean surplus identity and the 
dividend discount model. The assumed VAR does not limit the generalizability of our empirical 
results, because we estimate our forecasting and valuation results from unrestricted regressions 
and compare the coefficients on the variables with their theoretical counterparts implied by our 
assumed underlying VAR. The conceptual analysis also serves as a solid basis for how one 
would expect misclassified core earnings to behave in forecasting and valuation. Specifically, it 
suggests two possible roles for negative core earnings that are opportunistically transferred to 
special items; an information role as a core earnings component and a bad news signaling role 
for lower future profitability.  
We then develop an original metric of the misclassified operating expenses that is based on the 
McVay (2006) model. Our measure disentangles recurring expenses from nonrecurring real 
special items. It also accords with the plausible notion that not all firms with negative special 
items are misclassifying expenses, as is sensibly expected to be the case, and estimates the 
suspected shifted expenses at the firm-year level.  
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We test empirically the descriptive validity of our conceptual framework using different 
specifications of the models. Results validate our measure of shifted negative core earnings and 
show that our modeling procedures predict reasonable theoretical values for accounting variables 
coefficients. We provide evidence that shifted negative core earnings forecast one year ahead 
abnormal earnings in a similar fashion to reported core earnings. Although reported special items 
have limited forecasting ability in relation to one year ahead abnormal earnings; they include 
some “hidden” forecasting-relevant information due to classification shifting. The abnormal 
earnings dynamic results lend support to the ability of our classification shifting metric to extract 
this “core earnings” information content from special items. Purified special items do not 
significantly forecast future abnormal earnings, as broadly expected for transitory earnings. 
Although the theoretical bad news signal is indicated by the magnitude of the coefficient for 
shifted negative core earnings in abnormal earnings forecasts, the signal effect is only modest.  
In relation to market valuation, we find that stock prices do not fully reflect the heterogeneity 
between the components of special items. Nevertheless, when we estimate the valuation model 
using reported special items and allow the coefficient on reported special items to vary by the 
occurrence of shifting, an interesting result emerges. We find that the market places an 
incremental significant coefficient on reported special items when shifting occurs. In addition, 
the market values the entire amount of special items similar to core earnings. We conclude that 
the market can, at best, detect the incidence of shifting, but has limited ability in measuring the 
respective amount of shifted earnings. Therefore, the market chooses to penalize shifters by 
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tce  Core earnings = [ Sales – Cost of Goods Sold – Selling, General and Administrative 
expenses (#13) ] / Sale (#12)  
1tce   
Change in core earnings 1t tce ce    
 tato  Assets turnover ratio= [ sales (#12) /  1 / 2t tnoa noa  , inoa = operating assets  
operating liabilities  [ Total Assets (#6) – Cash (#1) and Short Term Investments 
(#32)] – [ Total Assets (#6) – Total Debt (#9 + #34) – Book value of Common (#60) 
and Preferred Equity (#130) – Minority Interest (# 38) ]. Average NOA is required 
to be positive. 
 
tato  Change in asset turnover ratio 1t tato ato    
 
tacc  Operating accruals = [ Net Income before Extraordinary Items (#123)  – Cash from 
Operations (#308 – #124)] / Sales (#12) ; 
 
tsa  Percentage change in sales = [ Salest  (#12) 1Salest    / 1Salest  
tneg sa  Percentage change in sales  tsa  if  tsa  is less than zero, and 0 otherwise. 
 
tnegsi  Negative special items= [Special items (#17) / Sales (#12) ] when special items are 
negative, and 0 otherwise. 
 
tMV  Market value three months after the fiscal year end = log (CRSP adjusted stock 
prices  number of outstanding shares) 
 
tbv  
Book value of equity scaled by sales = Common equity(#60)/Sales (#12) 
 
tdv  
Common dividends scaled by sales = Common dividends (#21) / Sales (#12) 
 
tte  
Transitory earnings measured as special items (#17)/ Sales (#12) or as tnegsi  




Purified transitory earnings measured as purified special items or purified negative 
special items according to the model specification in the empirical test. The 




Net income measure of abnormal earnings = [Net income (#172) – 0.12 ×  common 




Income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations measure of abnormal 
earnings = [Income before extraordinary items (#18) / Sales (#12) – 0.12 ×  lagged 
common equity deflated by sales]  
 
tcae  Core abnormal earnings =  [ Sales – Cost of Goods Sold – Selling, General and 




Shifted negative core earnings measured as described in the text. 
_ t tshift ind te
 



































Models of Core Earnings Levels and Changes 
 
Panel A: Core Earnings Level Model  
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Panel B: Core Earnings Change Model 
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  35.03% 51.83%  
11.93% 
52.47% 
The table provides fit statistics of the core earnings level and changes models. Standard errors are robust standard 


















Regressions of Unexpected Core Earnings and Future Unexpected Change in Core Earnings on 
Negative Special Items 
 
 
Panel A: Unexpected Core Earnings Model 
0 1t t t
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Panel B: Unexpected Change in Core Earnings Model 
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R    
0.03% 
The table provides results of pooled OLS regressions of current unexpected core earnings on current negative 
special items, and future unexpected core earnings change on current negative special items. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year. *,**and*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Negative 
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Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A: Distributional Statistics  
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
     
Market value  
(in $ million) 
1933.052 11546.29 0.158 507216.7 
Net income measure of Abnormal earnings  −0.156 0.484 −3.494 0.282 
Income before extraordinary items measure of 
Abnormal earnings  
−0.154 0.473 −3.318 0.248 
Abnormal core earnings  −0.004 0.363 −2.429 0.547 
Core earnings  0.082 0.353 −2.321 0.735 
Reported negative special items  −0.027 0.091 −0.697 0 
Shifted negative core earnings −0.002 0.009 −0.071 0 
Nonzero shifted core expenses −0.011 0.018 −0.071 −6.190 
True special items  −0.021 0.089 −0.697 0.152 
Book value  0.805 1.039 −0.393 7.078 
Dividends  0.015 0.042  0 0.312 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix (Pearson Top; Spearman Bottom) with Respective p-values in 
Parentheses 









      
Core earnings  0.100 0.075 0.303 0.399 
Purified special items 0.245  0.584 0.015 0.093 
Shifted negative core earnings 0.143 0.501  −0.020 0.071 
Book value − 0.259 −0.108 −0.078  0.101 
Dividends 0.248 0.047 0.026 0.257  










Estimated Coefficients of the Vector Autoregression (VAR) and Implied Theoretical Forecasting and Valuation Coefficients 
 
Panel A: The VAR Estimated   Matrix  
The VAR: 
 
1 11 13 14 15 1 1
1 22 2 1
1 11 33 3 1
1 41 42 43 44 45 4 1
1 51 52 53 54 55 5 1
0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
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tcae  tpute  tsce  tbv  tdv  
1tcae   
0.316*** 
(61.43) 






1tpute   
0   0.044*** 
( 8.37) 
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1tsce   
































Panel B: Calculated Abnormal Earnings Dynamic and Market Valuation Parameters Based on the VAR Estimated  Matrix  
 
The Forecasting Model: 1 1 2 3 4 5 1t t t t t t tae ce pute sce bv dv             
Coefficient Theoretical value based on  matrix Calculated value 
1`  11R  
0.354 
2`  22 11 11R     
−0.006 
3`  13 33 11 11R       
0.429 
4`  14 11 11R     
 0.183 
5`  15 11 11R     
0.274 



















Table 4 (continued) 
 
Core Abnormal Earnings Valuation Model ( )CAE MODEL :  
 
1 2 3 4 5
 
t t t t t t







Theoretical value based on  matrix 
 
Calculated value based on 
estimated matrix 
 
I II III Mean 
1
`  11 44 14 41
11 15 44 14 41 45
( )
( )( ) ( )
R
R R
   
     
 
    
 




22 11 44 14 42 22 41
2211 15 44 14 41 45
( )( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( )
R R R
RR R
      
     
   
    
 
 0.091  0.097  0.062 −0.083 
3
`   
 
11 13 44 14 43 33 41
33
33
11 15 44 14 41 45
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( )
R R R R
RR R
       
     
    
    
 
1.036 0.760 0.821 0.872 
4
`  11 44 14 41
11 15 44 14 41 45
( )( ) (
( )( ) ( )
)R R R
R R
   
     
   
    
 
0.993 1.060 1.078 1.044 
5
`  15 44 14 45
11 15 44 14 41 45
( )
( )( ) ( )
R
R R
   
     
 
    
 
0.476 0.574 0.634 0.561 
3 1
` `    
 
13 33 11 44 14 41 43
33 11 15 44 14 41 45
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
R R
R R R
      
      
    
     
 








Table 4 (continued) 
 
Core Earnings Valuation Model ( )CE MODEL : * * * * *
1 2 3 4 5
 
t t t t t t







Theoretical value based on  matrix 
 
Calculated value based on 
estimated  matrix 
 
I II III Mean 
*
1
`  11 44 14 41
11 15 44 14 41 45
[ ( ) ]
( )( ) ( )
R R
R R
   
     
 
    
 
0.512 0.546 0.719 0.592 
*
2
`   
 
14 42 41 22 44 22 11 22
11 15 44 14 41 45 22
( ( 1)) ( )( ( 1))
( )( ) ( ) ( )
R R R R
R R R
       
      
       
     
 
−0.036 −0.039 0.015 −0.02 
*
3
`   
 
14 43 41 33 44 13 33 11 33
11 15 44 14 41 45 33
( ( 1)) ( )( ( 1))
( )( ) ( ) ( )
R R R R
R R R
        
      
        
     
 
1.091 0.818 0.898 0.936 
*
4
`   14 14 41 11 44
11 15 44 14 41 45
( 1)( )
( )( ) ( )
R
R R
R     
     
   
    
 
0.939 1.001 1.000 0.98 
*
5 `  14 41 45 41 44 11 15 11
11 15 44 14 41 45
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
R R R
R R
       
     
     
    
 
0.421 0.516 0.557 0.498 
* *
3 1
` `    
 
13 33 11 44 14 41 43
33 11 15 44 14 41 45
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
R R
R R R
      
      
    
     
 
0.579 0.273 0.179 0.344 
The table provides results of the VAR estimated   matrix and theoretical counterparts of the abnormal earnings dynamics and valuation models coefficients. 
The VAR equations are estimated using fixed effects panel data models, except for the truncated dependent variables equations (shifted core earnings and 
dividends) where censored regressions with fixed effects are used. All VAR equations are estimated with intercepts and suppressed here. *,** ,***indicate 




 percentiles. All variables are defined in the appendix.  
(I) Significant and insignificant estimated  , (II) Only significant (at least at the 5% level) estimated  , (III) Further restrictions on the book value dynamic 
41
0  , 
42
0  , 
43
0  , 
45




Coefficient Estimates of the Abnormal Earnings Dynamic- AE DYNAMIC  
 
 
Panel A: The Abnormal Earnings Dynamic Using a Net Income Measure of Abnormal Earnings 
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 1t t t t t t tae ce pute sce b d error              













































































































































                 1966.02 
                 (0.00) 
 
                 324.195 
                 (0.00) 
  Adjusted
2
 R         0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 




Panel B: The Abnormal Earnings Dynamic Using an Income before Extraordinary Items Measure of 
Abnormal Earnings 
 
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 1
ib
t t t t t t tae ce pute cse bv dv error              
 







   
Fixed effects estimators 
 
Coefficient Variable (A) 
With purified 
special items & 
shifted core 
earnings 
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−0.203*** 
(−85.57) 













































0.4237   
    
2
Adjusted R         0.57 
 









Panel C: Abnormal Earnings Dynamic with the Earnings “plug” Variables: 
 
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1t t t t t t tae ce pute cse bv dv plug error                
 
 
 Fixed effects estimators 
 
 Abnormal earnings dependent variable 
Coefficient Variable  Income before extraordinary items 








tae   
 



































    
2
Adjusted R   0.57 0.58 
The table provides results of the abnormal earnings dynamics estimated coefficients.*,** ,***indicates significance 




 percentiles. All variables 
are defined in the appendix. 
Panel A; reports coefficient estimates for the AE DYNAMIC  using OLS, Fama-McBeth regressions, panel 
random effects, and panel fixed effects models. Abnormal earnings are measured using net income. t-statistics for 
the Fama-Macbeth regressions are Newey-West adjusted with a lag of 2. Results don‟t change using different lags 
Panel B; reports coefficient estimates for different specifications of the AE DYNAMIC  using a panel fixed effects 
model. Abnormal earnings are measured using income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. 
Panel C: reports coefficient estimates after including the earnings plug variable as an additional explanatory variable 
















Abnormal Earnings Dynamic with Positive/Negative Earnings Variables: 
 /   /  
1 0 1 1 2 2 3
4 5 1
_ _
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Coefficient Variable Fixed effects estimator 























 _t tpute ind pute  
0.101 
(1.33) 


































Adjusted R   
0.57 
The table provides results of the abnormal earnings dynamics estimated with positive/negative earnings variables. 
_
t
ce ind  is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if 
t
ce  is negative, and 0 otherwise. _
t
pute ind  is an indicator 
variable that is equal to 1 if 
t
pute  is negative, and 0 otherwise. Abnormal earnings are measured using income 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. *,** ,***indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and the 0.01 














Coefficient Estimates of the Valuation Models 
 
 
Panel A: Core Abnormal Earnings Valuation Model ( )CAE MODEL  
 
1 2 3 4 5 t t t t t tMV cae pute sce bv dv          
 
   
Fixed effects estimators 
 
Coefficient Variable (A) 
With purified 
special items & 
shifted core 
expenses 
                         
 
(B) 
With purified negative special 
items & shifted core expenses 
(C) 






   





















   0.648*** 
(14.20) 


































Panel B: Core Earnings Valuation Model ( )CE MODEL  
 
1 2 3 4 5 t t t t t tMV ce pute sce bv dv          
 
   
Fixed effects estimators 
 
Coefficient Variable (A) 
With true special 
items & shifted 
core expenses 
                                 
 
(B) 
With true negative special items 
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   0.676*** 
(16.41) 
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The table provides results of the valuation models. All implied theoretical counterparts of valuation coefficients are 
based on mean theoretical values reported in Table 4 (Mean). *** indicates significance at 0.01 level. Variables are 

















The Valuation Models and the Incidence of Shifting 
 
 
The CE MODEL with a Shifting Indicator  
0 1 2 3 4 5
 _
t t t t t t
MV ce te shift ind te bv dv             
 
  Fixed effects estimators 
Coefficient Variable Valuation Models 
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Adjusted R  
 0.08 
The table provides results of the valuation model estimated with a shifting indicator variable that interacts with 
reported special items. *,** ,***indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and the 0.01 levels, respectively. Variables are 


















Inter-Temporal Analysis of Unexpected Core Earnings  
 
 
 Panel A: A Seven-Year Window Analysis of Unexpected Core Earnings Surrounding the Shifting Metric,  




Panel B: A Seven-Year Window Analysis of Unexpected Core Earnings Surrounding the Shifting Metric for 
Current Shifters and Serial Shifters         
 
 
The figure presents the time series properties of unexpected core earnings surrounding the negative special items 
reporting for purposes of shifting or as a result of poor performance. Year 0 is the event year where the shifting/poor 







Annual Trend of the Frequency of Negative Special Items and Shifted Negative Core Earnings 
 
 
 Panel A: Percentage of Firms Reporting Negative Special Items and Shifting Negative Core Earnings 
 
 













Annual Trend of the Magnitude of Negative Special Items and Shifted Negative Core Earnings 
 
 
Panel A: Mean of the Absolute Value of Negative Special Items Reported by Negative Special Items Firms 
 
Panel B: Mean of the Absolute Values of Negative Special Items Deflated by Sales and Shifted Negative Core 
Earnings 
 

































Standard textbooks on financial statement analysis suggest excluding special items when 
forecasting future earnings. This is because special items have significantly lower information 
content than core earnings. Recent research documents a substantial increase in the magnitude 
and persistence of negative special items, which is not fully explained by corresponding changes 
in the business environment that could have resulted in recognizing shocks outside core earnings. 
This paper provides evidence on how the manager‟s misclassification of negative core earnings 
(operating expenses and losses) as negative special items (McVay 2006) affects special items 
reporting and the market valuation of special items. We develop a simple framework that 
demonstrates a scenario when the manager is more likely to misclassify earnings. The analysis 
considers the flexibility allowed under GAAP in presenting earnings-line items and highlights 
the case when the earnings presentation is discretionary (within-GAAP) versus manipulative 
(non-GAAP). In the current setting, investors are not able to perfectly observe the negative core 
earnings misclassification, and depend on reporting signals in the income statements to infer it. 
When the signal of misclassification is of low quality, investors‟ expectations of future 
profitability conditional on the signal contain noise that enters stock prices, which in turn 
temporarily diverge from the intrinsic values. 
We then develop empirical proxies for the main theoretical constructs to capture the negative 
core earnings misclassification phenomenon. The empirical results contribute to our 
understanding of prior empirical results on negative special items and expand current research in 
many aspects. First, We provide evidence that the propensity of the firm to report the highest 
(lowest) negative special items‟ magnitude in the market increases (decreases) with the 
difference between last year‟s reported core earnings and current year‟s expected core earnings. 
Using logistic regressions, We find that this core earnings difference is a main determinant of the 
decision of reporting large negative special items, after controlling for factors associated with 
negative special items recognition. This result expands the evidence in McVay (2006) that 
negative special items are used to hide negative core earnings, by showing ex ante when this is 
more likely to take place. We then examine the extent to which large negative special items 
reporting is attributable to either discretion allowed under GAAP or violation of GAAP. 
Interestingly, the evidence suggests that extremely large negative special items represent GAAP 
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violation rather than allowable management discretion. Therefore, in addition to the economic 
activity explanation for the increase in special items reporting as suggested by Donelson et al. 
(2011), our results suggest that the manager‟s motive to manage core earnings is a primary 
determinant of the magnitude of negative special items.   
Second, moving to the fundamental composition of negative special items, we split negative 
special items into two additive components; one that reflects misclassified negative core earnings 
(accounting misclassification) and another representing real negative special items (economic 
conditions). Using logistic regressions, we provide evidence that the association between 
negative special items and subsequent restatements is mainly attributable to misclassified 
negative core earnings rather than real special items at the time of misstatement, after controlling 
for other factors associated with future restatements. These results improve the results in Cain et 
al. (2014) who use a different approach to split negative special items into low and high quality 
special items components, but provide results of significant associations of both components and 
future restatements.  
Third, we provide strong evidence that the ability of negative special items to forecast lower 
future abnormal earnings, earnings, and earnings before special items is mostly attributable to the 
misclassification of negative core earnings. This expands the results in Fairfield et al. (2009), 
Burgstahler et al. (2002) and Cready et al. (2010), by showing that while negative special items 
have significant but low implications for future profitability, they contain a core component that 
forecasts future profitability for a period up to three years, similar to reported core earnings in 
the income statement. These findings are important because while some standard textbooks on 
financial statement analysis suggest excluding special items when forecasting future profit 
margin (Easton et al. 2008, Lundholm and Sloan 2004), the present paper shows that this might 
be “less harmful” if applied only on adjusted negative special items that represent unusual 
events. Quantifying the core composition of negative special items provides one way for such an 
adjustment.    
Fourth, we provide evidence that stock prices reflect the lower persistence of negative special 
items in comparison to core earnings, but appear not to fully impound the heterogeneous 
implications of special items components for future earnings. Further test results suggest that 
investors are not able to track the movement of negative core earnings to negative special items 
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and rely on reporting signals in the income statement to infer this movement. The results reveal 
that the investors‟ perceived signal is noisy and induces errors in stock prices, such that the stock 
return association with negative special items changes with the degree of the reporting signal, but 
this change does not correspond with any improvement in negative special items predictability 
for future earnings. In contrast, an informative signal of misclassification that is associated with a 
steady improvement in negative special items predictability is not accompanied by a consistent 
price adjustment.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework. Section 3 is a description of the data. Section 4 presents results of the manager‟s 
misclassification decision. Section 5 describes the negative special items decomposition 
approach and reports results on the validation of the approach. Section 6 reports the forecasting 
and pricing results of negative special items components. In section 7, we present the 
misclassification signal tests and results. The final section is a summary of the main findings of 
this paper. 
2. Theoretical Motivation and Modeling 
The model setup assumes an accounting system that processes transactions and produces the 
base information for financial statements that is subsequently mapped into an earnings report 
issued by the manager. We distinguish between a core earnings signal, , which denotes                 
a summary of the annual base information that is unbiased about the terminal value, and reported 
core earnings, , which map the current core earnings signal.   
Near to the end of year , if the manager privately observes that 
 
is lower than a certain 
threshold, such as last year‟s reported core earnings, he can shift some negative core earnings to 
current period‟s special items to give a better picture for the firm‟s core profitability, and then 
reports earnings that are biased with respect to the underlying core earnings signal in the 
following manner: 




 t t trc c 
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where  denotes the level of  misclassification. Although  inflates  relative to , the 
increase in  is offset by a decrease (an increase) in current period‟s (negative) special items 
and hence bottom line earnings are not affected. Nevertheless,  is likely to affect investors‟ 
perceptions because different line items receive different weights from investors when setting 
stock prices.  
Assume the following function for :  
  (2)   
where 
 
denotes current accounting standards (GAAP),  is the manager‟s  private 
information about the firm‟s core earnings signal and  is a random shock.  is a reporting 
parameter that captures the degree to which  is a transformation of .  is the 
acceptable range where the manager‟s movement of expenses is discretionary, within GAAP and 
less likely to raise red flags for outside monitors.  is limited not to equal zero, because  acts 
as background information for the manager‟s classification choice. If  is equal to unity,  is 
perfect transformation of GAAP. However, if ,  represents GAAP violation rather than 
allowable management discretion.  
Though  is not communicated to investors by the manager, there is a probability that 
investors make some inferences about the misclassification of earnings conditional on potential 
misclassification signals in reported statements, . This implies that: 
  (3) 
where t  is a disturbance term (garbling in the misclassification signal received by investors). 
 becomes noisy with higher first and second moments of the disturbance term (i.e. when 
and ).  
Assuming rational expectations hypothesis (Mishkin1983 and Sheffrin 1996), the market 
assessment of future earnings conditional on  is said to be rational when this assessment 
agrees with the actual earnings process at least in terms of the first moment: 

























  (4)    
where  is the market conditional expectations operator,  is future earnings,  is the 
price that the firm receives for its equity and  is the intrinsic value of equity.  
When  is of low quality, the market assessment of future earnings conditional on  is 
irrational. Therefore stock price measures intrinsic value with a mispricing error and the extent 
of this mispricing depends on the first and second moments of the error term. 
3. Sample Selection 
To test the implications of the model including the use of negative special items as a 
“shifting” device to manage core earnings and the market consequences, we collect an initial 
sample of accounting data and stock returns from the intersection of Compustat and CRSP, for 
the period 1989−2012. The sample begins in 1989 because accruals are measured directly from 
the cash flow statement, and the cash flows from operations become available in Compustat after 
1988. Equally (value) weighted abnormal returns are size-adjusted returns calculated as the 
difference between buy-hold returns in excess of the buy-hold returns on the CRSP equally 
(value) weighted market index. The measurement of returns starts the fourth month of the fiscal 
year and ends with the third month of the next fiscal year. Delisting returns are used when 
available, and we substitute zero for missing monthly returns following Campbell et al. (2010). 
A two-digit SIC code is used to identify industry association and a minimum of 15 non-missing 
data are required per industry-year group.  
The following restrictions are imposed on the data. First, we eliminate firms with sales less 
than $1 million and missing book values. Second, we assign 0 to missing values of extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations used to define accruals, and require non-missing values of 
variables used in measuring expected core earnings. We also require the estimated unexpected 
core earnings to be non-missing. For the full sample regressions, we assign 0 to special items if 
they are missing or if the special items are positive (Elliott and Hanna 1996, Dechow and Ge 
2006, and MacVay 2006)
27
. The resulting sample is 67,859 (10,185) firm-years (firms).   
                                                 
27
 We require non-zero special items in all regressions that uses a subsample of negative special items firms.   
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Restatement data are obtained from the Audit Analytics Non-Reliance Restatement database. 
We use Audit Analytics for the following reasons. First, Audit Analytics covers an entire set of 
restating firms and indicates the reason for restatements. This allows me to direct the restatement 
tests to only restatements due to irregularities (intentional misstatements) rather than error-
related misstatements that are unintentional (Hennes et al. 2008).  Second, Audit Analytics 
indicates the fiscal years affected by restatements. Other competing databases, such as the GAO 
database, identify only the year of the restatement announcement, which is an average of two 
years after the misstatement year (Cheffers et al. 2010). Studies using these databases assume 
that a misstated year is one that is followed by a restatement over the subsequent two or three 
years. While the two or three years‟ range is the average period, identifying the misstated years 
from Audit Analytics eliminates any possible measurement error associated with this lag 
assumption.  
Restatement data from Audit Analytics begin in 2000. Therefore, we merge Audit Analytics 
with the Compustat-CRSP sample for the period 2000-2012, and estimate the regressions that 
involve restatements for this sample period. The resulting sample consists of 38,282 (6,850) 
firm-years (firms).  
We winsorize each accounting continuous variable at its first and 99
th
 percentiles to control 
for the potential effect of outliers, and report two-tailed significance levels in all regressions. We 
present descriptive statistics of the main variables before reporting the results of the regressions 
throughout the paper.  
4. The Manager’s Decision to Shift Negative Core Earnings to Negative Special Items 
4.1. Main Results 
The theoretical model suggests that the manager is more likely to take a misclassification 
decision by moving negative core earnings to negative special items when he observes that the 
core earnings signal is lower than a certain threshold. To investigate this relation, we initially 
develop an empirical model that tests for the likelihood that a firm reports negative special items 
deflated by sales that are higher than the annual cross section mean of negative special items 
firms after controlling for the firm‟s poor current and historical performance and other specific 
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factors that are associated with special items reporting. Specifically, we estimate the following 
regression: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 1
6 7 8 9 1
10 2~ 1 11 1 12 2~ 1
                       1 2 5
                       
t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t t
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    
     
   
     
 (5) 
where the dependent variable 1tLARGESP   if firm  reports negative special items deflated by 
sales that are higher than the cross section mean of non-zero negative special items firms at year 
, and zero otherwise
28
. The main variable of interest is , defined as reported core 
earnings at year  minus predicted core earnings at year . This definition assumes that that 
last year‟s reported core earnings is the manager‟s benchmark (core earnings threshold) for what 
he perceives to be a high or low observed signal of core earnings at year , and that predicted 
core earnings act as a proxy for the manager‟s observed core earnings signal . The choice of 
this benchmark is motivated by evidence in Schrand and Walther (2000) that managers use the 
last period‟s earnings as a benchmark to evaluate current period‟s earnings. We estimate 
predicted core earnings as the fitted value from the following core earnings model developed in 
McVay (2006): 
  (6) 
All variables in equation (6) are measured similar to McVay (2006). 
 
is core earnings 
measured as operating income before depreciation divided by sales. 
 
is assets turnover 
measured as sales divided by average net operating assets. Net operating assets are calculated as 
operating assets minus operating liabilities. 
 
is operating accruals measured as net income 
before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations and divided by sales.
 
is 
sales growth measured as the percentage change in sales, and 
 
is the percentage 
change in sales if sales growth ( ) is negative and 0 otherwise. Following McVay (2006), 
                                                 
28
 Note that special items are conceptually infrequent or unusual earnings items. However, this infrequency at the 
firm level does not imply infrequency in the cross section. Indeed, one would expect average special items reporting 
to be indicative of common economic conditions. Reporting above average special items is subject to the firm‟s 















the core earnings model is estimated out of sample for each industry-year combination and 
excluding firm .   
We predict the coefficient on 
 
to be positive, indicating a positive relation between the 
likelihood to report above-average negative special items and the difference between the prior 
year‟s core earnings benchmark and current year‟s predicted core earnings. We include other 
factors that might potentially contribute to the likelihood of reporting large negative special 
items. These variables control for economic determinants associated with negative special items 
reporting and are based on prior research. We include a variable that controls for significant 
mergers and acquisitions , because some merger-related costs are reported under 
negative special items, hence significant mergers are expected to be positively correlated with 
large negative special items. we measure significant mergers and acquisitions following Baber et 
al. (2011), but as a dummy variable that is 
 
if annual acquisitions are greater than 
20 % of the firm‟s beginning of the year total assets, and zero otherwise. 
 
is the natural log 
of average total assets (Ahmed and Duellman 2007). We expect the coefficient on  to be 
negative, because Callen et al. (2010) find that reporting negative special items is positively 
associated with conditional conservatism, and smaller firms are more conservative consistent 
with their higher level of operational uncertainty. We include abnormal stock returns in the 
current year  and the last year , measured as the firm‟s stock return in a given year 
minus equally weighted market return for the year, in order to control for stock price 
performance. We expect the coefficients on the abnormal returns variables to be negative, 
because poor performing firms are found to be more likely to undertake higher restructuring 
charges (Lee 2014) and one-time write-offs (Francis et al. 1996), which are reported as special 
items.  
We use ,  and 
 
to control for the frequency of negative special 
items recognition, because Elliot and Hanna (1996) find that approximately 50 % of negative 
special items firms report negative special items in the subsequent period, and that 50 % of those 
reporting two prior negative special item charges report a third charge. In addition, Johnson et al. 
(2011) find that the preceding reporting frequency of negative special items over the prior five 
years can have some implications on subsequent reporting. We measure 
 












reported negative special items in the previous year and zero otherwise. Similarly,  
and  if the firm reported negative items two times and five times over the past two 
and five years, respectively, and zero otherwise. Controlling for prior reporting frequency is 
important in this setting, because the aim is to capture the currently overstated negative special 
items that are attributable to the contemporaneous signal on core earnings rather than the 
negative special items firms‟ propensity to report consecutive charges. We expect the reporting 
frequency to be positively, albeit weakly, associated with the response variable, because 
tLARGESP  
captures the existence of “above-average” reporting of negative special items rather 
than “frequent” reporting.  
We use the firm‟s industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio at the year preceding the special 
item charge , because Francis et al. (1996) find that book-to-market ratios higher 
than industry peers are positively associated with write-off charges. This is consistent with the 
assets being impaired when their book values are higher than their economic values which might 
result in a significant level of negative special items. We measure  as the difference 
between the firm‟s book-to-market ratio and the cross section mean of the ratio in the firm‟s 
industry. In addition to the adjusted level of the ratio, we include the change in the firm‟s book-
to-market ratio in the year preceding the special item charge . We expect the 
coefficients on both book-to-market ratio variables to be positive. We also include the firm‟s 
industry-adjusted return on asset pre-special items  and the change in the firm‟s 
return on asset one year before the negative special item . We measure the return 
on assets as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus special items 
and divided by average assets. We expect the coefficients on both return on asset ratios to be 
negatively associated with the dependent variable. 
In addition to the test in equation (5), the dependent variable is also modified to be either 
 
or , to capture extreme special item charges.
 
is an indicator variable that takes 
the value 1 when the firm reports negative special items deflated by sales that are in the fifth 
quintile of their distribution in the year, and zero otherwise. 
 
is an indicator variable that 
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in the year, and zero otherwise. Quintiles are formed on the absolute magnitude of (non-zero) 
negative special items deflated by sales every year. We expect the coefficient on the main 
variable of interest, , to be increasing with 
 
and decreasing with . In addition, 
We predict that the negative impact of 
 
on the outcome variable 
 
is less pronounced 
than the positive impact of  on the outcome variable 5tHI , because the test for the 
misclassification likelihood is more directed to the propensity to hit an upper level of negative 
special items. All control variables that are expected to be positively (negatively) associated with 
tLARGESP  are expected to be positively (negatively) associated with , and negatively 
(positively) associated with . Since these regressions examine dichotomous choices, We 
estimate the regression models using logistic regressions (LOGIT), to mitigate the 
heteroscedasticity that might be associated with using ordinary least squares linear probability 
model (OLS-LPM) estimation (Stone and Rasp 1991). However, We also report the OLS-LPM 
results to see if they are different from the LOGIT results.  
Table 1 reports the results of the regressions. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the 
regression variables. In Panel B, We present the coefficient estimates using LOGIT and OLS-
LPM. In Panel C, wee provide some further analyses regarding the economic significance of the 
variables coefficients. In both panels B and C, we highlight the main variable of interest, , 
that we predict to be a major determinant of the misclassification decision, consistent with 
theory. Model (1) is the regression model with tLARGESP  as the dependent variable. Model (2) 




as the dependent variables, 
respectively. The logistic regression results in Panel B show significance in the predicted 
direction of 
 
in the three models. According to Model (1), there is a high probability of 
reporting negative special items above the annual cross section mean when the difference 
between last year‟s reported core earnings and current year‟s predicted core earnings increases. 
Model (2) shows that the likelihood of reporting extremely high negative special items that are in 
the fifth quintile of the negative special items distribution also significantly increases with 
. Model (3) shows that extremely low negative special items that are in the first quintile of 













extant research and predictions, except that is insignificant in all models, and 
is insignificant in Model (3).
 
appears to act as the main influential 
determinant of reported large negative special items, consistent with a misclassification decision. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the negative coefficient on 
 
is relatively lower in Model (3) 
consistent with predictions. The OLS-LPM estimations show consistent results to the LOGIT in 
the three models.  
Panel C provides insights into the economic significance of the coefficients and changes in 
probabilities of the dependent variables when a firm takes different positions with regard to 
incentives for special items reporting. For each of the three models, we calculate the marginal 
effects of the coefficients when the model is estimated using actual values as in Panel B, the 
marginal effects when the model is estimated using standardized variables
29
, and the change in 
propensity to report the different magnitudes of negative special items, according to the models 
specifications for each variable when the firm moves from the first to the fifth quintile of the 
variable
30
. We also calculate the probability of the occurrence of the dependent variable when 
the firm is in the bottom (top) quintiles of the explanatory variables with positive (negative) 
coefficients
31
. Model (1) shows that when the firm takes on lower quintile values of the 
explanatory variables, there is a probability of 1.5% for large negative special items reporting. 
When the firm moves to the upper quintile position, the propensity to report large negative 
special items increases to 82.4% i.e. there is an 80.9% change in probabilities of large negative 
special items reporting between the two hypothetical positions. Model (2) shows also consistent 
results. In addition, moving from the first to the fifth quintile values of each explanatory variable 
and holding the remaining variables constant at their means reveal that 
 
is the main 
determining factor for the change in the probability of reporting large negative special items in 
Model (1) and (2). Interestingly, when the focus is on the propensity to report extremely low 
negative special items in Model (3), the change in probability between the two hypothetical 
                                                 
29
 In standardized variables regressions; continuous explanatory variables are ranked into quintiles, while indicator 
variables take the values 1 and 0 as in the actual values regressions.  
30
 These economic significance analyses are broadly similar to Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) 
31
The benchmark probability for indicator variables is determined with the zero (one) value of the indicator variable, 
when it has a positive (negative) coefficient. 






positions of the explanatory variables is 56%, and the effect of 
 
on the outcome variable 
becomes relatively less pronounced consistent with prediction. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Figure 1 shows an inter-temporal analysis of negative special items for the years surrounding 
signed . In Panel A (B), the event year 0 is the year in which  is positive (negative). 
The plots show negative special items (deflated by sales) in the three years before and after the 
event year. Figure 1 Panel A shows that negative special items are relatively stable three years 
before the year of positive . At the event year, there is an upward spike in negative special 
items, which is followed by a monotonic decrease in negative special items over the following 
three years. This result is consistent with a higher motivation to move more negative core 
earnings to negative special items, when the prior year‟s reported core earnings are higher than 
the current year‟s predicted core earnings, which results in a larger magnitude of reported 
negative special items at the event year. 
Figure 1 Panel B shows that negative special items monotonically increase up to the event 
year of negative . However, at the event year, there is a downward spike in negative 
special items. Over the three years following the event year, the monotonic increasing pattern of 
negative special items continues. This result is consistent with less motivation to move negative 
core earnings to negative special items, when the prior year‟s reported core earnings are less than 
the current year‟s predicted core earnings, which yields a smaller magnitude of negative special 
items. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
4.2 Is the Manager Decision to Shift Negative Core Earnings to Negative Special Items 
Discretionary or Manipulative? 
Thus far, results reveal that  is an influential determinant of the probability to report 
large negative special items. We now further investigate whether the extreme reporting strategy 
is discretionary and within-GAAP or manipulative and represents a GAAP violation. According 
to the model, accounting misclassification is indicative of the degree of compliance with 








motivated the misclassification. To align the empirical analysis as closely as possible with the 
model, we focus only on a cutoff point for compliance with GAAP such that 
=1 if the firm‟s fiscal year is not a misstated year, and zero if the firm‟s 
fiscal year is a misstated year that has been subsequently restated ( due to irregularities or fraud). 
As mentioned in the data section, the test here is restricted to years after 2000, because 
restatements data from Audit Analytics are only available after 2000
32
.  
We estimate the following regression: 
  (7) 
where  are the same set of controls used in equation (5).  
We predict the coefficient on  to be positive if the extreme reporting 
strategy of negative special items complies with the accounting standards. In other words, the 
manager uses his discretion and classifies some negative core earnings as negative special items, 
which increases the negative special items magnitude, but this classification choice is within the 
limits allowed under accounting standards. We predict the coefficient on  
to be negative if the reporting strategy is more likely to represent GAAP violation.  
As a robustness check, we replace  with an indicator variable, , which is 
equal to 1 if reported negative special items deflated by sales are within a ratio of 30 % higher or 
lower than the annual cross section mean of non-zero negative special items firms, and zero 
otherwise. The aim is to ensure that results of equation (7) are exclusive for a large negative 
special items strategy that is more likely to reflect accounting misclassification rather than 
normal special items reporting. Therefore, we predict lower significance for the coefficient on 
 in this case. Table 2 reports the results of these models using logistic 
regressions. 
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 The use of an indicator variable GAAPCOMPLIANCE  is meant to proxy for firms that do not misreport their 
financial statements due to irregularities or fraud and regardless of the cause of misstatement. The indicator variable 
partitions firms on the basis of compliance with GAAP and thus firms that restate their financial statements for 
reasons other than expense misclassification are pooled together as violators. Interpreted with caution, the results 
here investigate the tendency of complying firms versus manipulating firms to report large negative special items. 
GAAPCOMPLIANCE








Table 2 Panel A reports results of the compliance of extreme special items reporting with 
accounting standards. The results reveal that the coefficient on  is 
significantly negative with industry-year fixed effects, and 
 
without industry-year fixed effects). This suggests that the 
outcome strategy of extreme negative special items reporting is more likely associated                           
with firms not complying with accounting standards. The coefficient on  remains 
significantly positive at a relatively similar magnitude with 
industry-year fixed effects, and 
 
without industry-year fixed 
effects).  
Table 2 Panel B reports results of the compliance of normal special items reporting with 
accounting standards. The results reveal that the coefficient on  is                        
lower and insignificant with industry-year fixed effects and 
without fixed effects). Moreover, the coefficient on  is 
negative and insignificant with industry-year fixed effects, and
without industry-year fixed effects). These findings indicate 
that the GAAP violation results in Table 2 Panel A are specific for a reporting strategy of large 
negative special items that is consistent with negative core earnings misclassification. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
5. Decomposition of Negative Special Items: Separating Accounting Misclassification from 
Economics 
5.1 The Decomposition Approach 
McVay (2006) finds evidence that accounting misclassification results in a positive 
association between current unexpected core earnings and current negative special items. She 
argues that the negative special items‟ “positive” coefficient captures the average degree of 
misclassified operating expenses in special items. Following Abdalla and Clubb (2015), we split 
negative special items into two additive components. The first component represents negative 
core earnings that are misclassified in the income statement (accounting misclassification). The 
tGAAPCOMPLIANCE
1( 0.264, 3.161t statistics     
1 0.187, 2.35t statistics     
tDIFF
2( 2.398, 10.58t statistics   
2 2.179, 9.64t statistics   
tGAAPCOMPLIANCE
1( 0.095, 0.92t statistics     
1 0.055, 0.54t statistics      tDIFF
2( 0.046, 0.25t statistics     
2 0.086, 0.41t statistics     
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second component represents special items that reflect unusual events (economics). To do this,  
we use the same core earnings expectation model by McVay (2006) as in previous sections to 
proxy for expected core earnings, and regress current unexpected core earnings on current 
negative special items (measured in absolute terms here) for each industry-year group. 
Determination of industry membership by a two digit SIC code gives smaller groups with more 
spread, which enhances the accuracy of the measurement approach
33
. Then, we set all negative 
industry-year coefficients to equal zero, because negative coefficients are consistent with 
negative special items being reported in these industry-year groups due to poor economic 
performance rather than misclassification (approximately 45 % of coefficients are negative). In 
addition, instead of setting all estimated positive coefficients that are higher than one to be zero 
as in Abdalla and Clubb (2015), we alternatively set them to be equal to one (these coefficients 
represent only 4% of all estimated coefficients)
34
 . Finally, we multiply the resulting industry-
year positive coefficients by the actual negative special items of firms in the related industry-year 
group. This produces a firm-year measure of misclassified negative core earnings (that is 
negative by construction to represent the expense nature of the earnings component), denoted 
. We subtract this measure from reported negative special items, , to estimate real 
negative special items that reflect economic conditions rather than accounting misclassification, 
denoted .  
 Figure 2 displays the mean industry-year coefficients over the sample period. The results 
show that the coefficient sign varies. On average, this is consistent with reporting negative 
special items to accommodate misclassified negative core earnings (positive coefficient), or as a 
result of poor performance (negative coefficient). The decomposition approach aims to measure 
misclassified earnings and back out real special items that are not used to manage core earnings. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
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 As mentioned earlier, each industry-year group is required to have at least 15 non-missing observations.  
34
 Both methodological choices are consistent with the notion that classification shifting is bounded by 100% of 
negative special items. One approach chooses to exclude coefficients higher than 100%, while the other one sets 





5.2 Validation of the Decomposition Approach and Prediction of Annual Report 
Restatements 
The empirical evidence so far reveals that firms are less (more) likely to report larger 
negative special items when their financial statements comply with (violate) the accounting 
standards. This suggests that the negative special items reporting strategy might contain 
information that can be used to identify the misstatement years. If  captures information 
about the misuse of negative special items to conceal negative core earnings, and tRSP  is a 
measure of real special items that are not related to earnings management, we expect the 
association between negative special items and the probability to restate an annual report to be 
attributable to the 
 
component of negative special items, after controlling for factors that 
might be related to restatements. We estimate the following regression:  
  (8) 
where 
 
is an indicator variable that is equal to one if firm  fiscal year  is misstated 
and subsequently restated due to accounting irregularities or fraud, and zero otherwise.  is the 
main variable of interest. We first estimate the regression with , and then replace  with its 
underlying components 
 
and . We also estimate the regression by replacing  with 
only an indicator variable  that is equal to one if  is non-zero and zero otherwise, 
as a robustness check. We measure negative special items and their two components in absolute 
terms in these regressions. Most control variables are taken from Dechow et al. (2011) and 
Hribar et al. (2014). 
 
is the change in receivables divided by average total assets. 
 
is the change in inventory divided by average total assets.
 
is the percentage of soft 
assets and defined as total assets minus cash and PPE, divided by total assets. The variables 
 and  are accruals components that improve sales growth and gross margin 
respectively, when misstated.  controls for the accounting flexibility to use net 
operating assets to meet short term earnings expectations (Barton and Simko 2002).  is 
the percentage change in cash sales where cash sales are defined as sales minus change in 
tMCE
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accounts receivable. This cash sales measure controls for the firm‟s change in sales that is not 
subject to accruals management.  is a measure of sales volatility and defined as the 
standard deviation of the firm‟s rolling five-year net sales, divided by average total assets 
(minimum of three non-missing observations). 
 
is the abnormal change in employees 
and defined as the percentage change in the number of employees divided by the percentage 
change in total assets. Dechow et al. (2011) use the  measure to capture information 
about firms reducing employee headcount and overstating assets to cover deteriorating financial 
performance.  is the change in return on assets pre-special items and defined as earnings 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations less special items, divided by average 




to control for stock price performance and 
 
to 
control for optimistic expectations embedded in the firm‟s stock valuation, which can be a 
motive to misstate earnings in order to maintain overvaluation.  is the firm‟s leverage and 
defined as the sum of short term debt and long term debt, divided by average total assets. 
Leverage controls for the effect of debt contracting on misstating earnings in order to satisfy 
financial covenants.  
 
Table 3 Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables. We estimate the 
regressions using OLS-LPM and LOGIT and report the results in Table 3 Panel B. For the sake 
of brevity, we report only the marginal significance from the logistic regressions
35
. Table 3 Panel 
B results reveal that the coefficient on  is significantly positive (0.061, t =2.64)
36
. This 
indicates that a proportion of reported negative special items is associated with the occurrence of 
restatements. When the two components of negative special items are used in lieu of reported 
negative special items in the regression, the results show that the coefficient on the  
component is significantly positive (0.492, t =2.15) and the  component does not load in the 
regression (0.029, t=1.07). When only the  indicator variable is used to proxy for the 
incidence of negative core earnings misclassification, the coefficient on  is positive and 
                                                 
35
 All OLS-LPM and LOGIT coefficients results are very similar.    
36
 Since the OLS-LPM and LOGIT-MEM results in Table 4 are highly consistent, we choose to refer to the OLS-














significant (0.014, t= 3.17).  The economic significance from the LOGIT estimation is also 
highly consistent with the OLS-LPM results. The control variables‟ results are fairly consistent 
with those in Hribar et al. (2014)
37
. These regression results validate the decomposition approach 
by showing that  is the respective component of negative special items that reflects 
earnings management. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
6. The Forecast Information Content of Misclassified Negative Core earnings and the 
Market Perception of Misclassification 
Equation (4) expresses a relation between the market assessment of the earnings process 
relative to the actual earnings process and a resulting equality of stock price and intrinsic value. 
The researcher cannot directly observe the market assessment or measure the intrinsic value 
without error, but can instead observe the historical forecasting relevance of earnings variables 
with respect to future earnings, as well as stock prices. Assuming that stock prices impound the 
market assessment, a comparison between the earnings variable‟s ability to forecast future 
earnings and its perceived valuation relevance with regard to stock returns helps to draw some 




  (9) 
  (10) 
  (11) 
  (12) 
 
is earnings for period divided by sales, 
 
is core earnings measured as operating 
income before depreciation divided by sales, 
 
is reported negative special items divided by 
sales, 
 
is misclassified negative core earnings, 
 
is real special items, 
 
is ending 
book value divided by sales, and tAR  
is abnormal returns measured as stock return for firm  in 
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 Although Hribar et al. (2014) report coefficients‟ results when the dependent variable includes only accounting 
restatement, fraud, or comment letter; our results are reasonably consistent with their results. 
38
 Although we present results from the price change (return) model rather a price level model; using the natural 
logarithm of stock prices measured three months after the end of the fiscal year and the accounting variable levels 
give qualitatively similar results.   
MCE
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year  minus equally weighted market return for year 39, and denotes the change in variables 
between years  and .  
We estimate both the forecasting and pricing models using OLS.  The earnings dependent 
variable is measured using three earnings metrics. We use abnormal earnings (earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus 12% of beginning of the period book 
value)
40
 because abnormal earnings represent the excess value created, which play a central role 
in equity valuation (Ohlson 1995, O‟Hanlon and Peasnell 2002), earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations (earnings hereafter), and earnings before special items. The 
last earnings measurement complements the results by showing whether the relation between 
misclassified negative core earnings and future profitability holds after removing special items 
from the profitability measure. We also estimate the earnings model for a forecast horizon up to 
three years, because we expect firms that temporarily hide negative core earnings in the current 
period to have poorer performance over the next few years. In addition, an earnings variable‟s 
ability to forecast only one-year ahead earnings might not be the only value relevance dimension 
when setting stock prices.  
In the following tests, we use two alternative research designs similar to Doyle et al. (2003) 
with regard to the inclusion/exclusion of zero negative special items observations in/from the 
sample. Including the zero observations improves the analysis by including estimates of the 
impact of other variables in the entire sample. Excluding the zero observations provides direct 
evidence with regard to the magnitude of the non-zero negative special items and rules out the 
possibility that the results are driven to some extent by the decision to have negative special 
items in a given year
41
. The results appear to be robust to both alternative research designs. We 
report the forecasting results in Table 4, and the pricing results in Table 5. 
Table 4 Panel A displays the descriptive statistics of the sample. Table 4 Panel B shows 
estimates of the earnings forecast model without negative special items decomposition. The 
results show that both reported core earnings and negative special items have different 
                                                 
39
 Results do not change when we use value weighted abnormal returns.  
40
 We assume a fixed 12% cost of capital consistent with Barth et al. (1999). 
41
 Doyle et al. (2003) and McVay(2006) use the same alternative research designs in treating zero Pro-forma 





information content with regard to future earnings over all earnings windows
42
. There is a 
decreasing pattern for both the core earnings and negative special items coefficients, as the 
earnings horizon expands. Although the coefficient of negative special items decreases over 
longer windows, it does not lose significance except in the three-year window when the earnings 
forecast variable is measured before special items. 
  
We now test the same forecast models after negative special items decomposition. Table 4 
Panel C shows the results of estimating the models after negative special items are decomposed 
into their components. The results reveal that all earnings variables have some information 
content with regard to one-year ahead abnormal earnings, however, the equality of the earnings 
coefficients cannot be accepted using Wald test (untabulated).  Interestingly, the two components 
of special items look so different now. While the coefficient on misclassified negative core 
earnings has an increasing pattern as the abnormal earnings window expands, the          
coefficient on real negative special items has a decreasing pattern and loses significance.           
In addition, both core earnings and misclassified negative core earnings forecast one               
year-ahead abnormal earnings as if they are the same earnings variable and their                             
coefficients are significantly indifferent .When the     
abnormal earnings window increases, misclassified negative core earnings provide                  
some information beyond core earnings and the difference between both variables coefficients 
becomes marginally significant  for the one-year horizon] 
and  for the two-year horizon]. This is consistent with the 
prediction that temporary shifting in the current period is associated with deterioration in 
profitability in future periods
43
. Similar results are obtained when earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations are used as the earnings forecast variable, except that the 
increasing pattern of the misclassified negative core earnings coefficient is weaker. In addition, 
although the misclassified negative core earnings coefficient is still relatively higher than the 
core earnings coefficient, the difference between the coefficients is insignificant in all earnings 
                                                 
42
 Untabulated results using Wald test show significant differences between the core earnings and negative special 
items coefficients in all regressions over the three earnings windows.  
43
 Abdalla and Clubb (2015) show analytically some conditions under which misclassified negative core earnings act 
as a bad news signal for poor performance besides their role as an earnings variable, which drives their coefficient 
relatively higher than that of reported core earnings, consistent with this incremental informational role. Their 
empirical analyses using only one-year ahead abnormal earnings show that this bad news signal is insignificant. We 
find here that it can be marginally significant when the earnings horizon expands beyond one year.  
[ 0.02, 0.892]F value P value   
[ 4.38, 0.036F value P value   
[ 3.91, 0.0480F value P value   
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windows. Moreover, when earnings before special items are used, there is still a significant 
association between misclassified negative core earnings and future earnings. This ensures that 
the association of misclassified negative core earnings with future earnings is not only 
attributable to the possibility of serial shifting (i.e. the persistence of misclassified negative core 
earnings when firms serially shift in subsequent periods), but also to the forecast of future core 
profitability. This is consistent with the original nature of misclassified earnings as core earnings 
rather than their representational form as special items in the income statement. Furthermore, the 
results show that real special items have their smallest coefficient with regard to one year-ahead 
earnings in this latter case, and that the coefficient loses significance earlier once the forecast 
horizon increases to two years (in the first two earnings regressions it loses significance in the 
three-year horizon).  
 
In Table 4 Panel D, we estimate the earnings forecast model using two subsamples of special 
items firms; namely a subsample of firms with non-zero negative special items and a subsample 
of firms with non-zero misclassified negative core earnings. We use the future earnings forecast 
measure that excludes special items
44
. The results show that the association of misclassified 
negative core earnings with future earnings increases as the sample is restricted to negative 
special items firms and further to negative special items shifters.  
These results expand the evidence in Abdalla and Clubb (2015) to show that the misclassified 
negative core earnings measure has more than one forecasting relevance dimension with regard 
to future earnings. Since misclassified negative earnings are “negative” data values, their positive 
coefficients here are consistent with lower profitability over future years for firms that shift 
certain amounts of their operating expenses in the current period.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Moving to the pricing models, we test the pricing model with reported negative special items 
(no-decomposition) in Table 5 Panel A, and the pricing model with the two negative special 
items components in Table 5 Panel B. The results in Panel A show that the changes in              
both core earnings and negative special items are incorporated in stock returns with significantly 
different weights consistent with their forecasting relevance 
                                                 
44
 Results are consistent using the three measures of future earnings.  
[ 6.88, 0.008]F value P value   
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in the earnings forecast test. When reported negative special items are replaced with their two 
components in Panel B, an interesting result emerges. Unlike the forecast test results, the 
coefficient on real special items is similar to that on reported negative special items in the no-
decomposition scenario, and misclassified negative core earnings also have the same coefficient 
magnitude, albeit rather insignificant. This discrepancy from the forecasting results suggests that 
the market does not appear to understand the implications of negative core earnings 
misclassification on future earnings and ignores the informational heterogeneity between the 
negative special items components. The market assessment of the earnings process does not 
appear to adjust for the fact that negative core earnings misclassification in the current year has 
negative impact on future profitability.  
We subsequently limit the sample to firms that reported negative special items in years and 
, and, further, to negative special items firms that misclassified negative core earnings in 
years  or , or misclassified in both years. Table 5 Panel C presents the results of the three 
subsample tests. Similar to the full sample test results, misclassified negative core earnings do 
not appear to be fully impounded in stock returns relative to their superior forecasting impact on 
future earnings that persists (or even increases) over a horizon up to three years. Moreover, 
restricting the sample to negative special items firms and more specifically to firms that 
misclassified negative core earnings decreases the magnitude of the coefficient on misclassified 
negative core earnings which is still insignificant across all subsamples. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
7. Negative Core Earning Misclassification Signals 
7.1 Informative and Noisy Misclassification Signals  
Theoretically, mispricing occurs when the market expectation of the earnings process is          
a biased estimate of the actual process. In the context of earnings misclassification, this bias is 
likely to be attributable, in part, to noise and garbling in the misclassification signals processed 
by investors when setting prices, i.e. . 
 We distinguish between two types of misclassification signals: an informative 
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as being “informative”, when the predictive ability of negative special items for future earnings 
improves in line with the signal. This is because transferring operating (recurring) expenses to 
negative special items increases the core element of special items and therefore is expected to 
increase the predictive ability of special items. This forecast information content is a function of 
the proportion of operating expenses in special items, such that the more the negative special 
items are contaminated with operating expenses, the higher the predictive ability the special 
items have, and this is signified by the magnitude of the informative signal. With regard to 
valuation, the contemporaneous association between stock returns and negative special items 
conditional on the informative misclassification signal depends on investors‟ perception of the 
signal. In contrast, a misclassification signal is “noisy” when it leads to a monotonic change in 
the contemporaneous association of stock returns with negative special items that is in line with 
the signal but inconsistent with negative special items predictability for future earnings.  
This suggests that the match between the investors‟ perception of the misclassification signal, 
which is reflected in stock prices, and the improvement in the negative special items 
predictability of future earnings relative to the signal, infers whether investors are reacting to 
noisy or informative signals of misclassification. This intuition formulates the empirical tests in 
this section. 
To operationalize the misclassification signals idea, we hypothesize, building on the previous 
empirical results, that one informative signal of the occurrence of misclassification is . 
The logistic regression results showed a propensity to report large negative special items in 
relation to an increasing level of , which is consistent with a shift of negative core 
earnings to negative special items. If 
 
signifies the movement of operating expenses to 
negative special items with a sufficient degree of accuracy, we predict an improvement in the 
predictability of negative special items for one year-ahead earnings across portfolios formed on 
. If investors do not rationally process this informative misclassification signal, the 
improvement in negative special items predictability is not impounded in stock prices, i.e. stock 
prices do not react to information in the signal correspondingly.  
On the other hand, if investors naively infer the extent of misclassification from the earnings 







If this signal is noisy, negative special items predictability should not exhibit a similarly 
consistent monotonic pattern across portfolios formed on the noisy signal. A hypothetical 
reporting signal of misclassification could be an increasing level of operating income before 
special items when the firm reports negative special items in a given year, denoted . We 
investigate the quality of this crude reporting signal in our test, because Fairfield et al. (2009) 
find that negative special items are more likely to include operating expenses when firms have 
high rather than low core profitability.  
7.2. Misclassification Signals: Testing Methodology 
The misclassification signals test is formed as following. First, we construct five portfolios 
on the basis of the signals,  and . Second, we estimate the earnings forecast model, 
which incorporates reported negative special items with no decomposition in equation (9), per 
each portfolio of the signal. We use OLS portfolio regressions and the three earnings dependent 
variables as before (abnormal earnings, earnings, and earnings before special items). We report 
on the coefficient of negative special items and the difference between the core earnings and 
negative special items coefficients across all portfolios. A monotonic increasing pattern of the 
negative special items coefficient in relation to the signal portfolio rank indicates that the 
negative special items impact on future earnings corresponds with the signal. Hence, the signal 
reliably infers the transfer of negative (recurring) core earnings to negative (nonrecurring) 
special items, which in turn enhances the negative special items predictability. A monotonic 
decreasing pattern of the difference between core earnings and negative special items 
coefficients in relation to the signal portfolio rank signifies the degree of convergence between 
core earnings and negative special items in their predictive ability as the proportion of negative 
(recurring) core earnings increases in negative special items because of the misclassification. In 
other words, the negative special items become more core. According to theory, we predict only 
the informative signal, , to exhibit these consistent patterns. 
To provide more evidence on the improvement in the forecast information content of 
negative special items in correspondence with the misclassification signal, we group the bottom 
(top) two signal portfolios in a lowest (highest) signal portfolio and estimate the adjusted  for 







Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition of the model-adjusted (Shapley 1953, Shorrocks 1982 & 
2013) to investigate if the marginal contribution of negative special items towards the total 
adjusted increases when moving from the lowest to the highest signal portfolio
45‟46. We 
predict an improvement in the negative special items-decomposed  only when the 
misclassification signal is informative.  We also estimate the impact of a one-standard deviation 
change in negative special items on future earnings in the lowest and highest portfolio groups to 
test the economic significance of negative special items predictability between the two groups. 
Third, we estimate the pricing model, which has no negative special items decomposition in 
equation (11), per each portfolio of the five signal portfolios. We report on the ERC (earnings 
response coefficient) of negative special items and the difference between the ERCs of core 
earnings and negative special items across the signal portfolios. We predict that investors 
respond to the reporting misclassification signal, , when pricing negative special items. 
Therefore, we expect a monotonic increasing pattern for the ERC of negative special items and a 
monotonic decreasing pattern for the difference between the ERCs of core earnings and negative 
special items in relation to the  portfolio rank. If these pricing results do not correspond 
with a consistent improvement in the predictive ability of negative special items relative to the 
 portfolio rank, we conclude that stock prices react to information in a noisy 
misclassification signal. In this case, we also expect to observe no clear pattern for the change in 
the association between stock returns and negative special items relative to the 
 
signal. 
7.3 Misclassification Signals: Results 
7.3.1 The Informative Signal Results 
Figure 3 reports on the variation of the forecast information content of negative special items 
across the  portfolios. Panel A shows the negative special items forecasting coefficient 
estimates, and Panel B shows the difference between the core earnings and negative special 
items forecasting coefficients. Panel A plots indicate that negative special items coefficients 
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 Results are qualitatively similar when we estimate the Shorrocks-Shapley decomposed 
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R for each portfolio of the 
five portfolios in the subsequent tests. We choose to present the extreme group portfolio results.  
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display a monotonic increasing pattern with . The forecasting ability of negative special 
items increases from 0.196 to 0.396 with respect to future abnormal earnings, 0.219 to 0.437 
with respect to future earnings and 0.029 to 0.223 with respect to future earnings excluding 
special items. The increase in the negative special items coefficient is approximately 100% in 
forecasting abnormal earnings and earnings, and exceeds 600% in forecasting earnings before 
special items. This is consistent with negative special items being more contaminated with 
negative core earnings that improve the special items forecasting ability. The major improvement 
of 600% in the coefficient of negative special items indicates that “a major structural change” 
takes place in the fundamental composition of the negative special items between portfolio 1 and 
portfolio 5, which allows the special items to forecast recurring earnings that exclude special 
items.  
Panel B plots show a convergence between the forecasting ability of core earnings and 
negative special items with the  portfolio rank. The distance between the core earnings 
and negative special items coefficients with respect to all earnings forecasts decreases 
monotonically with .  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Table 6 presents the results of the Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition of the adjusted of the 
earnings forecast model. For ease of exposition and the focus on negative special items, we show 
only the Shorrocks-Shapley values pertaining to negative special items. In addition, Table 6 also 
reports the economic significance of the negative special items coefficient. We present results for 
the lowest and highest portfolio groups as described in the test methodology. Panel A, B and C 
show the estimation results for forecast of abnormal earnings, earnings, and earnings before 
special items, respectively.  
Table 6 Panel A reveals that the negative special items‟ marginal contribution to the model 
increases from 3.71% to 7.30%, although the model decreased from 64% to 57% (i.e. an 
approximate 100 % in the negative special items‟ contribution to the model ). The increase in 
the Shorrocks-Shapley value between the lowest and highest portfolios signifies the gain in the 
negative special items‟ marginal contribution to the explanatory power of the earnings forecast 











which represents a drop in the predictive ability of the model, can be linked to a loss in the 
forecast information content of core earnings that are “artificially” boosted by the 
misclassification. This is because core earnings are supposed to contribute the most to the model 
.  
In untabulated results, the core earnings‟ marginal contribution to the model declined 
from 59.15% in the lowest portfolio to 55.08 % in the highest portfolio. The book value‟s 
marginal contribution is approximately the same between the portfolios: 37.14 % in the lowest 
portfolio and 37.62 % in the highest portfolio. This result is interesting in itself, because it shows 
a relation, as one would expect, between only the accounting variables that are affected by the 
misclassification (core earnings and negative special items but not book value) and the 
misclassification signal. We conclude that although the negative special items‟ contribution to 
the model  increases by an approximately similar drop in the core earnings‟ contribution, 
which resembles a transfer of forecast information from core earnings to special items, this 
transfer results in a loss of information due to an accompanying adverse effect on the overall 
predictive power from the illusionary and unmaintainable increase in core earnings
47
. 
With regard to economic significance, Table 6 Panel A shows that the impact of a one-
standard deviation change in negative special items on one-year-ahead abnormal earnings is 168 
basis points in the lowest portfolio and increases to 526 basis points in the highest 
portfolio.  
Table 6 Panel B and Panel C show similar results for the increase in the negative special 
items Shorrocks-Shapley values and economic significance between the portfolio groups. In 
Panel B (C), the Shorrocks-Shapley value of negative special items is 4.28% (3.30%) in the 
lowest portfolio and increases to 9.74% (6.55%) in the highest portfolio. A one-standard 
deviation increase in negative special items reduces future earnings (earnings excluding special 
items) by 179 (47) basis points in the lowest portfolio and 566 (295) basis points in the highest 
portfolio. 
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R of the model. The 
decomposition approach shows each variable‟s relative contribution to the
2












Based on these forecasting results, we conclude that tDIFF  is an informative 
misclassification signal that indicates the likelihood of negative core earnings transfer to negative 
special items. This transfer changes the fundamental structure and forecast information content 
of negative special items, such that it increases the proportion of the core composite of special 
items and hence the special items predictability of future (value-added) profitability. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
With regard to the pricing results, Figure 4 reports on the contemporaneous association of 
stock returns with negative special items across the  signal portfolios. The results show 
that the value relevance of negative special items, as per their ERC, exhibits a concave relation 
with the informative signal portfolio rank. The ERC increases in portfolios and decreases 
in portfolios . In addition, the pricing convergence with core earnings, measured as the 
difference between the ERCs of core earnings and negative special items, increases between 
portfolios (1−2), decreases in portfolios (2−4) and then increases again in portfolio (5). The 
return associations do not correspond with the improvement in negative special items 
predictability as documented by the forecasting results. Stock prices appear not to adjust to the 
improvement in the forecast-relevant information of negative special items across the 
portfolios, because of the market inability to fully infer the misclassification, as predicted by 
theory.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
7.3.2 The Noisy Reporting Signal Results 
Figure 5 reports on the variation of the forecast information content of negative special items 
across the  portfolios. Panel A shows the negative special items coefficient, and Panel B 
shows the degree of forecasting convergence between core earnings and negative special items, 
across the signal portfolios. The results reveal no consistent increasing (decreasing) patterns in 
Panel A (B). In Panel A, the negative special items coefficient decreases between portfolios 
(1−2), increases between portfolios (2−3) and then decreases again in portfolios (3−5). In Panel 
B, the difference between core earnings and negative special items coefficients decreases in 








[Insert Figure 5 here] 
Table 7 shows the results of the Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition, and economic 
significance of negative special items, between the lowest and highest  portfolios. Panels 
A, B, and C show the estimation results with respect to forecasting abnormal earnings, earnings, 
and earnings before special items, respectively. Panel A results reveal that the model
decreased from 62% to 20% between the two portfolios, but the negative special items marginal 
contribution to the model remains relatively the same. This implies that the negative special 
items‟ predictive ability of value-added profitability does not change relative to the reporting 
signal. The economic significance of the negative special items coefficients even decreases from 
726 basis point in the lowest portfolio to 229 basis point in the highest portfolio. Panel B results 
show a substantial drop in the model , an increase in the Shorrocks-Shapley value, and a 
decrease in economic significance. Panel C shows a substantial drop in the model , a decrease 
in the Shorrocks-Shapley value, and a decrease in economic significance.  
The forecasting results reveal that the negative special items predictability in relation to the 
 portfolios look so different from that in relation to the  portfolios. While the 
 signal manifests itself in a consistent increasing predictive ability of negative special 
items,  does not signal any improvement in the predictability of negative special items. In 
most results, negative special items even appear to lose rather than gain forecast-relevant 
information by the  signal. This suggests that reporting an escalating level of operating 
income before special items when the firm has negative special items does not necessarily imply 
that the negative special items contain more negative core earnings to the extent that justifies the 
enhancement of operating income before special items.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
To investigate whether the market perceives the “misclassification” information in negative 
special items by  to be of lower or higher quality, Figure 6 reports on the ERC of negative 
special items in Panel A, and the pricing convergence with core earnings in Panel B. The results 
in Panel A indicate a monotonic increase in the ERC of negative special items. The coefficient 













portfolio (5). Panel B also indicates a monotonic decrease in the difference between core 
earnings and negative special items coefficients over all portfolios except for portfolio (1).  
These results are, on average, consistent with stronger association between stock returns and 
negative special items conditional on the reporting signal, and that this reporting signal does not 
provide useful information about the composition and predictability of negative special items. 
The results reveal that firms improving their operating income before special items and reporting 
negative special items in the same year are not necessarily misclassifying their negative core 
earnings. Therefore, the misclassification information by  is noisy and should be 
disregarded when setting prices. However, it appears that the market reacts to this reporting 
signal when pricing negative special items due to its restricted ability to infer the informative 
signal, which in turn, is likely to induce noise in stock prices.  
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
8. Conclusion 
Prior research documents that the classification of earnings components in the income 
statements has significant impact on the market response to earnings (Lipe 1986, Ohlson and 
Penman 1992, Bartov and Mohanram 2014). We extend this research by studying a special case 
when this classification is a manifestation of the manager‟s “preferred classification” of 
earnings-line items rather than “economic reality”. In this sense, the placement of earnings in the 
income statement represents a misclassification of earnings components, such that an income 
statement classification pools earnings numbers that have economically different content. We 
study how the classification of recurring earnings as nonrecurring earnings induces a “hidden” 
core element in nonrecurring earnings. More specifically, we focus on the misclassification of 
negative core earnings as negative special items in the income statement.   
We document that extremely large negative special items in the income statement are 
positively associated with the difference between reported core earnings in the prior period and 
expected core earnings in the current period, after controlling for economic conditions. We 
interpret this as the manager misclassifying some negative core earnings as negative special 




the manager‟s misclassification strategy represents GAAP violation rather than allowable 
discretion. 
Applying a decomposition approach on negative special items to disentangle the 
misclassified component from real special items yields two earnings components with different 
accounting properties. The results show that the association between negative special items and 
subsequent restatements of financial statements is mainly due to the identified component of 
misclassified earnings. Additionally the forecasting coefficient of the misclassified component is 
similar to that of reported core earnings. However, stock prices do not appear to fully reflect the 
information contained in the misclassified component. 
We investigate the contemporaneous association between stock returns and reported negative 
special items conditional on signals of misclassification. We document that the market is not able 
to process an informative misclassification signal, which is consistent with enhancements in 
negative special items predictability of future earnings, but rather relies on a noisy reporting 
signal, which does not signify the movement of negative core earnings to negative special items. 
For example, we find that the negative special items persistence increases and the distance 
between the core earnings persistence and the negative special items persistence decreases in 
relation to the informative misclassification signal. Moreover, the economic significance of 
negative special items predictability of future earnings increases from 179 to 566 basis points 
and the Shorrocks-Shapley value of negative special items increases from 4.28% to 9.74%, when 
moving from the lowest informative signal portfolio to the highest informative signal portfolio. 
Nevertheless, stock return association with negative special items does not change accordingly. 
In contrast, when we investigate the stock return association with negative special items 
conditional on a reporting misclassification signal deduced from the income statement, we find 
evidence of negative special items being priced in correspondence with the reporting signal. This 
suggests that investors rely on the reporting signal to infer the misclassification. However, the 
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Label  Description Measurement 
 
t
LARGESP  Large negative special 
items indicator variable 
Equal to one when the firm reports negative special items deflated by sales that are 
higher than the annual cross section mean of non-zero negative special items firms, and 
zero otherwise.   
 
 Lagged reported core 
earnings and expected 






DIFF CE E CE

   where  is the fitted value from the McVay (2006) core 
earnings model: 
 
The core earnings model is estimated out of sample for each industry-year group and 
excluding firm  
core earnings = [ sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general and administrative 
expenses  #13 ] / sale #12,  
 assets turnover ratio= [ sales #12 /average net operating assets] , where net 
operating assets = operating assets−operating liabilities = [ total assets #6 – cash #1 and 
short term investments #32] – [ total assets #6 – total debt (#9 + #34) – book value of 
common  #60 and preferred equity #130  – minority interest     # 38 ]. I require average 
net operating assets to be positive, 
operating accruals = [ net income before extraordinary Items #123  – cash from 
operations (#308 – #124)] / Sales #12, 
= sale growth = current sale minus lagged sales and divided by current sales,
 is negative sales growth, equal to percentage change in sales if , 
and zero otherwise. 
 
 Significant merger and 
acquisitions indicator 
 
Equal to one if annual acquisitions (#129) > 0.2×lagged total assets (#6) , and zero 
otherwise. 
t
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 Firm size Natural logarithm of average total assets.  
 
 Abnormal returns The difference between buy-hold returns, minus the buy-hold returns on the CRSP 
(equally or value) weighted market index over the same period. The return measurement 
starts four month after the end of the fiscal year from which accounting information is 
gathered.  
 
 Frequency of negative 
special items reporting 
indicator 
Equal to one if the firm reported non-zero negative special items in the last year               
( ), over the last three years ( ), or over the last five years ( ), and 
zero otherwise.  
 
 Industry adjusted book 
to market ratio (one 
year before negative 
special items) 
 
Book to market ratio minus annual cross section mean of the firm‟s industry book to 
market ratio. 
 Change in book to 
market ratio (one year 
before negative special 
items) 





 Industry adjusted return 
on assets pre special 
items(one year before 
negative special items) 
 
Return on assets pre-special items (earnings before extraordinary items #123 minus 
special items #17 / average total assets) minus annual cross section mean of the firm‟s 
industry return on assets pre-special items.  
 
 Change in return on 
assets pre special items 
(one year before 
negative special items) 
 
 
Return on assets at   minus return on assets at . 
 
 Highest negative special 
items quintile indicator 
Equal to one if the firm‟s negative special items deflated by sales are in the fifth quintile 


















, 2~ 1i t t
BTM
 




, 2~ 1i t t
ROA
 






 Lowest negative special 
items quintile indicator 
Equal to one if the firm‟s negative special items deflated by sales are in the first quintile 
of distribution in the year, and zero otherwise. 
 
 GAAP compliance 
indicator 
Equal to one if the firm‟s financial statements are not misstated, and zero if the firm 
financial statements are misstated and subsequently restated (for reasons of accounting 
restatements and fraud). Data on restating firms are obtained from Audit Analytics and 
merged with the Compustat-CRSP sample after year 2000. 
 
t




Equal to one if negative special items deflated by sales are within a ratio of 30% above 
or below the annual cross section mean of (non-zero) negative special items, and zero 
otherwise. 
 Reported negative 
special items 
Negative special items as reported by Compustat #17 (deflated by sales). Missing special 
items and positive special items are set to equal zero. 
 
 Misclassified negative 
core earnings 
 
Measured using a negative special items decomposition approach as described in text. 
 
Misclassified negative 
core earnings indicator 
 
Equal to one if , and zero otherwise. 
 Real negative special 
items 
Measured as the difference between reported negative special items and misclassified 
negative core earnings. 
 
 Restatement indicator Equal to one if the firm‟s fiscal year is misstated and subsequently restated (for reasons 
of accounting restatements and fraud), and zero otherwise.  
 
 Change in receivables Change in receivables #2 divided by average total assets 
 
 Change in inventory 
 
Change in inventory #3 divided by average total assets 






























 Percentage change in 
cash sale 
The difference between current and lagged cash sale and divided by lagged cash sale. 
Cash sale is measured as sale #12 minus change in receivable #2. 
 
 
 Sales volatility The standard deviation of the firm‟s rolling five-year net sales, divided by average total 
assets. We require at least three non-missing observations. 
 
 
 Abnormal change in 
employees 
Percentage change in the number of employees #29, divided by percentage change in 
total assets 
 
 Leverage Long term debt #9 plus short term debt #34,  and divided by average total assets. 
 
 Book value Total common equity #60 divided by sales. 
 
 Book to market ratio Measured as total common equity #60  divided by market value ( #25×stock price from 
CRSP). 
 
 Operating income 




Measured as [ sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general and administrative expenses  



















The Misclassification Decision 
The Dichotomous Misclassification Choice Model: 
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Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Continuous Variables  
 The Full Sample  The Negative Special Items Sample 
   
Percentile 
   
Percentile 
Variables Mean SD (10) (90)  Mean SD (10) (90) 
 0.006 0.261 −0.098 0.113  0.019 0.181 −0.088 0.147 
 5.541 2.145 2.864 8.491  6.016 2.090 3.322 8.867 
 −0.001 0.594 −0.520 0.627  −0.001 0.607 −0.527 0.633 
 0.012 0.474 −0.381 0.416  0.038 0.490 −0.368 0.473 
 −0.652 0.269 −0.988 −0.366  −0.654 0.270 −0.996 −0.369 


























Panel B: Logistic Regression and Ordinary Least Square Coefficients Results for Dichotomous 
Misclassification Choice Models 











































































































































































































         
Pseudo R2  
R2 




 2.7%  
2.7% 








































Panel C: Marginal Effects and Changes in Probabilities of the Misclassification Decision 






































          
 0.332 0.042 16.5% 0.293 0.037 14.5% −0.172 −0.028 11.2% 
 0.070 0.082 9.7% 0.074 0.086 10.5% −0.054 −0.068 6% 
 −0.023 −0.029 12.1% −0.020 −0.027 11.3% 0.021 0.031 12.1% 
 −0.059 −0.034 13.6% −0.051 −0.029 11.7% 0.042 0.025 10.3% 
 −0.049 −0.032 12.7% −0.046 −0.030 11.7% 0.031 0.025 10.1% 
 0.027 0.024 2.4% 0.026 0.023 2.3% −0.026 −0.024 2.4% 
 0.026 0.019 1.9% 0.028 0.023 2.3% −0.026 −0.023 2.2% 
 0.022 0.016 1.7% 0.024 0.021 2.1% −0.054 −0.052 4.8% 
 0.019 0.003 1.3% 0.019 0.003 1.2% −0.009 −0.001 0.6% 
 0.006 −0.004 1.5% 0.001 −0.002 0.9 % −0.014 −0.000 0.1% 
 −0.065 −0.015 6% −0.056 −0.014 5.7% 0.016 0.003 01.1% 
 −0.161 −0.006 2.5% −0.124 −0.005 2% 0.131 0.008 3% 
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(II) at   
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56% 
Panel A shows the distribution of selected variables. SD is the standard deviation.  
Panel B shows the regression results for the negative special items sample. The LOGIT column reports the logistic 
regression coefficients. The OLS-LPM reports the ordinary least squares linear probability model coefficients. 
In Panel C, MEM (AV) is the marginal effect at means based on actual variables. MEM (SV) is the marginal effect 
at means based on standardized variables (variables are ranked into five quintiles). Indicator variables take the value 
of 1 or 0 in both actual and standardized variables regressions. 
In both probabilities (I) and (II), an indicator variable is zero (one) when the variable has a positive (negative) 
coefficient in the logistic model.  
t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors. All variables are defined in the Appendix. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively.  
 










































The Misclassification Decision Compliance with Accounting Standards 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression Results for the Dichotomous Misclassification Choice Model that Incorporates 
GAAP Compliance: 
 















Controls Included Yes Yes 
Year and Industry Effects Yes No 
Pseudo   13.2% 7% 
Sample size 12,184 12,291 
GAAP Compliance Firm-Year 35,016 35,016 
Non-GAAP Compliance Firm-Year 3,266 3,266 
 
Panel B: Logistic Regression Results for a Normal Reporting Strategy of Negative Special Items: 
  



























The sample period is 2000-2014 from the merge of Audit Analytics with the Compustat-CRSP sample after 2000. 
Regressions are estimated for non-zero negative special items. Coefficients are measured using logistic regressions. 
t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors. All variables are defined in the Appendix. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively.  (results suppressed) are the same set 
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Restatements and Fraud Association with Negative Special Items Components 
The Restatement Model: 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables  
 The Full Restatement Sample 
(2000-2014) 
  Percentile 
Variables Mean SD (10) (90) 
     
 −0.034 0.108 −0.073 0 
 −0.003 0.011 −0.006 0 
 −0.031 0.102 −0.063 0 
 0.008 0.060 −0.047 0.067 
 0.005 0.044 −0.028 0.046 
 0.559 0.250 0.194 0.890 
 0.103 0.379 −0.225 0.441 
 0.160 0.154 0.029 0.344 
 −0.045 0.272 −0.287 0.202 
 −0.004 0.090 −0.087 0.073 
 0.713 0.719 0.158 1.461 
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Negative Special Items   Negative Special Items 
Decomposition 
 Misclassification Indicator 
OLS-LPM LOGIT 
(MEM) 
 OLS-LPM LOGIT 
(MEM) 







   
0.117*** 
(4.75) 
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Sample Size 23,053 22,971  23,053 22,971  23,053 22,971 
The OLS-LPM column reports coefficients based on ordinary least square linear probability model. LOGIT (MEM) 
reports the logistic regression marginal significance. Industry fixed effects are included, and results are consistent 
without industry fixed effects. The sample period is 2000-2014. t-statistics are calculated using robust standard 
























Misclassified Negative Core Earnings Forecast Properties 
 
The Earnings Forecast Model: 
*
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Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables  
 The Full Sample  The Negative Special Items Sample 
   
Percentile 
   
Percentile 
Variables Mean SD (10) (90)  Mean SD (10) (90) 
          
t
AE  −0.156 0.480 −0.401 0.054  −0.224 0.542 −0.580 0.0365 
t
EBE  −0.079 0.492 −0.298 0.152  −0.160 0.567 −0.515 0.119 
t
EBESP  −0.049 0.423 −0.222 0.157  −0.075 0.447 −0.304 0.151 
t
CE  0.0698 0.383 −0.114 0.347  0.043 0.392 −0.172 0.316 
t
SP  −0.030 0.099 −0.065 0  −0.075 0.145 −0.203 −0.002 
t
MCE  −0.003 0.012 −0.005 0  −0.007 0.017 −0.021 0 
Non-zero 
t
MCE  −0.013 0.021 −0.040 −0.000
2 
 −0.013 0.021 −0.040 −0.0002 
t
RSP  −0.030 0.093 −0.056 0  −0.068 0.137 −0.182 0.001 
Non-zero 
t
GSP  −0.070 0.138 −0.188 −0.002  −0.070 0.138 −0.188 −0.002 
t
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Forecasting Coefficients 
                      






































































































        










































( )t   
Forecasting Coefficients 
                      




















































































































Table 4 Panel C (continued) 
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Forecasting Coefficients 
                      











































































































The table provides results of pooled OLS regressions of earnings forecast models that include core earnings and 
special items. The earnings forecast model is estimated using reported negative special items (no-decomposition) 
and the two fundamental compositions of negative special items (decomposition). Regressions are estimated using 
the full sample, in addition to reduced subsamples as indicated in the table. t-statistics are calculated using robust 













The Market Perception of Misclassified Negative Core Earnings  
 
The Pricing Model 
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Firms Reporting Negative Special 






















Firms Reporting Negative Special 
Items in Years t and 1t   that have 
























Firms Reporting Negative Special 
Items in Years t and 1t   that have 




















5,318   
The table provides results of pooled OLS regressions of abnormal returns on changes in earnings components that 
include core earnings and special items. The pricing model is estimated using reported negative special items (no-
decomposition) and the two fundamental compositions of negative special items (decomposition). Regressions are 
estimated using the full sample, in addition to reduced subsamples as indicated in the table. 
t
AR is equally weighted 
abnormal returns. The return cumulation period begins four months after the end of the fiscal year. t-statistics are 
















The Shorrocks-Shapley Decomposed 
2
R and Economic Significance of Negative Special Items 
Forecastability for Portfolio Assignment Based on the Informative Misclassification Signal  
Panel A: Shorrocks-Shapley 
2
R Decomposition and Economic Significance of Negative Special Items with 


















in Basis Points 
Lowest- DIFF  64% 3.71% 168 
Highest- DIFF  57% 7.30% 526 
 
Panel B: Shorrocks-Shapley 
2
R Decomposition and Economic Significance of Negative Special Items with 

















in Basis Points 
Lowest- DIFF  53% 4.28% 179 
Highest- DIFF  46% 9.74% 566 
 
Panel C: Shorrocks-Shapley 
2
R Decomposition and Economic Significance of Negative Special Items with 

















in Basis Points 
Lowest- DIFF  58% 3.30% 47 
Highest- DIFF  50% 6.55% 295 
Economic Significance in basis points is the product of the negative special items coefficient estimate from an OLS 
portfolio regression of one-year ahead of the earnings metric on core earnings, negative special items and book 
value, and the standard deviation of negative special items in the portfolio sample. It shows the impact of one 
standard deviation change on the next year earnings metric. The Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition of adjusted
2
R
shows the contribution of negative special items to the total adjusted 
2
R of the portfolio regression. The 
2
R  
decomposition approach provides an additive decomposition of the estimated adjusted 
2
R , and shows the relative 
contribution of each independent variable to the total adjusted
2
R . The tables show only the negative special items 
Shorrocks-Shapley values. Lowest (Highest) - DIFF  portfolio corresponds to portfolios 1 and 2 (4 and 5). Portfolio 





The Shorrocks-Shapley Decomposed 
2
R and Economic Significance of Negative Special Items 
Forecastability for Portfolio Assignment Based on the Noisy Misclassification Signal  
Panel A: Shorrocks-Shapley 
2
R Decomposition and Economic Significance of Negative Special Items with 
Respect to One-Year Ahead Abnormal Earnings 
 
 
Noisy Signal Portfolio 












in Basis Points 
Lowest- OIBD  62% 12.44% 726 
Highest- OIBD  20% 12.64% 299 
 
Panel B: Shorrocks-Shapley 
2
R Decomposition and Economic Significance of Negative Special Items with 
Respect to One-Year Ahead Earnings 
 
 
Noisy Signal Portfolio 












in Basis Points 
Lowest- OIBD  51% 14.64% 798 
Highest- OIBD  5% 35.61% 300 
 
Panel C: Shorrocks-Shapley 
2
R Decomposition and Economic Significance of Negative Special Items with 
Respect to One-Year Ahead Earnings Before Special Items 
 
 
Noisy Signal Portfolio 












in Basis Points 
Lowest- OIBD  56% 11.67% 399 
Highest- OIBD  6% 7.14% 116 
Economic Significance in basis points is the product of the negative special items coefficient estimate from a 
portfolio (OLS) regression of one-year ahead of the earnings metric on core earnings, negative special items and 
book value; and the standard deviation of negative special items in the portfolio sample. It shows the impact of one 
standard deviation change on the next year‟s earnings metric. The Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition of adjusted
2
R
shows the contribution of negative special items to the total adjusted
2
R from the portfolio regression. The 
decomposition approach provides an additive decomposition of the estimated adjusted 
2
R , and shows the relative 
contribution of each independent variable to the total adjusted
2
R . The table shows only the negative special items‟ 
Shorrocks-Shapley values. Lowest (Highest) - OIBD portfolio corresponds to portfolios 1 and 2 (4 and 5). Portfolio 






Inter-Temporal Analysis of Means of Negative Special Items Surrounding Positive and Negative 
Deviations of Prior Year’s Reported Core Earnings and Current Year’s Predicted Core Earnings as 
Measured by DIFF  
 
Panel A: Times Series Properties (Seven-Years Window) of Negative Special Items Deflated by Sales 
Surrounding the Event Year of Positive DIFF  
 
 
Panel B: Times Series Properties (Seven-Year Window) of Negative Special Items Deflated by Sales 












  0 1  tt t t errorCE E CE a a SP    
 
 
The y-axis represents the mean coefficient of negative special items from contemporaneous industry-year 
regressions of unexpected core earnings on negative special items. Unexpected core earnings are the difference 
between reported core earnings and expected core earnings. Core earnings expectations are estimated                    
out-of-sample using McVay‟s (2006) model of core earnings: 
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Negative special items are measured in absolute terms in this regression. Positive coefficients on negative special 
items are consistent with shifting negative core earnings to negative special items. Negative coefficients on negative 
special items are consistent with poor performance rather than misclassification and shifting. All variables are 
























































































Changes in the Forecast Information Content of Reported Negative Special Items Across Portfolios 
Formed on the Informative Misclassification Signal 
 
The Forecast Model 
*
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with Respect to on One-Year Ahead Earnings 









Panel B: Negative Special Items Forecastability Convergence with Core Earnings 
*
1 2,3
( )   with Respect to 
One-Year Ahead Earnings Across the Informative Misclassification Signal 
 
 
The figure shows the change in the forecasting ability of negative special items over portfolios formed on the 
Informative misclassification signal. The forecast model is estimated per portfolio using OLS. The dependent 
earnings forecast variable is: abnormal earnings, earnings, and earnings before special items. Portfolios are formed 




estimates in each portfolio. In Panel B, the y-axis represents forecastability convergence measured as (
*
1 2,3
  ). The 











Stock Return Association with Negative Special Items Conditional on the Informative 
Misclassification Signal 
 
The Pricing Model 
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The figure shows the stock return association with negative special items over portfolios formed on the Informative 
misclassification signal. The pricing model is estimated per portfolio using OLS. Portfolios are formed annually 
based on the DIFF signal. The x-axis represents the portfolio rank. The y-axis represents either 
*
2,3
  estimates in 
each portfolio or pricing convergence measured as (
*
1 2,3
  ). 
t
AR is value weighted abnormal returns. All 













Changes in the Forecast Information Content of Reported Negative Special Items across Portfolios 
Formed on the Reporting (Noisy) Misclassification Signal 
The Forecast Model 
*
0 1 2,3 4t t t t t
E CE SP BV error
 
   
 
    
 
 





with Respect to on One-Year Ahead Earnings 







Figure 5 Panel A (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Negative Special Items Forecastability Convergence with Core Earnings 
1
*
2,3( )  with Respect to 





Figure 5 Panel B (Continued) 
 
 
The figure shows the change in the forecasting ability of negative special items over portfolios formed on the 
informative misclassification signal. The forecast model is estimated per portfolio using OLS. The dependent 
earnings forecast variable is: abnormal earnings, earnings, and earnings before special items. Portfolios are formed 
annually based on 
t
OIBD . The x-axis represents the portfolio rank. In Panel A, the y-axis represents 
*
2,3  estimates 




  ). The earnings 


















Stock Return Association to Negative Special Items Conditional on the Reporting (Noisy) 
Misclassification Signal 
 
The Pricing Model 
*
0 1 2,3 4t t t t t
AR CE SP BV error            
 
The figure shows the stock return association with negative special items over portfolios formed on the noisy 
misclassification signal. The pricing model is estimated per portfolio using OLS. Portfolios are formed annually 
based on the OIBD signal. The x-axis represents the portfolio rank. The y-axis represents either 
*
2,3
  estimates in 





AR is value weighted abnormal returns. All 












Chapter 5: Do Analysts Fully 
Understand the Quality of 
Negative Special Items When 
Negative Core Earnings are 













Street earnings are a special form of GAAP earnings that are modified on the basis of 
analysts‟ decision on the inclusions and exclusions of certain components of earnings that are 
potentially less persistent. Analysts tracking services such as IBES and First Call report street 
earnings that include or exclude these less persistent earnings components based on the treatment 
of majority of analysts (Gu and Chen 2004, Baik et al. 2009)
48. Although the analysts‟ 
determination of street earnings inclusions and exclusions is non-uniform, the explicit motive is 
to filter the street earnings measure from less persistent earnings components.  There is evidence 
that analysts have expertise in processing earnings information to determine the extent of 
permanence of different earnings component and adjusting street earnings accordingly (Gu and 
Chen 2004). However, there is also documented evidence that this adjustment process is 
incomplete, because some expenses excluded from IBES street earnings still have predictive 
ability for future operating cash flows. While the exclusions contain special items among other 
exclusions, special items are found to be the most prevalent earnings component that is excluded 
from street earnings (Doyle et al. 2003)
49
.  
Special items pose a complicated problem for analysts in arriving at street earnings and also 
in developing their earlier earnings forecast than other less recurring components of earnings 
such as discontinued operations and extraordinary items for the following reasons. First, 
discontinued operations and extraordinary items are reported below earnings from continuing 
operations on the income statement, but special items are not (Elliot and Hanna 1997). Second, 
while special items often signify unusual economic conditions related to the firm, their negative 
composition is suspected to include negative core earnings that have been strategically reported 
as negative special items (McVay 2006, Frankel and Roychowdhury 2008). This suggests that 
negative special items have both transitory and core compositions. The former is attributable to 
the recognition of one-time and unusual events, and the latter is a core component made up by 
misclassification of negative core earnings.  
 
                                                 
48
 Throughout the paper, we assume the “majority rule” for inclusions and exclusions. 
49
 Table 1, page (156) in Doyle et al. (2003), shows that the means of total exclusions, excluded special items and 
other excluded items are 0.03, 0.03, and 0.00, respectively, in their full sample. In a reduced sample that is only 
restricted to non-zero exclusions, the means are 0.10, 0.09, and 0.02, respectively.   
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The analysts‟ treatment of special items inclusions and exclusions in arriving at street 
earnings is idiosyncratic and deals with special items at the firm-level. Although , in some cases, 
managers propose inclusions and exclusions of special items and other less recurring items, 
analysts often make their inclusion/exclusion decision based on their awareness of the 
persistence of these items. Therefore, the analysts‟ decision often deviates from the management 
recommendation (Gu and Chen 2004). In addition, the evidence that links analysts‟ 
inclusions/exclusions to management guidance cannot determine who of the analysts or 
managers are the initiators or followers of the inclusions/exclusions (Christensen et al. 2011). 
The result is that analysts decide to include special items in street earnings in one firm, but 
exclude the same items from another; and there is no clear evidence whether the analysts‟ 
adjustment process of special items is consistent with the circumstances or incentives leading up 
to the recognition of special items and hence their potential implications on future earnings
50
.  
While evidence documents that inclusions are more persistent that exclusions (Gu and Chen 
2004), we do know little about the nature and composition of negative special items that promote 
them for an inclusion/exclusion decision.  
In this study, we investigate the inclusion/exclusion decision from the perspective of the 
underlying compositions of negative special items. More specifically, we examine whether 
analysts fully understand the nature and quality of negative special items when they adjust actual 
earnings and whether their future earnings forecast incorporates the actual persistence of 
components of negative special items. We first decompose negative special items into a shifted 
negative core earnings component and a purified negative special items component, and then 
validate our decomposition methodology and our measures using an earnings forecast test and an 
asymmetric earnings timeliness test. We predict and find that shifted negative core earnings 
forecast future earnings and abnormal earnings as a core earnings component, and purified 
negative special items act as a one-time event that contains less information about future 
earnings. We also find that purified negative special items are much asymmetrically timelier than 
shifted negative core earnings in recognizing bad news. This is consistent with the transience 
nature of purified negative special items that is attributable to their use as a channel to recognize 
                                                 
50
 The only exception is Hsu and Kross (2011) who investigate some differences between included and excluded 
special items. However, their paper does not look into the underlying compositions of negative special items that 
might justify their inclusion or exclusion.  
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negative news immediately, and also validates that shifted negative core earnings are 
fundamentally unrelated to the negative special items classification in the income statement and 
are indeed a misclassified component.  
We next examine the analysts‟ treatment of negative special items in arriving at street 
earnings (actual earnings), and whether this treatment aligns with the nature of negative special 
items compositions. Since analysts include some negative special items and exclude others, we 
expand our decomposition of negative special items further in order to examine the nature of 
included and excluded negative special items. We find that included negative special items have 
higher predictive ability with respect to future operating cash flows, and excluded negative 
special items do not predict future operating cash flows. Moreover, the shifted component of 
included negative special items has higher predictive value than the purified component of 
included negative special items, and each included component has higher predictive value than 
its excluded counterpart. We also document that while included or excluded negative special 
items might have shifted and purified components, shifted negative core earnings (purified 
negative special items) are significantly and positively (insignificantly but negatively) associated 
with an analysts‟ inclusion decision. In addition, the analysts‟ inclusion decision captures the 
underlying management incentives and economic conditions that lead up to the recognition of 
negative special items by the firm. 
Finally, we assess whether analysts‟ forecast fully incorporates the actual persistence of 
negative special items compositions. We follow an approach in the spirit of Chen (2010), Ahmed 
et al. (2005) and Weber (2009). We estimate actual persistence of earnings components from an 
actual earnings regression, estimate analysts‟ implied persistence from a forecast earnings 
regression and then test the significance of the differences between actual persistence and 
analysts‟ implied persistence using an analysts‟ forecast error regression. Results demonstrate 
that analysts‟ treatment of negative special items does not lead to predictable forecast errors, 
consistent with analysts fully understanding the persistence of negative special items 
compositions. 
Section 2 describes the analysts‟ adjustment process of negative special items. Section 3 is 
the sample selection. In section 4, we develop and validate the decomposition approach of 
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negative special items. Section 5 examines the analysts‟ treatment of negative special items in 
adjusting actual earnings and developing earnings forecast. Here we develop expanded 
decomposition of negative special items in the light of negative special items inclusions and 
exclusions. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.  
2. Analysts’ Adjustment of Special Items 
Analysts adjust GAAP earnings in order to develop a street earnings-metric that excludes less 
persistent components of earnings.  Therefore, the difference between GAAP earnings and street 
earnings implies the magnitude of total exclusions. It has been found that special items are the 
primary reason for this difference (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002, Abarbanel and Lehavy 2007, 
Doyle et al. 2003). In addition, nonrecurring items included in street earnings are also special 
items and other components of earnings. Therefore, both inclusions and exclusions have special 
items that analysts, for little known reasons, decide to include or exclude. Prior research suggests 
that the analysts‟ adjustment process of special items is linked to management recommendations 
(Christensen et al. 2011), but that the management influence is also limited to the analysts‟ 
beliefs on the persistence of earnings components (Gu and Chen 2004). Moreover, this 
adjustment process appears to be affected by other factors such as analysts‟ incentives for 
promoting stocks with glamour characteristics (Baik et al. 2009). 
Given that negative special items are an account that absorbs the transience of earnings via 
recording most “unusual” or “infrequent” economic events due to accounting conservatism 
inherent in GAAP (Callen et al 2010), and have also been misused to accommodate shifted core 
losses (McVay 2006); we believe that the quality of the firm‟s negative special items is a major 
determinant of their inclusions in or exclusions from street earrings. The analysts‟ adjustment 
process of negative special items is an income-decreasing (income-increasing) decision when 
analysts agree on including (excluding) negative special items.  If the motive of analysts is to 
develop a reliable metric of earnings that expresses the magnitude of sustainable earnings, the 
component of negative special items that contains less information about the future is removed. 
In addition, firms moving core losses to negative special items are “penalized” by including the 




We specifically examine the composition of analysts‟ included and excluded negative special 
items. The uncertainty surrounding the economic circumstances and management incentives that 
lead to recognition of special items, which in turn affect the transience of special items, pose an 
identification problem for analysts because analysts need to estimate the magnitude of both 
effects and adjust street earnings accordingly. In addition, since the managers‟ misuse of 
negative special items to accommodate core losses is a major cause for permanence of negative 
special items, it is not possible that analysts will be guided by managers in correcting their 
misclassification. In this setting, analysts‟ expertise in processing earnings information will be a 
major determinant of their adjustment decision. 
We focus on the analysts‟ treatment of negative rather than positive special items, because 
our argument is that the negative special items have core and transitory components that can be 
linked to shifting (expense-misclassification) and conditional conservatism, while this is not 
obvious for positive special items. Since we examine the fundamental compositions of special 
items that nominate them for an inclusion/exclusion decision, we limit our analysis to included 
and excluded negative special items while controlling for positive special items in our analysis. 
Moreover, approximately 76% of total special items in our sample are negative special items. 
This is not surprising given the conservative nature of GAAP that results in negative special 
items being more prevalent than positive special items. 
3. Sample Selection 
The full sample consists of firm-year observations from 1989 to 2012 with sufficient 
Compustat and CRSP data for estimating the negative core earnings level and change 
regressions. We assign zero to special items if they are missing (Elliott and Hanna 1996, Dechow 
and Ge 2006), and require unexpected negative core earnings to be non-missing. Following 
McVay (2006), we drop firms with sales less than $1 million and firms that had a fiscal-year end 
change. We use a two-digit SIC code in order to identify industry membership and require a 
minimum of 15 non-missing data per each industry-year combination. Abnormal returns are 
sized adjusted returns calculated as the CRSP buy-and-hold returns less the buy-and-hold returns 
on the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio. The measurement of returns commences the 
fourth month of the fiscal year and ends with the third month of the next the fiscal year. 
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Following Campbell et al. (2010), we use delisting returns when available and substitute zero for 
missing monthly returns. The full sample consists of 67,859 firm-year observations. We use the 
full sample in replicating the main regressions in McVay (2006) using negative core earnings in 
lieu of net core earnings; and so in our new adaptation of the negative special items 
decomposition approach. 
We then build our IBES sample. We collect actual earnings per share from IBES unadjusted 
detail actual file, most recent consensus forecast of earnings per share from IBES unadjusted 
summary file, and primary/diluted indicators from the IBES identifier file to be used when 
Compustat GAAP earnings per share are matched to IBES street earnings per share
51
.We then 
impose an IBES data requirement for all tests related to analysts. The Compustat-CRSP-IBES 
reduced sample consists of 46,291 firm-year observations, and 20,782 firm-year observations 
with non-zero negative special items. The number of observations in any particular test will vary 
on the basis of the data availability for this particular test.  
In order to control for the potential effect of outliers, we winsorize each accounting 
continuous variable at its first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We report two-tailed significance 
levels in all regressions. We present descriptive statistics of the main variables in the full sample 
and the reduced sample in their respective sections in the paper before reporting the regression 
results.  
4. A Direct Decomposition Approach of Negative Special Items 
4.1. An Expense-Expense Decomposition Approach 
McVay (2006) provides empirical evidence of firms shifting negative core earnings to 
negative special items in order to increase their net core earnings. The basic McVay‟s design 
employs a two-stage regression procedure. In the first stage, expected net core earnings are 
estimated using a net core earnings expectation model that controls for economic performance. 
In the second stage, current unexpected net core earnings are regressed on current negative 
special items. Results in McVay (2006) show a positive association between unexpected net core 
                                                 
51
 The primary/diluted indicator shows whether the firm is followed on a primary or diluted basis. The basis can also 
change over time. In programming, we ensure that we have the correct basis for the firm in a certain year.  This can 
be done by tracking down each firm and its start date (sdate) in the identifier file. The start date shows the date when 
the variable first appeared and when the basis later changes.  
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earnings and negative special items in the second stage regression, consistent with shifting 
negative core earnings to negative special items in the year a firms reports negative special items. 
In addition, McVay (2006) shows that the next year unexpected net core earnings changes, 
estimated using an expectation model of net core earnings change, are decreasing with current 
year negative special items. This later result is consistent with a reversal of the improvement in 
net core earnings when negative core earnings return to core earnings in the next period
52‟53. 
Shifting results in a misclassification of negative core earnings, because a batch of negative 
core earnings is buried in negative special items in the income statement. Consequently, negative 
special items, that are less persistent by definition, become contaminated with more persistent 
negative earnings. Building on the McVay‟s approach to classification shifting, Abdalla and 
Clubb (2015) employ a decomposition approach of special items that breaks down the special 
items into a more persistent component due to shifting and a less persistent component 
representing the genuine special items that are free of shifting
54
. In this paper, we employ a 
similar methodology that validates the decomposition approach and is based on a negative core 
earnings variant of the McVay‟s model. Specifically, we replicate the analysis in McVay, but we 
replace net core earnings with only negative core earnings. Therefore, our analysis is directly 
focused on the association between unexpected negative core earnings and negative special 
items. We believe that this expense-expense approach provides more direct evidence to 
classification shifting than an observed association between net core earnings and negative 
special items, which implicitly infers the negative core earnings transfer. We expect a 
contemporaneous negative association between unexpected negative core earnings and negative 
special items, because shifting increases negative special items and decreases unexpected 
negative core earnings. We expect a positive association between next year unexpected negative 
core earnings changes and current negative special items, that is a result of the reversal of the 
artificial efficiency and reduction in negative core earnings in the current year.  
 
                                                 
52
 McVay (2006) shows that the reversal is less pronounced when the firm reports negative special items in the 
current and next years. 
53
 Throughout the paper, negative special items are multiplied by -1 in our adaptations of the McVay models, in 
order to be comparable to McVay (2006). In all other regressions, negative special items are negative data values. 
54
 Abdalla and Clubb (2015) is based on chapter three of this thesis. 
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The negative core earnings levels and changes expectation models are as following:   
 0 1 1 2 3 1 4 5 6t t t t t t t tNCE NCE ATO ACC ACC SALE NEG SALE                   (13) 
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7              
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      
 
            
  
 (14) 
where tNCE  
is negative core earnings measured as the sum of cost of goods sold and selling and 
administrative expenses divided by sales. If the values are missing, we calculate negative core 
earnings as the difference between sales and operating income before depreciation divided by 
sales. The data values for tNCE  are positive. tATO  is assets turnover ratio measured as sales 
divided by average net operating assets. tACC  is operating accruals measured as net income 
before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations divided by sales. tSALE  is the 
percentage change in sales measured as current sales minus lagged sales and divided by lagged 
sales. tNEG SALE  is the negative percentage change in sales measured as tSALE  when 
0tSALE  , and zero otherwise. The models are estimated for each industry-year combination 
and excluding firm i  from the estimation. We report the models fit statistics in Table 1.We 




The association between unexpected negative core earnings and negative special items is 
tested using the following models: 
 0 1t t tUNCE NSI      (15) 
 1 0 1 1t t tU NCE NSI        (16) 
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 . Both of the lagged values are predicted to be similar in direction to 
the AR(1) coefficients in McVay (2006). For other explanatory variables, we predict the opposite direction. For 
example, if 
t
ACC  is positively related to net core earnings in McVay (2006), we predict it to be negatively related 
to the expense component of core earnings in our analysis, that is negative core earnings. 
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where  t t tUNCE NCE E NCE  ,  1 1 1t t tU NCE NCE E NCE         , and  tE NCE  and 
 1tE NCE   are expected negative core earnings levels and expected negative core earnings 
changes from equation (1) and equation (2), respectively. tNSI  is negative special items divided 
by sales. Negative special items are multiplied by 1  in this regression. We estimate the 
regressions using OLS, and report the results in Table 2. 
We then adopt a similar decomposition technique, as in Abdalla and Clubb (2015) that is 
relevant to the new adaptation of the McVay‟s core earnings model. First, we regress unexpected 
negative core earnings on negative special items for each industry and year combination. Since 
shifting in this case results in a negative coefficient on the negative special items that is between 
zero and negative one, we set all positive industry-year coefficients to be equal to zero 
(approximately 44.9% of the coefficients are positive), and set all negative industry-year 
coefficients that are less than negative one to be equal to the maximum bound of shifting, which 
is negative one (3.6% of the negative coefficients are less than negative one)
56‟57. Second, we 
multiply the negative industry-year coefficients by reported negative special items of firms in the 
relevant industry-year combination in order to measure shifted negative core earnings, ,i tSNCE , 
at the firm level. We then subtract ,i tSNCE  from reported negative special items in order to 
measure purified negative special items, ,i tPNSI .We call this level of decomposition of negative 
special items; CLASSIFICATION DECOMPOSITION (CLDE hereafter), in order to 
differentiate it from other levels of decomposition in the next sections of the study. In Figure 1, 
we show the means of the two components of negative special items over years. 
Table 1 results show that the magnitude and direction of all coefficients are consistent with 
the results in McVay (2006) and our adaptations of the models. In Panel A of Table 1, negative 
core earnings are positively related to their lagged values, higher with assets turnover ratio and 
                                                 
56
 Recall that , in the presence of shifting, negative special items have shifted negative core earnings and special 
items charges that are free of shifting. Therefore, a dollar increase in negative special items results in a decline in 
unexpected negative core earnings relative to the proportion of shifted negative core earnings in special items. If 
special items are entirely shifted negative core earnings, we expected the coefficient to be equal to negative one. 
Negative coefficients that are less than negative one might be due to inevitable measurement error in expected 
negative core earnings. Restricting these coefficients to be zero does not qualitatively affect all related results in the 
next sections. 
57
 The counterpart negative industry-year coefficients when using a net core earnings models are 46%, and the 
counterpart extreme positive coefficients that are higher than one are 3.91% in Abdalla and Clubb (2015).  
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lagged accruals; and lower with current accruals, sales growth and negative sales growth. Mean 
coefficients using OLS and median coefficients using quintile regression are consistent. In 
untabulated results, we also run a censored regression (Tobit model) and the results are very 
similar to the OLS results. This gives us comfort in using OLS in the first stage regression. For 
sake of brevity, we only present the OLS results here. Adjusted 
2R are 76% and 73% in the OLS 
regression and quintile regression, respectively. In Panel B of Table 1, negative core earnings 
changes are negatively related to lagged negative core earnings levels and changes, higher with 
lagged accruals, and lower with assets turnover changes, current accruals, sales growth and 
negative sales growth. Mean and median coefficients are consistent, except that negative sales 
growth is insignificant using OLS and significant using quintile regression. Adjusted 
2R are 35% 
and 31% in the OLS regression and quintile regression, respectively.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 shows results supporting the existence of negative core earnings misclassification. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the main test results. Panel B of Table 2 reports on whether the 
relation between unexpected negative core earnings and negative special items, which is 
observed in Panel A, is attributable to misclassification or efficiency in negative core earnings as 
a result of special items reporting. In Panel A, a dollar of negative special items in the entire 
sample (negative special items subsample) decreases an average of 4.2 (3.8) cents of negative 
core earnings, consistent with a portion of reported negative special items being shifted negative 
core earnings. In Panel B, the next year unexpected negative core earnings changes are 
increasing with current negative special items, consistent with a reversal of the artificial 
reduction in negative core earnings that is a result of misclassification. When we require next 
year negative special items to be non-zero in the regression in order to allow for the possibility to 
shift in the next period, which is expected to minimize the reversal, the results show that the 
reversal becomes insignificant. Overall, the results support our alternative adaptation of McVay 
(2006).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Figure 1 displays the magnitude of the negative special items components over years. Note 
that the entire negative special items are purified and have no shifted component when firms 
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report negative special items as a result of poor performance rather than shifting (those with 
positive coefficients in the decomposition industry-year regressions). When firms shift, negative 
special items contain shifted negative core earnings and purified negative special items 
components (those with negative coefficients in the decomposition industry-year regressions). 
Also, in some cases negative special items can be entirely shifted negative core earnings. The 
figure shows that the non-zero mean values of shifted negative core earnings are relatively stable 
in comparison to purified negative special items. The magnitude of purified negative special 
items is always higher than shifted negative core earnings. In years 2001 to 2003, purified 
negative special items reach a peak. This is concurrent with a warning issued by SEC in 2001 
about the use of pro-forma earnings by managers that exclude non-recurring expenses. This SEC 
action could possibly have restricted the misclassification during this time, especially because 
shifted negative core earnings are significantly lower in 2002.  After 2003, purified negative 
special items decline significantly, until climbing back in 2008 to just below their 2002 peak 
during the financial crisis period.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
4.2. Validation of the Decomposition Approach and Prediction of Future Earnings 
Reported negative special items pool expenses resulting from one-time events, which are 
generally not frequently recurring and therefore less persistent, and expenses resulting from 
strategic reporting of negative core earnings as negative special items. In order to validate the 
identification of the two unobservable components of negative special items on the basis of our 
direct decomposition approach, we test their forecasting abilities for future profitability (future 
earrings) and future excess value (abnormal earnings).  Specifically, we estimate the following 
regressions:   
 1 0 1 0 3 4 1.t t t t t tE CE NSI OTE BV IY               (17) 
 1 0 1 1 2 3 4 1.t t t t t t tE CE SNCE PNSI OTE BV IY                 (18) 
1tE   is the dependent earnings variable measured as earnings (earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations ),  or abnormal earnings (earnings before extraordinary items 
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and discontinued operations minus the multiplication of cost of capital and beginning book    
value ) divided by sales
58
. 
tCE  is core earnings measured as operating income before 
depreciation divided by sales, tOTE  is earnings other than core earnings and negative special 
items measured as ( ) /t t t tE CE NSI SALE  , tBV  is ending book value divided by sales, and 
IY  is a set of indicator variables that represent the industry membership and the year.  
We predict different forecasting properties for the two negative special items components. If 
tSNCE  extracts shifted negative core earnings from negative special items leaving out tPNSI  as 
a measure of purified negative special items, we expect 1 1   and 1 2  .  We estimate the 
regressions using OLS and report the results in Table 3. Panel A reports the regressions results 
for forecasting earnings and Panel B reports the regression results for forecasting abnormal 
earnings. In each regression, we first regress the earnings variable on core earnings and negative 
special items (or their components), and then estimate the regression using the full specification 
as in equation (5) and equation (6). Since both results are consistent, we discuss only the full 
specification results and the variables of interest.  
Table 3 Panel A reveals that the mean of special items is negative, consistent with the 
literature. Purified negative special items are larger in magnitude than shifted negative core 
earnings. Earnings other than core earnings and negative special items, tOTE , are negative on 
average. Table 3 Panel B results show that the coefficient on core earnings is 0.839 and highly 
significant  65.35t   and the coefficient on negative special items is 0.282 and highly 
significant  7.97t  . The value of the negative special items coefficient is approximately one 
third of the value of the core earnings coefficient. The difference between both coefficients is 
statistically different from zero (F−value =188.64, P−value = 0.00). In contrast, the results show 
that when negative special items are decomposed, tSNCE  has a pronounced relation with future 
earnings, which is statistically indifferent from that of reported core earnings (F−value =0.40, 
P−value = 0.529). On the other hand, the coefficient on tPNSI  is clearly lower than that on core 
earnings and the difference is statistically significant (F−value =152.38, P−value = 0.00).   
                                                 
58
 We assume a fixed 12% cost of capital consistent with Barth et al (1999) 
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Table 3 Panel C results for the abnormal earnings regression are consistent with the results in 
Table 3 Panel A. Before decomposition of negative special items,   the results show that negative 
special items forecast future abnormal earnings, but their forecasting coefficient is significantly 
lower than the coefficient on core earnings. When negative special items are decomposed, the 
coefficient on the shifted negative core earnings composition is nearly twice that on the purified 
negative special items composition  1 20.686, 2.82 and 0.232, 6.06t t     . Moreover, the 
coefficients on core earnings and the shifted negative core earnings (purified negative special 
items) composition of negative special items are statistically indifferent (different).  
In summary, negative special items have a forecasting value with regard to future (abnormal) 
earnings that is statistically less than that of core earnings. When negative special items are 
decomposed into a shifted negative core earnings component and a purified negative special 
items component using our direct decomposition approach, the forecasting coefficient on the 
former component is almost as large as the coefficient on core earnings. In contrast, the 
forecasting coefficient on purified negative special items is much lower in value and statistically 
less than core earnings, consistent with less persistent implications for future earnings. This 
implies that tSNCE  captures the permanence of negative special items that is due to strategic 
reporting of special items and tPNSI  reflects the transience of negative special items that is 
consistent with their presumed nature.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.3. Validation of the Decomposition Approach and Asymmetric Timelines of Negative 
Special Items compositions 
Under (conditional) conservative accounting, bad news accrues in earnings in a timelier 
fashion relative to good news (Basu 1997). This asymmetrically timely loss recognition is 
generally facilitated via the recognition of negative special items (Frankel and Roychowdhury 
2008 and Callen et al. 2010) and increases the transience of special items (Heflin et al. 2014). 
For example, the timely recognition of write-offs and restructuring charges in response to 
anticipation of a negative shock to the firm‟s future cash flows is generally reported as negative 
special items in the income statement. Consistent with this notion, Riedl and Srinivasan (2010) 
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find that reporting negative special items is more preponderant than positive special items, and 
Callen et al. (2010) provide evidence of asymmetric timeliness of special items and that negative 
special items act as a proxy for negative news regarding the firm‟s future cash flow.  
Together with the evidence of negative core earnings shifting to negative special items in 
McVay (2006) and our decomposition approach, we expect that timely loss recognition is more 
pronounced in the component of negative special items that represents purified negative special 
items, tPNSI , than the component of negative special items that is made up by shifting, tSNCE . 
In order to run this validation test, we use an adaptation of the Basu (1997) regression of 
earnings on abnormal returns (news proxy) as a measure of timely loss recognition, but we 
replace earnings with special items or different components of special items as following: 
 0 1 2 3 *t t t t t tSPECIAL D AR AR D          (19) 
tSPECIAL  is the special items component through which accounting conservatism is 
manifested. We estimate a set of regressions using total special items, tTSI , positive special 
items, tPSI ,  negative special items, tNSI ,  and our main interest variables: tPNSI  and tSNCE . 
tAR  is abnormal returns measured as the difference between buy-hold returns minus the buy-
hold returns on the CRSP equally weighted market index. The measurement of returns begins the 
fourth month of the fiscal year and ends three months after the end of the fiscal year. We use 
delisting returns when available and substitute zeros for missing monthly returns (Campbell et al. 
2010).
59
 D  is an indicator variable that is equal to one when 0tAR   and zero otherwise. 2  
captures the timeliness of tSPECIAL  with respect to good news, and 3  captures the 
asymmetric timeliness of tSPECIAL  with respect to bad news. We use OLS regressions and 
report the estimated coefficients in Table 4. We also estimate censored regressions (TOBIT) for 
positive and negative special items dependent variables that are censored at zero, and find that all 
results are consistent with the OLS results; therefore we choose to report only the OLS results for 
sake of brevity.  
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 Results are not sensitive to excluding missing returns. 
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Table 4 Panel A results show that the good news coefficient 
2
  is very small in all 
regressions. The asymmetric timeliness coefficient 3  is positive and significant when we use 
total special items (gains and losses) or only negative special items as the earnings dependent 
variable 3( 0.120, 27.59t    in the total special items regression, and 3 0.122, 28.68t    in 
the negative special items regression). The similar coefficients magnitude is not surprising, given 
that approximately 76% of the total special items are negative special items. The intercept 0  is 
negative and significant meaning that some prior years‟ bad news is incorporated in the current 
year total or negative special items. When only positive special items are used as the dependent 
earnings variable, 3  becomes negative and insignificant 3( 0.001, 1.63t     ). The intercept 
also becomes positive and significant with a lower value, which indicates that less good news 
from prior years are incorporated in positive special items. These results are consistent with our 
discussion that negative special items are an important means of conditional conservatism.  
Table 4 Panel B show more interesting results that support our decomposition of negative 
special items. Using the purified negative special items component, tPNSI ,  as the dependent 
earnings variable, the results show an asymmetric timeliness coefficient 3 0.127  and an 
intercept 0 0.042   . When we use the shifted negative core earnings component of the 
negative special items, tSNCE , the coefficient 3  decreases to a very small value of only 0.009 
in the same sample. That is, the asymmetric timelines coefficient is approximately 14 times 
lower in the case of tSNCE .  Also, the intercept decreases to only 0.005 . The adjusted 
2R
sharply declines from 5.7% in the PNSI  regression to only 1.7% in the SNCE  regression.  
These results provide further validation of our identification of the negative special items 
compositions by showing that tPNSI  is the underlying negative special items composition that 
represents the downward revision in anticipated future cash flows and induces an asymmetrical 
timeliness property, but tSNCE  has very small asymmetric timelines.   
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
189 
 
5. Analysts’ Treatment of Negative Special Items Compositions in Street Earnings 
5.1 Extended Decomposition of Negative Special Items between Street Earnings Inclusions 
and Exclusions 
The analysts‟ differential treatment of special items provides an interesting setting to test the 
properties of the negative special items that are included in and excluded from street earnings. 
Given our firm-level decomposition of negative special items, a firm‟s negative special items 
included in (excluded from) street earnings can have a shifted component and a purified 
component. While the motivation of analysts is to include (exclude) negative special items that 
are more persistent (less persistent), it is interesting to investigate whether the differential 
treatment of negative special items is attributed to the differential properties of the negative 
special items compositions. In other words, we test whether the extant empirical evidence that 
analysts having expertise in identifying more persistent negative special items is justified by the 
fundamental composition of negative special items. Towards this goal, we first identify two 
groups of negative special items on the basis of street earnings adjustment such that: 
 t t tNSI INCNSI EXCNSI   (20) 
tINCNSI  is negative special items included in street earnings and measured as negative special 
items if street earnings is equal to GAAP earnings, and zero otherwise. tEXCNSI  is negative 
special items excluded from street earnings and measured as negative special items if street 
earnings > GAAP earnings, and zero otherwise. This level of decomposition is meant to attach a 
label to the negative special items as per the analysts‟ treatment. We call this decomposition 
ANALYSTS DECOMPOSITION (ANDE hereafter). 
Given that an inclusion/exclusion decision is not expected to apply on the entire amount of 
negative special items of an individual firm, such that analysts decide to include either all 
negative special items of the firm or exclude them, but rather applies their decision on specific 
components within the total negative special items, we allow for an extended decomposition of 
negative special items that combines both CLDE and ANDE as following: 
 t t t t tNSI INCSNCE INCPNSI EXCSNCE EXCPNSI     (21) 
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tINCSNCE  ( tEXCSNCE ) is shifted negative core earnings included in (excluded from) street 
earnings and measured as shifted negative core earnings, tSNCE , if negative special items are 
included in (excluded from) street earnings, and zero otherwise. tINCPNSI  ( tEXCPNSI ) is 
purified negative special items included in (excluded from) street earnings and measured as 
purified negative special items, tPNSI , if negative special items are included in (excluded from) 
street earnings, and zero otherwise. This extended level of decomposition further tags the shifted 
and purified compositions within included and excluded negative special items. We call this 
ANALYSTS−CLASSIFICATION DECOMPOSITION (ANCLDE hereafter). 
An alternative approach to present the ANCLDE level is to sort negative special items 
between tINCNSI  and tEXCNSI  on the basis of whether negative special items are contaminated 
by shifted negative core earnings tSNCE  such that: 
 t t t t tNSI ICONTAM ICLEAN ECONTAM ECLEAN     (22) 
where tICONTAM  ( tECONTAM ) is negative special items included in (excluded from) street 
earnings and contaminated by shifted negative core earnings. We measure tICONTAM                    
( tECONTAM ) as tNSI  if tNSI  are included in (excluded from) street earnings and 0tSNCE  , 
and zero otherwise. tICLEAN ( tECLEAN ) is negative special items included in (excluded from) 
street earnings and are entirely free of any shifted negative core earnings
60
. We measure 
tICLEAN  ( tECLEAN ) as tNSI  if tNSI  are included in (excluded from) street earnings and 
0tSNCE  , and zero otherwise. We call this sorting, ANALYSTS−CLASSIFICATION 
SORTING (ANCLSO hereafter). Although we expect consistent results using both ANCLDE 
and ANCLSO, we expect results using ANCLDE to be more pronounced. This is because 
ANCLDE is more directed to the compositions of negative special items, and as mentioned 
earlier, analysts‟ decision of inclusions and exclusions applies on specific items within special 
                                                 
60
 Recall that the CLDE level defines negative special items as being entirely purified and has no shifted negative 
core earnings when the negative special items have a positive coefficient in the decomposition regression. In this 
case, negative special items are reported by the firm as a result of poor performance rather than shifting. 
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items rather than being an “all-or-none” decision. In Figure 2 we present the different earnings 
components used in the analysis as per the level of negative special items decomposition. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
5.2 Future Cash Implications of Negative Special Items Extended Compositions 
Doyle et al. (2003) argue that future cash flows are a desirable metric to test potentially 
“mislabeled nonrecurring expenses”, because cash flows are less vulnerable to traditional 
earnings management. Therefore, the association of a negative special items component with 
future cash flow determines the degree of permanence of the component as it recurs in the future 
and consumes cash flows. Our first set of tests of the analysts‟ treatment of negative special 
items examines the relation between future cash flows and different decomposition levels of 
negative special items identified in the text. We use a regression of the following form: 
 1 0 1 1t t t tOCF EBSI SPECIAL         (23) 
1tOCF   is one year-ahead operating cash flow and measured as operating cash flow divided by 
total assets. tEBSI  is earnings before special items and measured as operating earnings per share 
divided by assets per share, and tSPECIAL  is the special items components as per each 
decomposition level.  
We estimate the future cash flows regressions using OLS and show the results in Table 5. 
Each Panel in Table 5 corresponds to a decomposition (or sorting) level. We run the regressions 
for a sample of all special items firms and a restricted sample of only negative special items 
firms. Though CLDE is not an analysts‟ decomposition level, we show the results of this 
decomposition for two reasons. First, all regressions here (and in next sections) are based on 
reduced samples after merging with IBES data, so it is important to show that the properties of 
shifted negative core earnings and purified negative special items, as per our decomposition 
measurement approach applied on the initial sample, hold in these samples. Second, the results 




Table 5 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the main variables. It shows that the 
magnitude of negative special items excluded from street earnings is higher than the magnitude 
of those included in street earnings, consistent with the literature. Table 5 Panel B shows results 
of the CLDE level. In the special items firms sample (A), results indicate that a dollar of earnings 
before special items predicts 0.538 dollars of future operating cash flow. With regard to special 
items, shifted negative core earnings predict lower future operating cash flows and have a 
significant coefficient of 0.151, purified negative special items have a small and insignificant 
coefficient of 0.017, and positive special items have a negative and significant coefficient of 
−0.256. When the sample is restricted to only negative special items, results remain consistent 
except that purified negative special items become marginally significant at the 10% level with a 
coefficient of 0.023. These results further validates the original CLDE level by showing that the 
predictive ability of shifted negative core earnings is not limited to the forecast of earnings, and 
if operating cash flows are the only metric for evaluating the predictive ability of misclassified 
expenses as argued by Doyle et al. (2003), our CLDE results of the differential predictive 
properties of decomposed negative special items hold in this setting.  
We now move to the analysts‟ adjustment of street earnings in order to see if there are any 
differences between the negative special items that analysts choose to include in street earnings, 
and those items excluded from street earnings
61
. Table 5 Panel C shows interesting results with 
regard to the analysts‟ inclusion/exclusion choice. When negative special items are decomposed 
into included and excluded negative special items, it appears that only included negative special 
items predict future operating cash flows. The included negative special items have a highly 
significant coefficient of 0.132 (0.138) in the special items sample (negative special items 
sample).  Excluded negative special items have a small and insignificant coefficient of 0.011 
(0.016) in the special items sample (negative special items sample). The similarity between the 
coefficient of included (excluded) negative special items in Panel C and shifted negative core 
earnings (purified negative special items) in Panel B is “eye catching”. While this is appealing by 
itself, it does not provide evidence of an analysts‟ inclusion/exclusion choice being taken on the 
                                                 
61
 Earnings before special items coefficient and positive special items coefficient are relatively consistent across all 
levels of decomposition in Table 5. To be more focused on our main interest variables, which are the negative 
special items components, we discuss in text the coefficients on the different negative special items components in 
subsequent panels of Table 5. 
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basis of the underlying core and transitory compositions of negative special items. We provide 
this latter evidence in Panel D and Panel E among other results in the next sections. 
We now report results from the ANCLDE level, which is an intersecting decomposition level 
of the CLDE and ANDE levels. Table 5 Panel D shows a very interesting pattern on the 
coefficients of negative special items components. Both included shifted negative core earnings 
and included purified negative special items have significant coefficients and their excluded 
counterparts have insignificant coefficients. The coefficient on included shifted negative core 
earnings is 0.630 (0.637), and insignificantly different from the coefficient on earnings before 
special items, which is equal to 0.539 (0.526) in the special items firms sample (negative special 
items sample)
62
. Included purified negative special items have a significant coefficient of 0.094 
(0.10) in the special items sample (the negative special items sample) which is much lower than 
the included shifted negative core earnings coefficient. We interpret this such as the included 
shifted negative core earnings component being a manager‟s misclassified core earnings 
component that originally belongs to earnings before special items rather than special items. 
Therefore, the included shifted negative core earnings are an analysts‟ adjustment of the 
managers‟ misclassification. On the other hand, included purified negative special items are an 
analysts‟ selection of real special items that are higher in their predictive ability of next period 
cash flows than other real special items, which are excluded. For example, a write-off or 
restructuring charge, that arises due to changes in economic conditions might be associated with 
lower cash flows in the next year, and hence included by analysts for reasons other than shifting. 
Another intuitive example is that a write down of inventory in the current year is expected to be 
related to subsequent cost of goods sold because the written-down ending inventory is carried 
forward to the next period and becomes a part of subsequent cost of goods sold
63
.  In contrast, 
One-time losses from sale of assets or merger and acquisition losses might not have significant 
implications for future cash flows, therefore excluded by analysts. This is consistent with the 
evidence of differential predictive abilities of categories of special items documented in Riedl 
and Srinivasan (2010). 
                                                 
62
 Untabulated Wald tests report F- value=0.10, and P-value 0.7491 in the special items sample, and F value=0.15, 
and P-value= 0.6972 in the negative special items sample. 
63
 Ohlson (2006) argues that this property is one of the drawbacks that stems from the GAAP reliance on a balance 
sheet approach rather than an income statement approach, and will induce permanence in some items of special 
items, apparently without any management intention to use them as device for shifting core expenses.  
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Though excluded negative special items corresponding to shifted negative core earnings and 
purified negative special items have insignificant coefficients, the coefficient on excluded shifted 
negative core earnings is still higher than that on excluded purified negative special items. The 
exclusion choice of shifted negative core earnings might be due to analysts‟ belief that although 
this batch of shifted losses is recurring, the likelihood of its recurrence is not high enough to 
warrant its inclusion in street earnings. On the other side, excluded purified negative special 
items are more consistent with transitory losses that are real special items. In any event, the 
analysts‟ inclusion and exclusion choices appear to be successful in picking up the more 
persistent batches of losses that are shifted core losses or special items associated with future 
performance. 
Table 5 Panel E show results of the ANCLSO level. Though the negative special items 
coefficients exhibit a decreasing pattern as in Panel C, some interesting results emerge. The only 
significant coefficient on negative special items components is the coefficient on included 
contaminated negative special items, which are basically negative special items that 
accommodate shifted negative core earnings. Excluded contaminated negative special items 
become marginally significant at the 10% level only when the sample is restricted to negative 
special items firms. Together with results from Panel D, the analysts‟ inclusion decision of 
purified negative special items might be also due to a less ability to isolate purified negative 
special items from shifted negative core earnings when negative special items are contaminated 
with shifting, or as in Panel D, because some of the purified items are more persistent by 
themselves. Another interesting result is the significant drop in the coefficient attached to 
included contaminated negative special items in Panel E in comparison to the included shifted 
negative core earnings coefficient in Panel D, which indicates how the aggregation of the core 
(shifted) and transitory (purified) components of negative special items affects the persistence of 
the negative special items measure.   
Taken as a whole, the future cash flow regressions results indicate analysts‟ ability to process 
negative special items information and include in street earnings the more dominant shifted and 
purified components of special items. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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5.3 Determinants of Inclusions and Exclusions of Negative Special Items Compositions 
So far, our results reveal that analysts include in (exclude from) street earnings selective 
shifted and purified components of negative special items, and that each included component 
appears to have higher association with future cash flows than its excluded counterpart. Next, we 
more explicitly investigate the relation between the analysts‟ inclusion/exclusion decision and 
the compositions of negative special items after controlling for other factors that are likely to be 
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tINCLUSION  is an indicator variable coded as one if negative special items are included in 
street earnings, and zero if negative special items are excluded from street earnings. tSHIFTED  
is an indicator variable equal to one if shifted negative core earnings have a non-zero value, and 
zero otherwise. tPURIFIED  is an indicator variable equal to one if purified negative special 
items have a non-zero value, and zero otherwise. On average, a successful analysts‟ decision will 
have the tendency to include shifted negative core earnings in street earnings and exclude 
purified negative special items from street earnings. In this case, we expect 1  to be positive and 
2  to be negative.  We include other determinants and factors that might be associated with the 
analysts‟ decision. We include a variable, tSMOOTH , that controls for accounting discretion and 
use of accruals to smooth earnings (Bowen et al. 2008,  Leuz et al. 2003). tSMOOTH  is 
measured as the ratio of volatility of operating cash flow to volatility of earnings (after special 
items and before extraordinary items), where volatility of operating cash flow or earnings is 
measured as the standard deviation of the firm‟s rolling five-year window (minimum of three 
non-missing observations). Ratios higher than one indicate higher volatility of operating cash 
flows relative to earnings, which is consistent with the use of accruals to smooth earnings. Since 
most special items are accruals (Dechow and Ge 2006), we expect the analysts‟ propensity to 
include negative special items in street earnings to be increasing with tSMOOTH . We include an 
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analysts coverage variable, tCOV , measured as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts 
following the firm. We expect the coefficient on tCOV  to be negative if the analysts believe that 
higher analysts coverage serves a monitoring role in mitigating the managers‟ misuse of negative 
special items to bury core losses. We include two variables that control for the firm‟s repeated 
negative special items reporting over the past two years, tFRE , and the analysts history of 
treating the firm‟s negative special items when arriving at street earnings over the same time 
period, tHIS . We measure tFRE  as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported 
negative special items in years 1t   and 2t  , and zero otherwise. We measure tHIS  as an 
indicator variable equal to one if the analysts chose to include the firm‟s negative special items in 
years 1t   and 2t  , and zero otherwise. We do not have a priori expectation on the coefficient 
of these variables. 
We add other variables that capture the reporting of negative special items by firms due to 
unusual events, which are expected to increase the transience of negative special items.  We add 
the book to market ratio at the beginning of the year, 1tBTM  , because higher book to market 
ratios are positively associated with significant impairment losses, consistent with assets being 
written-off when their book values are higher than their market values (Francis et al. 1996). We 
add tMER  to control for significant mergers and acquisitions-related costs, which are more 
likely reported as negative special items. We measure tMER  as an indicator variable equal to 
one if annual acquisitions are higher than 20 percent of the firm‟s beginning of the year total 
assets, and zero otherwise (Baber et al. 2011). We also add the return on asset ratio at the 
beginning of the year, 1tROA , because poor past performance is associated with larger 
impairment losses (Francis et al. 1996). We expect to observe negative coefficients on 1tBTM  , 
tMER , and 1tROA  if analysts understand the transitory nature of negative special items 
associated with these variables. We add a variable, tMAG , that controls for the magnitude of 
negative special items. Large negative special items often include large restructuring charges, 
impairment losses and write-offs associated with higher conditional conservatism and lower 
negative special items persistence. However, significant large negative special items can be also 




tMAG  as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported negative special items 
higher than the annual cross section mean of negative special items firms, and zero otherwise, 
but because of the competing effects, we do not have a priori expectation on the coefficient of 
the variable. 
 Since the analysts‟ decision model is a dichotomous outcome model, estimating the model 
using ordinary least square linear probability (OLS-LPM) results in unbiased coefficients that are 
directly interpreted as probabilities, but the standard errors from the model are heteroscedastic 
(Stone and Rasp 1991).Therefore, in order to mitigate heteroscedasticity, we estimate the model 
using a logistic regression (LOGIT). Nevertheless, we also report the OLS-LPM results to see if 
they differ from the LOGIT results. We report the LOGIT coefficient estimates and their 
marginal significance and the OLS-LPM coefficients in Table 6. 
Table 6 Panel A reports descriptive statistics. Table 6 Panel B results show that all estimated 
coefficients have the expected sign and are significant at conventional levels with the exception 
of the coefficient on tPURIFIED , which has the predicted sign but is insignificant. The intercept 
is negative, consistent with an average trend to exclude negative special items from street 
earnings. It appears that analysts are more likely to include shifted negative core earnings hidden 
in negative special items to correct for the expense misclassification, and also negative special 
items that are used to smooth earnings. The negative coefficient on purified negative special 
items suggests some tendency to exclude them from street earnings, but the coefficient is 
insignificant. Nevertheless, this insignificance can be justified on the basis that although purified 
negative special items are on average less persistent, our results in Table 5 reveal that they have 
an included persistent component. This might have affected the significance of the negative 
relation between the inclusion decision and purified negative special items in the logistic 
regression.  
We find that analysts perceive analysts coverage as a monitoring device for the manager‟s 
misuse of negative special items and tend to exclude negative special items for firms with higher 
analysts coverage. Additionally, analysts are less likely to include negative special items when 
the firm repeatedly reports negative special items over the last two years, but are more likely to 
include them if they have been included by analysts over the same period. Consistent with our 
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expectations, we find that the variables associated with more transitory negative special items are 
negatively associated with the inclusion decision. The OLS-LPM estimation shows consistent 
results to the LOGIT model.  
Overall, the results of analysts‟ decision model indicate that the analysts‟ treatment of 
negative special items in arriving at street earnings is guided by their awareness of the 
motivations and circumstances associated with negative special items reporting. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
5.4 Does Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Fully Incorporate the Actual Persistence of Negative 
Special Items Compositions? 
5.4.1 Main results 
Our results suggest that negative special items components that analysts choose to include in 
street earnings dominate their excluded counterparts in forecasting future operating cash flows. 
In addition, the analysts‟ inclusion/exclusion decision of negative special items is responsive to 
the management incentives versus economic conditions leading up to negative special items 
reporting. In our next tests, we complement our analysis by examining whether the analysts 
implied expectations of persistence of negative special items compositions reflected in their 
earnings forecast just prior to earnings announcement are consistent with the actual persistence 
implied by the earnings process. It is reasonable to test this relation at the forecasting stage, 
because the existence of less recurring items such as special items is already known and reflected 
in analysts‟ earlier forecasts before actual earnings are reported. Hence, the actual amount of the 
less recurring items rather than their existence may come at a surprise when actual earnings are 
announced (Gu and Chen 2004). 
 We estimate the actual persistence of each negative special items composition as per its 
estimated coefficient in the following earning regression: 
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where 1tSTR   is one year ahead-street earnings (i.e. actual earnings) and measured as the IBES 
reported actual earnings per share divided by assets per share. All other variables were defined 
before.  
Next, we estimate the implied persistence weights that analysts attach to each negative 
special items composition as per its estimated coefficient in the following analysts forecast 
regression: 
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 (26) 
where 1tANF   is one year ahead-analyst consensus forecast (i.e. forecast earnings) and measured 
as the last median consensus forecast of actual earnings per share issued before the earnings 
announcement date.   
The relations between 
STR
n  and  
ANF
n  determine whether analysts are more or less optimistic 
in their inclusions and exclusions of negative special items and the weights they attach to each 
included/excluded negative special items composition. In order to test for analysts‟ efficiency, 
we subtract equation (14) from equation (13), and estimate the following forecast error 
regression: 
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where 1tFE   is one year ahead forecast error measured as 1 1 1t t tFE STR ANF    . Each variable 
coefficient in the forecast error regression is equal to its coefficient in the earnings regression 
minus its coefficient in the analysts forecast regression. For example; 1 1 1
FE STR ANF    , 
therefore a significant coefficient on  1
FE  implies that analysts attach a weight to shifted 
negative core earnings, which is significantly different from the actual persistence of shifted 
negative core earnings. The sign of 1
FE  in this case determines whether analysts 
underreact/overreact to information in negative special items. Given that shifted negative core 
earnings, and all negative special items compositions, are negative data values; a positive 
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(negative) coefficient in this case means that analysts underreact (overreact) in reflecting that 
firms with higher shifted negative core earnings in the current period have less favorable future 
earnings outcomes, then forecast errors will be more negative (positive) for these firms, resulting 
in a positive (negative)  association between shifted negative core earnings and forecast errors.  
However, if analysts‟ forecast is efficient, we expect to find insignificant coefficients on all 
included and excluded compositions of negative special items. We estimate the regressions using 
OLS and report the results in Table 7. The regressions are estimated for negative special items 
firms. When we run the regressions for all special items firms and include also positive special 
items as an additional explanatory variable, our results on the negative special items 
compositions do not change. For sake of brevity, we report the results for regressions estimated 
for only negative special items firms in Table 7.  
Table 7 Panel A reports descriptive statistics. It shows that analysts forecast errors are 
negative, consistent with the overall optimism bias documented in prior studies (Bradshaw et al. 
2001, Chen 2010). Table 7 Panel B presents results of the actual earnings and analysts forecast 
earnings regressions in column (I) and column (ii), respectively. The actual persistence of 
earnings before special items is 0.677 in column (I) in comparison to the analysts‟ implied 
estimate of persistence of 0.595 in column (ii). With regard to negative special items, only 
included components are significant in columns (I) and (ii).The actual (analysts‟ implied) 
persistence of included negative core earnings is 0.829 (0.698). The difference between the 
actual or analysts‟ implied persistence of included shifted negative core earnings and the 
persistence of earnings before special items in its respective regression is statistically 
insignificant (untabulated result of 0.19 F-value , 0.661 P-value in the actual earnings regression; 
and 0.13 F-value, 0.716 P-value in the analyst forecast regression). Included purified negative 
special items have an actual persistence of 0.114 and an analysts‟ implied persistence of 0.097 in 
columns (I) and (ii), respectively. Excluded components of negative special items are statistically 
insignificant. The coefficient on excluded shifted negative core earnings is positive and 
insignificant (0.043,  t-statistic = 0.47) in column (I) and turns out to be negative but also 
insignificant ( −0.007, t-statistic = −0.08) in column (ii). Excluded purified negative special 
items have insignificant and negative coefficients in columns (I) and (ii).  
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Table 7 Panel C presents results of the analysts forecast error regression. Results reveal that 
the analysts‟ under-reaction to information in earnings before special items is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, leading to systematic forecast errors. This result is consistent with 
prior research (Ahmed et al. 2005). Interestingly, all coefficients on negative special items 
compositions are unrelated to forecast errors. The only exception is the marginal significance at 
the 10% level of the coefficient on excluded purified negative special items
64
.  Overall, the 
results demonstrate that analysts fully incorporate information in negative special items 
consistent with each negative special items differential implication on future earnings. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
5.4.2 Additional Tests  
For robustness check, we replicate the forecast error regression using different specifications 
to investigate if our results hold under differing disclosure environments, information 
environments, and after controlling for firm characteristics that might be related to analysts‟ 
ability to assess the persistence of earnings components. With regard to change in disclosure 
requirements, Chen (2010) find a change in analysts‟ ability to understand the persistence of 
some earnings exclusions after the introduction of Regulation G by the SEC, which came into 
effect on March 2003. This regulation requires managers disclosing non-GAAP earnings to also 
present GAAP earnings, which might affect the practice of expense misclassification by 
management and/or the analysts‟ understanding of persistence of earnings components. In order 
to test if our results are different pre and post the SEC intervention, we partition our negative 
special items sample into two subsamples; Pre-Regulation G (from 1991-2002) and Post-
regulation G (2003-2012), and run the forecast error regression for each period subsample.  
Previous research finds evidence of analysts differing understanding of persistence of 
earnings, which is relative to the flow of information surrounding the firm (See Weber 2009, Lev 
and Nissim 2004, Ahmed et al. 2005 among others). Following Weber (2009), we use analysts 
                                                 
64
 Note that purified negative special items (that are negative data values) have an insignificant negative coefficient 
in the actual earnings regression that is slightly larger in absolute value to the insignificant and negative coefficient 
in the earnings forecast regression, and that this difference is only statistically significant at the 10% level in the 
forecast error regression, which clearly shows a very minor under-reaction. This significance vanishes after adding 
controls in the next table, Table 8. 
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following as a proxy for information environment, and partition the negative special items 
sample into two subsamples of firms on the basis of the number of analysts following the firm 
relative to the annual cross section median of all firms with non-zero analysts‟ followings.  
As a last check, we also add four additional controls to the negative special items sample. We 
add accruals, tACC , because negative special items comprise large accruals. We control for 
growth using market to book ratio, tMTB , because firms with higher growth opportunities 
relative to assets in place may be more difficult to assess (Ahmed et al. 2005). We also add the 
natural logarithm of analysts following, tCOV , and change in sales, tSALE . We report the 
results of all additional tests in Table 8. 
Table 8 results reveal that the partition of sample does not affect the inferences from the 
forecast error regression with regard to negative special items compositions and only show 
differences in analysts‟ ability to assess earnings before special items. For example, the Post 
Regulation G subsample shows a significant coefficient of 0.055 on earnings before special items 
in comparison to a significant coefficient of 0.080 in the Pre Regulation G subsample. Also, the 
association of earnings before special items and forecast errors is much attenuated for firms with 
enhanced information environment, that is 1
FE  is equal to 0.079 with t-statistic of 9.01 in the 
Low Following subsample and decreases to 0.014 with a t-statistic of 2.26 in the High Following 
subsample. All negative special items have insignificant coefficients across different subsamples 
consistent with analysts‟ ability to track down the compositions of negative special items. 
We obtain similar inferences with the addition of control variables to the negative special 
items sample in the last column of Table 8. The coefficient on earnings before special items is 
still significant and does not appear to be highly affected. The control variables results are 
qualitatively consistent with prior research (Ahmed et al. 2005 and Chen 2010). Again, all 
coefficients of negative special items are still insignificant. Also, the coefficient on excluded 
purified negative special that is marginally significant in the full sample becomes insignificant in 
the subsamples regressions and the regression with additional controls.  
In sum, these results demonstrate analysts forecast efficiency with respect to negative special 
items components but not earnings before special items. Any differences between the actual 
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persistence of negative special items components and the weights attached by analysts to these 
components appear to be insignificant and do not contribute to any related analysts forecast 
errors. However, another interpretation of this result does exist. If analysts always adjust actual 
street earnings to be the same basis as their forecast prior to earnings announcement by 
excluding the same special items, the actual-analysts‟ implied persistence results could be a 
manifestation of an arbitrary match of actual earnings adjustment and forecast basis. 
Nevertheless, the overall evidence in the paper is highly consistent with analysts‟ expertise in 
treating negative special items by including a negative special items construct that have more 
persistent implications on future earnings and operating cash flows; and taking an 
inclusion/exclusion decision that appears to be guided by their awareness of the underlying 
compositions of negative special items.   
[Insert Table 8 here] 
6. Conclusion 
Negative special items are conceptually associated with significant firm-specific conditions 
that have uncertain consequences. Additionally, there is evidence of strategic reporting of 
negative core earnings as negative special items. This poses an identification problem for 
analysts when adjusting street earnings in order to develop an earnings metric that reflects more 
persistent earnings components. Therefore, analysts‟ treatment of special items is idiosyncratic 
and deals with special items at the firm-level. Prior research documents that street earnings‟ 
inclusions are more persistent than their exclusions, but does not examine the rationale 
underlying the analysts‟ adjustment process of negative special items. In this study, we provide 
such evidence of the rationale of the inclusions/exclusions of negative special items in the light 
of the fundamental composition of negative special items. 
We first decompose negative special items into two fundamental components that reflect the 
recognition of unusual events (measure of purified negative special items) and the 
misclassification of earnings (measure of shifted negative core earnings). Our decomposition 
passes validation tests. We show that the purified measure is less persistent and has high 
asymmetric timeliness, but the shifted measure is more persistent and less asymmetrically 
timelier. This is consistent with the purified measure capturing transience caused by conditional 
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conservatism, and that the shifted measure is a misclassified item that is conceptually unrelated 
to negative special items. These components represent the fundamental structure of negative 
special items.  
We then investigate the properties of negative special items that analysts include in and 
exclude from street earnings. We apply extended decompositions on negative special items that 
ultimately yield four components: included shifted, included purified, excluded shifted and 
excluded purified. We find that analysts process information in negative special items and adjust 
street earnings to reflect only the more dominant components of negative special items that have 
higher persistence, which is in line with the fundamental composition of negative special items. 
In addition, logistics regression results show that analysts are more likely to include the shifted 
negative core earnings component of special items, and are aware of the motivations and 
conditions associated with the firm‟s negative special items recognition. We also provide 
evidence that the analysts‟ implied persistence for the four components is consistent with their 
actual persistence, such that future analysts forecast errors are not predictable by these 
components. This later result is robust to different disclosure environments and information 
environments, and also holds after controlling for factors associated with lower analysts‟ ability 
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Variable Description Measurement 
t
NSI  Negative core earnings (level)  = [ cost of goods sold (#41) + selling, general and administrative expenses (#189) ] / sale (#12). If 
the values are missing, negative core earnings are calculated as the difference between sale (#12) 
and operating income before depreciation (#13), and divided by sale (#13). 
 
t








ATO  Assets turnover ratio = [ sale (#12) / average net operating assets]. Net operating assets = operating assets − operating 
liabilities = [ total assets (#6) − cash (#1) and short term investments (#32)] − [ total assets (#6) − 
total debt (#9 + #34) − book value of common (#60) and preferred equity (#130) − Minority 
Interest (# 38) ]. Average NOA is required to be positive. 
 
t








ACC  Operating accruals = [ earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#123) − cash from operations 
(#308− #124)] / sale (#12) 
 
t
SALE  Percentage change in sales 
 
= [ sale at year (t) – sale at year (t−1)] / sale at year (t) 
t




SALE  when 0
t
SALE  , and zero otherwise.  
t
BV  Ending book value = common equity (#60) / sale (#12). 
 
t
E  Earnings Measured as; earnings = earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#123) / 
sale (#12), or abnormal earnings = [earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations (#123) / sale (#12) ] – an implied cost of capital of 0.12 × book value at year (t−1).  
 
t
CE  Core earnings = operating income before depreciation (#13)= [ sales − cost of goods sold− selling, general and 
administrative expenses (#13) ] / sale (#12) 
 
t










OTE  Earnings other than core earnings 
and negative special items 
=  
t t t
E CE NSI  / sale (#12) 
 
t
SNCE  Shifted negative core earnings Measured using the classification decomposition approach described in text. 
 
t
PNSI  Purified negative special items = 
t t
NSI SNCE  
 
t
AR  Abnormal returns Measured as; size adjusted returns = The difference between the buy-hold returns and the buy-hold 
returns on the CRSP equally weighted market index over the same period. Returns measurement 
commences in April and ends in March next fiscal year. Delisting returns are used when available, 





Negative abnormal return indicator 
variable 
1D   when abnormal return is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
 
t




NSI  when street earnings = GAAP earnings, and zero otherwise. GAAP earnings are measured 
as the applicable basic or diluted earnings per share (#58 or #57), that is matched to IBES reported 
actual earnings per share. 
 
t




NSI  when street earnings > GAAP earnings, and zero otherwise. 
 
t
INCSNCE  Shifted negative core earnings 






INCNSI  , and zero otherwise 
t
INCPNSI  Purified negative special items 






INCNSI  , and zero otherwise 
t
EXCSNCE  Shifted negative core earnings 






EXCNSI  , and zero otherwise 
t
EXCPNSI  Purified negative special items 






EXCNSI  , and zero otherwise 
t
ICONTAM  Negative special items contaminated 
by shifted negative core earnings and 








INCNSI   and 0
t







ICLEAN  Negative special items that are free 








INCNSI   and 0
t
SNCI  , and zero otherwise 
t
ECONTAM  Negative special items contaminated 
by shifted negative core earnings and 






EXCNSI   and 0
t





Negative special items that are free 







EXCNSI   and 0
t












Negative special items inclusion 
indicator 
Coded as one when 0
t
INCNSI  , and zero when 0
t




Shifted negative core earnings 
indicator 
Coded as one when 0
t




Purified negative special items 
indicator 
Coded as one when 0
t




Smoothing measure Measured as volatility of operating cash flow (#308) divided by volatility of earnings after special 
items and before extraordinary items (#123). Volatility of operating cash flows and earnings are 
measured as the standard deviation over the same five rolling five-year time windows. We require 









Frequency of negative special items 
reporting  indicator 





History of negative special items 
treatment indicator 
Coded as one if the analysts included negative special items in street earnings over the past two 











Significant merger and acquisitions 
indicator 
 










Negative special items magnitude 
indicator 
Coded as one if negative special items are higher than the annual cross section mean of non-zero 
negative special items, and zero otherwise. 
t
STR  Street earnings Measured as IBES reported actual earnings per share from IBES unadjusted detail actual file, and 





Most recent forecast of earnings per 
share 
Measured as IBES median consensus forecast of earnings per share from the IBES unadjusted 
summary file, and divided by assets per share. 
t
FE  Forecast error  
t t















Negative Core Earnings Models Fit Statistics 
 
 
Panel A: Negative Core Earnings Level  
0 1 1 2 3 1 4 5 6t t t t t t t t
NCE NCE ATO ACC ACC SALE NEG SALE       
 
           




































































Panel B: Negative Core Earnings change  
0 1 1 2 1 3 4 1 5 6 7t t t t t t t t t
NCE NCE NCE ATO ACC ACC SALE NEG SALE        
  
               
































































 35% 31% 
The sample consists of 72,447 firm-year observations on the Compustat-CRSP intersection from 1989 to 2012. t-
statistics are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses.*,**,*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
t
NCE (Negative core earnings) is a 


















Regressions of Unexpected Negative Core Earnings on Negative Special Items 
 
 
Panel A: Regression of Current Unexpected Negative Core Earnings Levels on Negative Special Items 
0 1t t t
UNCE NSI      






The full sample Negative special Items subsample 










Adj.R   0.03% 0.08% 
Sample size  67,859 27,174 
 
Panel B: Regression of Next Year Unexpected Negative Core Earnings Changes on Negative Special Items 
1 0 1 1t t t
U NCE NSI  
 
     










Negative special Items 
subsample 
Imposing a non-zero restriction on 
next year negative special items  
















    −0.036** 
(−2.00) 
2
Adj.R   0.02% 0.06% 0.15% 
Sample size  56,328 21,514 22,765 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year.*,**,*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
t





Validation of the Decomposition Approach and Forecasting Future Earnings 
 
1 0 1 0 3 4 1
1 0 1 1 2 3 4 1
.
.
t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
E CE NSI OTE BV IY
E CE SNCE PNSI OTE BV IY
      
       
 
 
      
       
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Main Continuous Variables in the Full Compustat-CRSP Sample  
 Full Compustat-CRSP sample    Non-zero special items components 
  Percentile    Percentile 
Variables Mean SD (5) (95)  Mean SD (5) (95) 
t
TSI  −0.026 0.102 −0.158 0.014  −0.050 0.136 −0.312 0.041 
t
NSI  −0.030 0.099 −0.158 0  −0.075 0.145 −0.408 −0.001 
t
SNCE  −0.003 0.012 −0.016 0  −0.013 0.021 −0.077 −0.000 
t
PNSI  −0.027 0.093 −0.142 0  −0.070 0.138 −0.385 −0.001 
t
PSI  0.004 0.019 0 0.014  0.030 0.045 0.001 0.151 
t
CE  0.070 0.383 −0.419 0.468      
t
OTE  −0.107 0.143 −0.388 0.017      
t
BV  0.842 1.148 0.049 2.634      
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Dependent earnings variable =  



















































IY  No Yes No Yes 
Wald Test     
1 0







   








   





























Dependent earnings variable = 



















































IY  No Yes No Yes 
Wald Test     
1 0







   








   







Adj.R  46% 56% 46% 56% 
The table provides results of pooled OLS regressions of two measures of future earnings on negative special items 
compositions. The sample includes 56,328 observations in the Compustat-CRSP sample from 1989 to 2012. 
Standard errors are robust standard error.*,**,*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. IY is a set of dummy variables that represent the industry association, based on two digit SIC 
code, and the year. Negative special items and their components are negative data values. All variables are defined 




















Validation of the Decomposition Approach and Asymmetric Timeliness of Special Items 
 
0 1 2 3
*
t t t t t t
D AR AR DSPECIAL            






























































































    
2
Adj.R  
 5.7% 1.7% 
The table provides results of pooled OLS regressions of different components of special items on measures of 
abnormal returns that proxy for good and bad news. In Panel A: the sample includes 35,585 observations for non-
zero special items firms in the Compustat-CRSP sample. In Panel B: the sample includes 27,174 observations for 
non-zero negative special items firms in the Compustat-CRSP sample. Standard errors are robust standard 
error.*,**,*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All variables are 





Future Cash Implications of Extended Decompositions of Negative Special Items 
 
 
1 10 1t t t tOCF EBSI SPECIAL       
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Main Continuous Variables in the Compustat-CRSP-IBES Sample   
Compustat-CRSP-IBES sample for non-zero negative special items  Non-zero special items components 
  Percentile    Percentile 
Variables Mean SD (5) (95)  Mean SD (5) (95) 
t
INCNSI  −0.006 0.044 −0.014 0  −0.046 0.114 −0.233 −0.000 
t
EXCNSI  −0.060 0.133 −0.323 0  −0.081 0.149 −0.429 −0.001 
t
INCSNCE  −0.001 0.005 −0.001 0  −0.008 0.017 −0.046 −0.000 
t
INCPNSI  −0.005 0.041 −0.011 0  −0.043 0.109 −0.223 −0.000 
t
EXCSNCE  −0.007 0.015 −0.034 0  −0.013 0.021 −0.076 −0.000 
t
EXCPNSI  −0.054 0.126 −0.298 0  −0.075 0.143 −0.406 −0.001 
t
ICONTAM  −0.004 0.037 −0.005 0  −0.052 0.126 −0.270 −0.000 
t
ICLEAN  −0.002 0.024 −0.001 0  −0.037 0.096 −0.181 −0.000 
t
ECONTAM  −0.039 0.114 −0.219 0  −0.090 0.160 −0.524 −0.002 
t
ECLEAN  −0.021 0.079 −0.103 0  −0.068 0.132 −0.323 −0.001 
t
OCF  0.053 0.131 −0.192 0.218      
t
EBSI  −0.012 0.164 −0.344 0.143      




























































































































































































The table provides results of pooled OLS of future operating cash flows on different measures of earnings. Each panel provides results corresponding to different 
decompositions of negative special items. Decompositions levels are defined in text and in Figure 2.  Sample (A) includes 20,149 observations for non-zero 
special items firms in the Compustat-CRSP-IBES sample. Sample (B) includes 15,654 observations for non-zero negative special items firms in the Compustat-
CRSP-IBES sample. Standard errors are robust standard error.*,**,*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 






Analysts’ Negative Special Items Inclusion Decision  
 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 1 8 9 1 10
                            
t t t t t
t t t t t tt
SHIFTED PURIFIED SMOOTH COV
FRE HIS BTM MER ROA MAG
INCLUSION     
      
 
    
      
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Main Continuous Variables  
Compustat-CRSP-IBES sample for non-zero negative special items 
   Percentile 
Variables Mean SD (5) (95) 
t
SMOOTH  1.520 1.741 0.187 4.492 
t
COV  1.445 1.003 0 2.100 
t
BTM  0.643 0.596 0.053 1.767 
t




Panel B: Logistic Regression and Ordinary Least Square Coefficients Results for Dichotomous Analysts’ 



















































































      
2
Adj.R    4%  3% 
Sample size   11,964  11,964 
The table provides results of logistic and linear probability models of the determinants of the analysts‟ decision of 
negative special items inclusion. The sample is comprised of non-zero negative special items firms in the 
Compustat-CRSP-IBES sample MEM is the marginal effect at means. z-statistic and t-statistic are calculated using 
robust standard errors. All variables are defined in the appendix. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 







Actual Earnings Process, Analysts Expectation and Negative Special Items Compositions Predictability of Forecast Errors  
 
1 0 1 1 2 3 4 1
1 0 1 1 2 3 4 1
STR STR STR STR STR STR STR
t t t t t t t
ANF ANF ANF ANF ANF ANF ANF
t t t t t t t
STR EBSI INCSNCE INCPNSI EXCSNCE EXCPNSI
ANF EBSI INCSNCE INCPNSI EXCSNCE EXCPNSI
      
      
 
 
      
     
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Main Continuous Variables  
Compustat-CRSP-IBES sample for non-zero negative special items 
   Percentile 
Variables Mean SD (5) (95) 
t
STR  −0.004 0.156 −0.312 0.142 
t
ANF  0.009 0.134 −0.250 0.145 
t














Panel B: Actual Earnings and Analysts Forecast Earnings Regressions 
 
Var. 
Dependent earnings variable 
   Column (I) Column (ii) 
 
Coeff. 
Future actual earnings  
Coeff. 
Future analysts forecast earnings 
Intercept 
0
STR  0.036*** 
(3.90) 0





STR  0.677*** 
(43.80) 1





STR  0.829** 
(2.40) 1





STR  0.114** 
(2.34) 2





STR  0.043 
(0.47) 3





STR  −0.023 
(−1.32) 4
ANF  −0.010 
(−0.70) 
2
Adj.R   48%  50% 













Panel C: Forecast Error Regression 
1 0 1 1 2 3 4 1
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
t t t t t t t
FE EBSI INCSNCE INCPNSI EXCSNCE EXCPNSI      
 
        







































The table provides OLS results of regressing future actual earnings, future forecast earnings, and future forecast error on earnings components. The sample is 
comprised of non-zero negative special items firms in the Compustat-CRSP-IBES sample. We include industry and year fixed effects in all regressions. All 













Additional Tests on the Association of Negative Special Items Compositions with   





















































































































FE      0.005** 
(2.37) 
       
2
Adj.R   7% 6% 8% 3% 8% 
Sample size  6,767 8,660 7,121 8,306 15,396 
The table provides OLS results of regressing future forecast error on earnings components using reduced sub-
samples and additional controls. We use reduced samples of non-zero negative special items firms in the Compustat-
CRSP-IBES sample. We include industry and year fixed effects in all regressions. Pre Regulation G corresponds to 
sample firms between 1991-2002; and Post-Regulation G corresponds to sample firms between 2003-2012. Low 
Following (High Following) subsamples are based on the number of analysts following the firm in non-zero 
followings that is lower than (higher than) annual cross section median of analysts following. All variables are 








Negative Special Items Decomposition Using an Expense-Expense Approach 
 
 
The figure shows the means of non-zero values of components of negative special items over years. The decomposition of negative special items is based on 917 
industry-year regressions of unexpected negative core earnings on negative special items. Negative coefficients between zero and negative one, which are 
consistent with classification shifting, are multiplied by actual negative special items of firms in the industry-year group to measure shifted negative core 
earnings at the firm level. Purified negative special items are the difference between actual negative special items and shifted negative core earnings. Imposing a 





Earnings Components Used in the Analysis 
 
 
 EBEIDO  
EBSI  NSI  PSI  
CLDE EBSI  SNCE  PNSI  PSI  
ANDE EBSI  INCNSI  EXCNSI  PSI  
ANCLDE EBSI  INCSNCE  INCPNSI  EXCSNCE  EXCPNSI    PSI  
ANCLSO EBSI  ICONTAM  ICLEAN  ECONTAM   ECLEAN  PSI  
  
                                      Negative Special Items Firms only 
 
 
   
 
         All Special Items Firms 
 
This figure presents a description of the earnings components used in the analysis in relation to the level of 
decomposition of negative special items. All earnings components in any level sum to EBEIDO , which is earnings 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. EBEIDO  is divided into earnings before special items, 
EBSI , negative special items, NSI , and positive special items, PSI . Subsequent decomposition levels are 
decompositions of negative special items as explained in text. CLDE is the CLASSIFICATION DECOMPOSITION 
level of negative special items into shifted negative core earnings, SNCE , and purified negative special items, 
PNSI  components. ANDE is the ANALYSTS DECOMPOSITION of negative special items into negative special 
items included in street earnings, INCNSI , and negative special items excluded from street earnings, EXCNSI . 
ANCLDE is the ANALYSTS-CLASSIFICATION decomposition into shifted negative core earnings included in street 
earnings, INCSNCE , purified negative special items included in street earnings, INCPNSI , shifted negative core 
earnings excluded from street earnings, EXCSNCE  , purified negative special items excluded from street earnings,
EXCPNSI .ANCLSO is ANALYSTS-CLASSIFICATION SORTING that categorizes negative special items into 
negative special items contaminated by shifted negative core earnings and included in street earnings, ICONTAM , 
negative special items that are totally free of shifting and included in street earnings, ICLEAN , negative special 
items contaminated by shifted negative core earnings and excluded from street earnings, ECONTAM , and negative 
special items that are totally free of shifting and excluded from street earnings, ECLEAN .  Detailed definitions and 










































The inherent uncertainty associated with negative special items recognition and the suspects 
for strategic reporting make special items being viewed by investors and analysts as a “black 
box”. While negative special items conceptually represent unusual or infrequent items that are 
not persistent, misclassifying some core operating expenses as negative special items “injects” a 
core element in this theoretically transitory earnings component. Research documents                  
a substantial increase in the magnitude and frequency of negative special items that might make 
special items “no-special” anymore. This thesis extends this line of research, analytically and 
empirically, by showing different properties of special items that are based on the composition of 
special items and the motives and circumstances behind special items reporting.  
In Chapter three, we develop an analytical framework that links the evolution of a set of 
accounting variables, including shifted core earnings and purified transitory earnings, to their 
weights in equity valuation models. Using special items as an objective measure of a transitory 
line item contaminated with core earnings, we construct an innovative measure of shifted 
negative core earnings at the firm-year-level. Building on our framework, we find empirically 
that reported special items have limited forecasting ability with respect to one year ahead 
abnormal earnings, however shifted negative core earnings forecast one year ahead abnormal 
earnings as if they are reported core earnings and purified special items evolve as a transitory 
component. We model an expected bad news impact of shifted negative core earnings on future 
profitability beyond their accounting informational role. Empirical results show that the 
theoretical bad news signal manifests in abnormal earnings forecast, but rather has a modest 
effect on the forecasting coefficient of shifted negative core earnings. With respect to valuation, 
we find that stock prices do not fully reflect the heterogeneity between the core and transitory 
components of special items, but rather overstate the entire amount of reported special items 
when classification shifting is suspected.  
In Chapter four, we articulate a conceptual framework that associates negative special items 
reporting with the manager‟s motive to enhance reported earnings via earnings misclassification. 
This framework also links the market valuation of reported negative special items to the 
investors‟ perception of signals of misclassification. We then empirically investigate the 
manager‟s incentive, and whether the manager‟s preferred classifications represent GAAP-
violation or allowable-management discretion. In addition, we examine the stock price reaction 
232 
 
to negative special items conditional on an informative misclassification signal and a reporting 
misclassification signal. We find that, large reported negative special items are prevalent when 
current expected core earnings fall below last year reported core earnings, and that the higher 
magnitude of negative special items in this case is associated with GAAP-violation rather than 
within-GAAP discretion. The results reveal that the ability of negative special items to forecast 
lower future earnings is mainly attributable to negative core earnings misclassification, such that 
only the misclassified core component of negative special items rather than real negative special 
items forecast future earnings for a horizon up to three years similar to reported core earnings in 
the income statement. We believe that this finding is important because it reconciles the standard 
financial analysis textbooks suggestions of the exclusion of special items when forecasting 
earnings with the research results of negative special items persistence. We argue that this 
exclusion is “less harmful”, if it is only applied on adjusted (real) special items that represent 
unusual economic events. Quantifying the core composition of negative special items makes this 
adjustment plausible. We also find that the market values negative special items in 
correspondence with a reporting signal of misclassification that proves to be noisy, because the 
change in the predictive ability of negative special items is inconsistent with the signal. 
Moreover, an identified informative signal of misclassification that is consistent with the change 
in the predictive ability of negative special items does not lead to a corresponding stock price 
reaction to negative special items.  
In Chapter four, we examine the analysts‟ treatment of negative special items in arriving at 
street earrings, and whether this treatment reflects analysts‟ awareness of the circumstances and 
motivations associated with negative special items reporting by firms. We develop direct 
measures of the core and transitory components of negative special items, and validate the 
measures using a forecasting test and a conditional conservatism test. We apply extended 
decompositions on negative special items that reflect different components of negative special 
items included in and excluded from street earrings. We find that analysts have expertise in 
processing negative special items to determine their level of permanence and adjust street 
earnings accordingly. Analysts include in street earnings the components of negative special 
items that lead to predictably lower future operating cash flows. The results reveal that the 
analysts‟ inclusion decision reflects analysts‟ understanding of the conditions (e.g. repeated 
negative special items recognition, merger-related charges, and poor performance) and 
233 
 
motivations (e.g. misclassification of expenses and smoothing of income) associated with 
negative special items reporting by firms. We also find that the analysts‟ adjustment of negative 
special items fully incorporates the implications of different components of special items for 
future earnings and does not lead to predictable analysts‟ forecast errors. Partitioning the sample 
to reflect different disclosure and information environments or using an augmented model that 
incorporates controls associated with lower analysts‟ forecast efficiency, do not change 
inferences.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
